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This study provides a critical examination of the characterization "postliberal" as
used to describe the theological politics of Stanley Hauerwas. Of particular concern
is the overall consistency of Hauerwas' postliberal program from its genesis in his
writings in the early 1980's through the 21st century; where such consistency is
lacking this study attempts to provide both critical analysis and opportunities for
repair.
Through a critical evaluation of Hauerwas' primary sources this study addresses the
tension in Hauerwas' writings between sectarian postliberalism and radical
democracy. It then begins the work of offering a means of resolving this tension by
recovering an ecclesial ontology of gathering. Inconsistency in Hauerwas' work will
be identified as due in part to his inability to reconcile the distance between politics-
as-discipline and politics-as-love. This study ends by exploring gathering, not simply
as another concept, but as the name for the ecclesial paradox between the
dichotomies of theology and theurgy, reason and faith, inclusion and exclusion,
discipline and freedom, already and not-yet, all of which are analogous to the
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The writings of Stanley Hauerwas span a wide array of topics in ethics, philosophy,
and theology. Yet the mode of argumentation used to explore these topics is
paradoxical: his method is sometimes unsystematic and occasional, while at others it
is exhaustively detailed; it is aggressive in places and tentative in others; it is
contextually American yet critical of its location; it is Roman Catholic and
Anabaptist, Methodist and Anglican. While many readers of Hauerwas have tried to
make sense out of this milieu, one of the original contributions of this thesis is to
argue that there is a style and telos to Hauerwas' method: love.
To say that Hauerwas' method is love is not simply a rhetorical affectation, rather it
places him within a broad tradition of early Neoplatonic, medieval, and eastern
theologians whose method has been a (sometimes systematic and other times mystic)
disclosure of exitus-reditus - a commitment to the notion that all things emerge from
and return to God. Love, for Hauerwas, is the gift of oneself in response to the gift
that God gives to humanity - Himself. It is about the erotic desire for the material -
for friends, enemies, and strangers - that is prefaced, designed, and made possible by
God's desire for Godself and for His creation. Love is God's grace conferred to the
world. Hauerwas announces the constitution of not only humanity, but of God, as
love. The God announced by Hauerwas is a God whose grace works within, and on
behalf of, history - whose being is activity and whose activity is love - making
possible within history a politics of love.
The nonsystematic nature ofHauerwas' writing has made the traditional structure of
exitus-reditus difficult to detect, but that is principally because he believes that God
is not patient and structured, but wild and unexpected, breaking into history
anywhere and everywhere. It is this God whose very being in cosmic history changes
everything. The celebration of, and call to participate in, love makes Hauerwas'
writings obedient rather than schizophrenic. It will be the work of the first portion of
this thesis to outline and explore the style of love in Hauerwas' writings, and the
relationship it has with his more recognized designation of postliberal (which is
4
ultimately participating in the wild and untamed God). Everything that follows in this
thesis is an attempt to disclose this style; to agree with Hauerwas' description of the
God-of-love even when, due to his postliberalism (or its failure), he does not agree
with himself; to begin thinking about the politics of love that God makes possible
within history (through the gift of himself); and to expose those political imaginaries
that locate a common good outside of the love ofGod.1
Hauerwas' popularity (which is an odd thing for a theologian to have) is due in part
to his refusal to legitimate political arrangements not gathered around the figure of
Christ. The most common criticism of Hauerwas' political theology is that he makes
discipleship to the God-of-love (rather than democratic contract, or economic and
physical security) the only basis for life together, and as such is perceived as
exhorting the people of God to sectarian withdrawal and fideism. For some critics
this makes the whole of Hauerwas' theology dismissible. Yet, Hauerwas is not alone
in his recognition of discipleship to Jesus as constituting a "third way" between the
American theological Left and Right. This position, of which Hauerwas' theology is
a unique variation, is postliberalism. A full accounting of the evolution and
development of postliberalism in the writings of Hauerwas will have to wait until
Chapter 1, for now it is enough to note that the contention of this thesis is that
Hauerwas' postliberalism can best be understood as a synthesis. It is a melding of the
Yale School's (Barthian) rejection of philosophical foundationalism; John Howard
Yoder's description of radical (Anabaptist) discipleship and his rejection of
Constantinianism (i.e., a contractual compromise between the church and state); and
Alasdair Maclntyre's critique of the modern liberal imperium, and the philosophies
upon which it is based. The resulting synthesis is Hauerwas' political theology of the
80's and 90's, which at once rejects the liberal state and her politics (particularly in
the form of democracy and capitalism), while at the same exhorts the church to
become a community of virtue, that is to say, an alternative to the violences—
' This reading of Hauerwas is taken directly from an article he wrote with Jim Fodor: "Performing
Faith: The Peaceable Rhetoric of God's Church" in Hauerwas, S. 2004. Performing the Faith, pp. 75-
109. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press. In their essay, Hauerwas and Fodor draw primarily on the
Trinitarian ontology of John Milbank (pp. 85-91) in order to begin describing a peaceable
ecclesiology. Cf. Chapter 6.
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economic, political and social—that govern the Fallen nations of the world. In short,
it is Hauerwas' unique reading of the postliberal that is responsible for his popularity,
and which has generated a wide variety of responses from many theologians (both
friendly and critical).
In recent years however, a number of challenges have been issued to Hauerwas'
postliberal description of non-Christocentric political arrangements. In 2004, Jeffrey
Stout published Democracy and Tradition, which provided a striking defense of
democracy, not as an intellectually fragmented politics ofmodernity, but as a vibrant
discourse exacting certain habits of reasoning that both create and sustain virtuous
communities of care. The book engaged Hauerwas' pessimism toward the
possibilities of democracy by rejecting liberal accounts of the state and refraining
democracy as a grassroots tradition of dialectic republicanism. Hauerwas then
responded to Stout and his supporters in a number of articles, and in 2006, began
embracing the work of Romand Coles and Sheldon Wolin, two political philosophers
who Hauerwas describes as the backbone of the "radical democracy" movement.
This thesis argues that Hauerwas' concessions to the radical democrats are the result
of three errors in his project: (1) his philosophical account of the problems of
modernity is based primarily on writings of Alasdair Maclntyre; (2) his adoption of
John Howard Yoder's description of Constantinianism discipleship and the messianic
community neglects to flesh out Yoder's ontology of the powers; and (3) Hauerwas
never explicitly rejects Yoder's call to morally evangelize the powers, particularly in
the form of the state. The result is that when faced with a new way of loving in the
world, in the persons of Stout, Wolin, and Coles, Hauerwas betrays his own best
insight, namely that radical politics without Jesus is like Christianity without Christ.
In what sense might such a politics be radical at all (i.e., what could it be "rooted"
in)? The only answer seems to be the acknowledgment of multiple communities of
character, i.e., ways of living together not gathered around the God who is love.
Hauerwas' seeming embrace of the possibility of plural communities of character is
still a long way from Milbank's call to a "contractual" peace with the liberal state,
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yet Hauerwas finds himself unable to answer: whose character, which memory? For
the radical democrat the answer may be Christ, but it need not be.
This thesis concludes by proposing that the deficiencies in Hauerwas' postliberal
political theology might be solved by pleonastically describing ecclesial politics, as
gathering. Conversely, the shape of other political imaginaries should be identified as
flight - dispersal. Just as the first four chapters proceed through the exhaustive
exploration ofHauerwas and his primary sources, the final two chapters of this thesis
explore new sources for creatively explicating: (1) the politics of love as ecclesial
gathering (and being gathered), and (2) a description of creaturely participation in
divine love. Chapter 5 does the work of the former, redefining politics as gathering,
whilst Chapter 6 does the work of the latter, redefining the human act of loving as an
acting-w/7/z-God.
Chapter Outline of Specific Contributions
This thesis contributes to scholarship at the intersection of philosophy and theology,
with particular emphasis on the relationship between ontology, ecclesiology, and
social philosophy in the writings of Stanley Hauerwas and his interlocutors. It will be
helpful to outline, more completely, each chapter in order to identify key arguments
and specific contributions to scholarship.
The first chapter contextualizes Hauerwas within twentieth and twenty-first century
theology in America, by providing a genealogy of Hauerwas' primary sources in the
development of his peculiar brand of postliberalism. This begins with a description
of the postliberalism of Frei, Lindbeck, and the Yale school, which provides
Hauerwas with both an intellectual heritage and a methodological vehicle for his own
theology. Yet, the postliberalism of Yale (Barthian Christocentricity combined with
postmodern critiques of the modern) is given unique expression, and eventually
transformed, by Hauerwas' synthesis of Yoder and Maclntyre. From Maclntyre,
Hauerwas adopts both a critique of Enlightenment rationalism and a solution: a
return to the pre-modern and to Aristotle in particular. The central philosophical
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categories in Hauerwas' writings become virtue, dialectic, narrative, community,
practices, tradition, and friendship. From Yoder, Hauerwas adopts a particular
community, story, tradition, set of practices, and list of the virtues; in short, a specific
history with which to clothe Maclntyre's philosophy: Christianity as experienced by
the Anabaptists. For Hauerwas, Yoder's theology not only fleshes out the
Aristotelian conceptually as defined by Maclntyre, but it affirms and extends
Maclntyre's critique of modernity (as de-particularization) as a non-identical
repetition of an earlier heresy, i.e., (the de-particularization of) Constaninianism.
Chapter 2 identifies Hauerwas' methodological postliberalism (theoria) as
simultaneously a theological politics {praxis), arguing that the two are inseparable
because of his claim that the church does not have a politics but is politics. This
chapter begins with a critical and original exposition of the political theology of
Oliver O'Donovan, in order to provide a framework with which to organize
Hauerwas' own scattered political insights (an approach made necessary by
Hauerwas' lack of systematicity). O'Donovan's project begins with a set of concepts,
such as politics, sovereignty, rule, and justice. He then undertakes a careful reading
of Scripture and the Christian tradition in order to expose the concepts' true
possibility and potentiality. Hauerwas on the other hand argues that political ideals
and symbolic structures are not pre-existing transcendentals of human sociality
which Scripture perfects and rehabilitates. Rather the activity of politics and the
embodiment of justice both name co-operations with the activity of Christ. For
O'Donovan all existing political arrangements are transformed by the Christ-event,
while for Hauerwas, God is love, and the Christ-event makes politics-as-love
possible for the first time in history. Thus for Hauerwas, what citizens of the civitas
dei are referencing when they talk about politics, justice, equality, and liberty, is a
disclosure of something new. It is not that the Christian use of terms like politics and
justice is simply a perfection of the secular use of the same terms. For Hauerwas, the
church does not transform the political, but it is the advent of God's politics in the
world. Furthermore, the nature of the God whose politics the church constitutes is a
God of love, vulnerability, weakness and peace. Therefore the church cannot set up
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for itself walled cities, but must constantly be on the move—celebrating its out-of-
place-ness, vulnerability and weakness.
Chapter 3 examines a recent shift in Hauerwas' political thought, i.e., the affirmation
of the radical democratic project. This chapter argues that Hauerwas' sympathy for
radical democracy undermines both his commitment to postliberalism and his
identification of the church as God's politics in the world. The shift occurs partly
because of Jeffrey Stout's recent critique of Maclntyre that identifies American
democracy as a tradition rather than a vehicle for the destruction or fragmentation of
tradition, and partly due to Romand Coles' appropriation of Yoder, which along with
his deconstruction of Rawlsian liberalism is central to his account of practical radical
democracy. Between the writings of Stout and Coles, Hauerwas' synthesis of
Christian particularity and Enlightenment critique is called into question. Hauerwas'
response is to make several key concessions to the radical democrats. He allows for:
(1) the assumption of non-Christologically founded political language; (2) non-
Christologically founded morality; the translation of Christian truth into secular
truth; and non-Christological remembering as a mode of politics. This chapter goes
on to argue that Hauerwas' support for radical democracy is due to radical
democracy's ability to provide an alternative to liberal political arrangements.
Ironically, in taking this position Hauerwas makes the same mistake that he criticizes
in O'Donovan, namely that he is identifying politics as a category external to the
community gathered around Christ. Thus, Chapter 3 argues that while there are
lessons that the church can learn from outsiders (like Coles and Stout), such lessons
only become intelligible because they are recognized as participating in the good of
the God-who-is-love. The chapter ends by addressing the kind of problems that can
occur when Christians identify political and philosophical categories as pre-existing
the church's own narratives, through a reading of the American civil war in the
writings ofMark Noll.
Chapter 4 is divided into two parts: the first attempts to creatively supplement
Hauerwas' theological politics with Yoder's ontology of the powers; the second
exposes Yoder's inconsistent description of the relationship between ecclesiology
and powers ontology, which led him to make his own concessions to liberalism (and
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which also explains why Coles is so easily able to appropriate his thought). The
purpose is to provide Hauerwas with a more robust reading of Yoder that avoids the
qualification of powers ontology via two kingdoms language, which rejects
utilitarian descriptions of violence as policing, and that is equally suspicious of
progress and democracy. This chapter argues that such a reading of Yoder is
essential to Hauerwas' project because a consistently employed ontology of the
powers would offer him a critical alternative to Maclntyre's attack on liberalism
(which Stout at least partially debunked). Rather than rejecting Constaninianism as a
form of liberalism, liberalism is rejected as a demonic and violent Constaninianism -
a re-description made possible by the activity ofChrist.
Chapter 5 begins to constructively plot a course past the problems in both Hauerwas
and Yoder by introducing the concept of gathering as central to recovering and
sustaining the Hauerwasian style of ecclesiology as love. In this chapter, the
metaphor of gathering is explored through the writings of Gerhard Lohfink and
Bernd Wannenwetsch as simultaneously a critique of false gatherings, the call to
exodus, and the hope of a place to rest. Chapter 5 argues that false gatherings are the
communities founded on violence and sustained by coercion, which have found their
apotheosis in globalization—the power that calls citizens of those communities to
exodus, flight, and dispersal, leaving them with no place to gather. Following
William Cavanaugh, the chapter argues that the only response to this diaspora is the
reclamation of particular locality—the gathering of the church inaugurated and
sustained in the gift of the eucharist. The viability of this reclamation is explored
through the celebration and suffering of the Bridgefolk as an example of the
brokenness of eucharistic communities. The chapter ends by returning to Hauerwas
in order to explore whether or not the concept of gathering engages usefully with his
body of work, and to discuss how radical gathering provides a properly Hauerwasian
response to the radical democrats.
Chapter 6 moves beyond the question of the gathering's own constitution and self-
knowledge, by moving beyond the concept of gathering. Just as the concept of
ecclesial politics is redefined to mean gathering in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 explores
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resources for redefining the love of the gathered as a participation in the activity of
God-whose-being-is-love. This is necessary in order to describe the church's love for
the world as a thing-itself, and to explain the temptation that Hauerwas finds in the
radical democracy of Stout, Wolin and Coles. The hope is to move Hauerwas and his
readers beyond a description of the gathered church as a politics of univocal love. In
order to do this a pleonastic reading of the doctrine of analogy in Aquinas is applied
to Marion's re-conceptualization of persons as constituted by love, in order to
describe, with Milbank, a God who is more than an infinite lover whom we must
imitate. God is not an-infinite-self-which-loves, but is love itself. Moreover, human
love is only love in its God-likeness. Chapter 6 argues, with Giorgio Agamben, that
the time of the now is the time of the messianic. The parousia is now, but it is not, as
for Agamben, a dislocation, or an infinite division of person from primordially
violent politics, but a re-gathering of persons into a new politics-of-love. A politics
that is only possible because the God who is love remains in us (the ecclesial polis),
allows for the loving of the world with, in and under His own activity. The
Hauerwasian ecclesiology then must be conceived of as not just theological, but also
theurgic. Gathering (and being gathered) is not just a way of reasoning about the
politics of love, but the active, pleonastic, creative, constitution of God in the world
through Spirit and sacrament. In short, the gathering is constituted by the sacraments,
yet also constitutes a sacrament, despite itself, in and for the world.
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Chapter 1
The Genealogy of Hauerwas' Postliberalism
The Maclntyre-Yoder Synthesis
This chapter identifies and describes the scholarly context that this thesis dialogues
with and contributes to, particularly in regards to the formulation of Hauerwas'
distinctive brand of postliberalism. It begins by outlining the historical and
ideological origins of postliberal theology, including those associated with the
movement and their contributions to it, and perhaps most importantly seeks to
establish an account of the instability of the definition as used by a variety of
postliberal scholars. It may seem odd to begin with an account of the history of
postliberal thought rather than with a definition of what postliberal thought actually
is. Yet, it is usually the case that those involved in something new rarely agree upon
stable definitions before they begin writing. Often it is not only the validity and
effectiveness of a new idea that is tested with time, but also its consistency and
parameters. Postliberal thinkers rarely meant the same thing when they used the
term, and so it is the task of later generations to try to identify the foundational
strictures, convictions, and parameters held in common by those involved in the
movement—a process that is all at once clumsy, ad hoc and necessary. While the
varying definitions offered in this chapter were, and continue to be, controversial
(particularly because in many cases thinkers do not agree on the liberalism that
postliberalism is post), they are necessary if one is to understand the context and
reasoning by which Stanley Hauerwas develops his political theology in terms of his
own account of postliberalism (as well as the myriad of thinkers with whom he has
dialogued). Thus the second half of this chapter explores two thinkers in particular,
Alasdair Maclntyre and John Howard Yoder, the synthesis of which makes
Hauerwas' definition of postliberalism possible.
History and Ideology: Frei and Lindbeck
Hans Frei and George Lindbeck authored the principal texts of the postliberal
movement at Yale University. In 1974, Frei published The Eclipse of Biblical
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Narrative, in which he observed that the tendency of modernity was to make more
basic to the reading of Scripture a particular perspective, doctrine, or form of
rationality—a hermeneutic—that is ontologically prior to Scripture's own narratives.
That is to say, according to Frei, the problem with the Enlightenment was that it
encouraged the formation of foundational hermeneutics that undermined the
authority of Scripture by illuminating a prior truth. Such prior truths shaped the
possibilities of meaning when it came to reading Scripture. Prior to the
Enlightenment, Scripture was viewed as a realistic narrative, i.e., both literal and
historical; the "words and sentences meant what they said, and because they did so
they accurately described real events and real truths that were rightly put only in
those terms and no others."2 The most eminent reading of Scripture to the pre-
modem "preacher or theological commentator" was that which identified all the little
narratives and stories of Scripture as "making...a single storied...historical
sequence."3 This overarching historical narrative "covered the span of ages from
creation to the final consummation to come" and placed within its purview the real
world of the reader of Scripture, including not only human beings but also their
environment and culture.4 The reader's participation in the world of Scripture was
assumed by its temporal placement between ascension and parousia. With the
celebration of universal rationalism in the Enlightenment, common sense and
experience identified a reality in opposition to that found in Scripture. As a result,
Scripture could only be meaningful when it was prefaced and critiqued by the
possibilities of the modern imagination. There were still truths in Scripture, but they
required translation into the world of the reader. To do this the reader was forced to
excise narrative context in the hope of uncovering the moral of the story. To the
Enlightenment reader of Scripture, "the Bible generally no longer authorized what
one believed—by providing either the reliably informative contents or the warrants
for believing them—it had to provide.. .the indispensable, factually informative, and
2
Frei, H. W. 1974. The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth andNineteenth Century




religiously meaningful."5 Thus Frei sums up the theological transformation that took
place between the pre-modern and modern reader noting that: "interpretation was a
matter of fitting the biblical story into another world with another story rather than
incorporating that world into the biblical story."6 Scripture became unintelligible for
all but the elite. The Bible no longer preserved the logic of history; it became a
window into an alien time and location. For those on the Left, its only use was as a
site of excavation for cultural-affirming transcendentals. For those on the Right, it
was the eternal handwriting of God - all semantic inconsistencies required "artificial
harmonizations...not found in scripture at all."7 Frei's contribution to the theological
origins of postliberalism consists, therefore, in his call to name, and reject, the
philosophical universalism and rational-hermeneutic methodologies for the reading
of Scripture—in favor of a return to emphasis on the pre-modern reading of Scripture
as a realistic narrative. For Frei, prior authorities, sources, and contexts outside the
narrative can no longer mandate the meaning of Scripture. In the Enlightenment
"[mjeaning came to be detached from the stories and located externally to it."8 For
Frei, meaning must be seen as a function of the text itself.
Frei's writings, including The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, are indebted to a variety
of intellectual traditions. Pivotal to Frei's project is its reliance on, and extension of,
Karl Barth's neo-orthodoxy Protestantism, the central tenet of which is that the
"Christian faith rests not upon universal reason or human self-consciousness, but is
sustained through and as commitment to a story."9 Gerard Loughlin identifies the
interrelationship between Barth and Frei as primarily the shared commitment to the
notion that the Christian story is a story. A story which:
5 Ibid. p. 130
6 Ibid.
7
Dorrien, G. 2001. "The Origins of Postliberalism." in The Christian Century. (July 4-11). pp. 16-21.
p. 18
8 Vidu, A. 2005. Postliberal Theological Method: A Critical Study. Grand Rapids, MI: Paternoster
Press, p. 49
9
Loughlin, G. 1996. Telling God's Story: Bible, Church andNarrative Theology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 33
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is not supported by anything else, by another story, theory or argument. The
story is simply told, and faith is a certain way of telling it, a way of living and
embodying it; a habit of the heart. But it is not the way of modern theology
whether liberal or evangelical.10
The influence of Barth on Frei was far-reaching, extending beyond a shared
skepticism ofmodernity and liberalism to a mandatory reevaluation of both classical
theological language and doctrine, including: Christology, revelation, a doctrine of
history and providence, and also a call for theology to regain its ability to speak in
public and toward practical issues. The theological relationship between Barth and
Frei has been well documented and need not be repeated in full here.11 For now it is
enough to point out that Frei's account of Scripture as a realistic narrative is possible,
in large part, thanks to the work of Barth, and to briefly illuminate the reading of
Barth peculiar to Frei's enterprise.
The question that Frei posthumously asks in (1994) Types of Christian Theology, is
whether Christian theology is a self-descriptive or externally-descriptive discipline.
That is, can theology be not only evaluated and critiqued, but also given identity by
outside philosophical disciplines, or is it a dialectical tradition internal to the church?
Is theology subject to reason and therefore a proper subject for the academy, or is it
subject only to Christian experience and so subject to the church? Yet, these polar
opposites are not the only options available on Frei's typology; indeed that to which
he is most sympathetic is Type 4 (on a 1-5 scale), the category into which he places
Karl Barth. Type 1 is the Kantian project in which the academic discipline of
philosophy stands as a rubric for the method of proof in every theological endeavor
(for example, radical evil replaces original sin). In this case valid philosophical
proofs demand Cartesian starting points in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics;
that which exists is that which is knowable to, and with, human reason. Type 5, on
the other hand, represents a Christian theology which is entirely self-descriptive and
whose proof lies in the grammar of its own internal logic. Dismissed out of hand is
10 Ibid.
11 See Higton, M. 2004. Christ, Providence & History: Hans W. Frei's Public Theology. Edinburgh:
T&T Clark International.
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any externally applicable rational method for the adjudicating of doctrinal
differences. Barth's Type 4 approach, which is the category into which Frei would
place himself, uses general philosophical principles to provide an ad hoc
interpretation of the church's experience. For Barth, because human existence is
finite while faith is often times mysterious, human "reasoning is not absent but
fragmentary."12 As Frei puts it:
Even the meaningfulness, to say nothing of the truth of Christian statements,
is a matter of faith seeking understanding rather than faith arising from the
statement of general meaning. Until we do know what can now only be the
content of faith, its internal logic has the shape of a limiting rule rather than a
testable position.13
The character of general philosophical principles is interpretative, insofar as
technical philosophical concepts do not provide explanations (truth-claims), but re-
descriptions. There is no sense here in which philosophy and theology meet as
equals, as there is in Schleiermacher (Type 3), or by which theology is the
hermeneutic (Type 2) through which human experience, and philosophy, can be re-
imagined.
The irony of Frei's typology, of course, is that while he sides with Barth that
methods outside the Christian discourse must always be ad hoc and interpretive, he
claims the book is "a piece of conceptual analysis—that is, in principle an exercise
chiefly about rather than in theology."1 Frei's position, adopted from Barth, is that:
[p]hilosophy...is not excluded from theology but firmly subordinate to
theology as normed Christian self-description or critical self-examination by
the Church of her language concerning God, in God's presence.15
12
Frei, Ft.W. 1994. Types ofChristian Theology. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 81.
Unfortunately, this kind of typological approach is necessarily explanatory rather than interpretive,
and Frei ends up providing a Type 2 ideological Wissenshaftslehre (epistemology).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. p. 1
15 Ibid. p. 42
16
For both Frei and for Barth ontological truth claims are secondary to discussions of
meaning. The truth question is eclipsed, but not obscured altogether, by the
catechized immersion of the individual into the communal context: rituals, practices,
language, concepts, and beliefs. It is with Frei's reading of Barth in mind that we
turn to the second founder of the postliberal movement, George Lindbeck.
In 1984, Lindbeck published The Nature ofDoctrine, an analysis of the concept of
doctrine within religious—particularly Christian—settings and the work doctrine
does to reconcile, or divide, traditions within such a setting. Lindbeck's analysis of
doctrine draws primarily on Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of language and grammar,
and Clifford Geertz's cultural anthropology. Lindbeck identifies his "cultural-
linguistic" model for understanding religion as standing in opposition to the two
most common alternatives: "cognitive-propositional" and "experiential-expressive."
The propositional model reflects the position held by the Right (fundamentalists and
conservatives), whereby doctrine represents a truth-claim about objective reality.
Religion on this model is "thought of as similar to philosophy or science as these
were classically conceived."16 Religion becomes an explanation of the whole of what
really is. The experiential-expressive model, on the other hand, "interprets doctrines
as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or
existential orientations."17 This approach tends to be appropriated by liberal
theologians who see in religion the reaffirmation of general truths about the world.
Subsumed within these two approaches is a variety of hybrid positions that
emphasize the importance of both, or limit the one with the other. The propositional
and expressive-experiential models make reconciliation between traditions either
impossible or irrelevant. In the first case "if a doctrine is once true, it is always true,
and if it is once false, it is always false. This implies, for example, that the historic
affirmations and denials of transubstantiation can never be harmonized."18
Agreement can only be reached with the abandonment of doctrine on one side or the
16
Lindbeck, G.A. 1984. The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.




other. Within the expressive-experiential model, doctrines stay the same while the
meaning of the doctrine changes, so that while reconciliation may happen, such a
move is arbitrary because the doctrine must become meaningless if reconciliation is
to occur—a move which amounts to the abandonment of doctrine. Hybrid theories,
on the other hand,
[a]re superior in that they do not a priori exclude doctrinal reconciliation
without capitulation as do simple propositionalism and simple symbolism, yet
their explanations of how this is possible tend to be too awkward and
complex to be easily intelligible or convincing.19
The alternative, as proposed by Lindbeck, is the cultural-linguistic, or rule theory, of
religion. Lindbeck describes the function of doctrine in the rule theory, noting that
the most prominent aspect of doctrine in this case is "their use, not as expressive
symbols or as truth claims, but as communally authoritative rules of discourse,
attitude, and action."20 With Lindbeck's approach, differing doctrines of Eucharistic
practice can be resolved by noting that:
Both transubstantiation and at least some of the doctrines that appear to
contradict it can be interpreted as embodying rules of sacramental thought
and practice that may have been in unavoidable and perhaps irresolvable
collision in certain historical contexts, but that can in other circumstances be
harmonized by appropriate specifications of their respective domains, uses,
and priorities.21
Thus for Lindbeck, the reconciliation of doctrinal disagreement need not involve the
capitulation of one side to another, but merely the careful analysis of cultural and
historical context in order to determine whether previous rules are valid or whether
they need to be recontextualized within their new setting.
The connection to Frei's work, and his reading of Barth, should be readily apparent,
insofar as maintaining the consistency of the internal logic of Christian self-
description is exactly what Lindbeck is trying to accomplish. Lindbeck's cultural-
19 Ibid. p. 17
20 Ibid. p. 18
21 Ibid.
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linguistic approach, and thus his appropriation ofWittgenstein and Geertz, relies on
Frei and Barth's apologetic for the incorporation of external logics, put to the task of
interpretation, within the Christian context. Thus Lindbeck would argue that the
cultural-linguistic approach should not be viewed as the starting point for explaining
doctrinal disagreement between traditions, but as a tool for navigating, and ultimately
reconciling, complex contexts which span history and culture.
The peculiarity of Frei's reading of Barth, mixed with Lindbeck's appropriation of
postmodern concepts and tendencies (including "otherness," "genealogy,"
Wittgensteinian grammar, and a preoccupation with context), created a seemingly
postmodern brand of neo-orthodoxy that was dubbed postliberalism. While Frei and
Lindbeck were responsible for the source texts of the postliberal movement, the
movement itself was continually shaped and reinvented by their students at Yale:
George Hunsinger, Stanley Hauerwas, William Placher, Bruce Marshall, Ronald
Thiemann, David Yeago, George Stroup, and Garrett Green. Moreover, following the
initial work of the abovementioned Yale-trained theologians, later generations of
Yale students, and students of those students, continue to contribute to the
movement.
Following the initial acclaim accorded to Frei and Lindbeck's work, real notoriety
for the movement began as mainstream Protestant theology began to take note of "a
satellite project"22 in Durham, N.C. embodied in the writings of Stanley Hauerwas.
Hauerwas and his students at Duke developed a brand of postliberalism very
different from that found at Yale, thanks in large part to the influence of John
Howard Yoder and Alasdair Maclntyre. Before addressing the particulars of that
synthesis, it will be useful to look, in a general way, at Yoder's reading of Barth,
Frei, and Lindbeck, in order to understand how Yoder helps move Hauerwas away
from the sociological explanatory critique of liberalism in the Yale school and
towards Christological pragmatic theology.
22
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Rapids, MI: Paternoster Press, p. 39
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So, what exactly is the relationship between Yoder and Yale in the writings of
Hauerwas? The answer lies partly in how one parses the influence of Barth on each.
James Smith has observed the curious relationship between Barth and Yoder, writing
that
the possibility of the synthesis is found in Barth and Yoder's shared emphasis
on the antithesis of revelation vis-a-vis given cultural forms. Both deeply
resist the correlational and Constantinian projects of modern theology, and
both emphasize the practices of being the church, informed by the narrative
of Scripture, constituting an alternative community and a peculiar people.
Echoing Barth, Yoder emphasizes that the norm for Christian existence-and
hence theology and proclamation—must derive from the gospel as modeled
by Jesus, not from the supposedly neutral norms of a public social ethics
independent of revelation.2
So how does Yoder's reading of Barth-as-realist jive with Yale's description of
Barth-as-Wittgensteinian? To begin with, it should be noted that Yoder was a
contemporary of Lindbeck and Frei, writing about and studying under Barth during
the same period as they. In 1962, Yoder received a Dr. Theol. from the University of
Basel.24 During his time at Basel, Yoder not only studied under Karl Barth in
dogmatics, but also began to read him sympathetically and even wrote a book on
Barth during this period, i.e., Karl Barth and the Problem ofWar (published in 1970
but written before 1957). The influence of Barth on Yoder has been explicated at
length by Craig Carter25 and need not be rehearsed fully here. For now it is enough to
note that Yoder identified the shape of ecclesiology as cruciform, while Yale
identified it as contextually/communally utilitarian. Carter notes symptoms of this
when he observes:
Yoder has engaged biblical texts more extensively than they have, even
though postliberals tend to criticize revisionists for being preoccupied with
prolegomena and strongly advocate the constructive engagement of
Scripture...Yoder's theological realism is much more clear cut... [because]
23 Ibid.
24
Nation, M.T. "John H. Yoder, Ecumenical Neo-Anabaptist: A Biographical Sketch" in Hauerwas,
S., Huebner, C., Huebner, H. and M. T. Nation (eds.). 1999. The Wisdom ofthe Cross: Essays in
Honor ofJohn Howard Yoder. pp. 1-23. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. p.l 1
25 See Carter, C. 2001. The Politics ofthe Cross: The Theology and Social Ethics ofJohn Howard
Yoder. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.
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Yoder's nonfoundationalist approach to epistemology does not lead him to a
relativist position when it comes to affirming the ontological reality ofGod.26
For readers of Stanley Hauerwas, the above comparison between the attributes of
Yoder's Barthian theology versus that of the Yale school would seem to place
Hauerwas firmly within the Yale camp. Hauerwas has never consistently used
specific texts of Scripture in his theological reflections and even Yoder criticized his
earliest writings for an over-preoccupation with sociological descriptions of
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community dependency. For Yoder, Hauerwas, along with the rest of the Yale
school, placed too high a priority on the sociological transmission and maintenance
of narrative within community (utilitarianism). This led Hauerwas and Yale to read
in Barth a methodological or sociological realism as opposed to an Incarnational
28realism. That is to say, ontological priority was given to the function of narrative
itself rather than to the truth of the particular narrative of Jesus Christ.29 That is why
Nigel Biggar is able to complain that Hauerwas' early work is more concerned with
affirming the reality of the ecclesial space and method by which that story can be
heard, than in asserting that "the [heart of the] moral life consists in responding to the
30address of a reality beyond ourselves." In Hauerwas' middle and later work he does
not suffer from the same problem, which is due primarily to the influence of Yoder.
Yet, as we will see, Hauerwas never stops arguing that the response to which the
reality of the cross calls humanity is the communal-political work of the church.
26 Ibid. p. 25
27 See Yoder, J. H. "Absolute Philosophical Relativism is an Oxymoron." (1983). Unpublished.
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For a more comprehensive discussion of the differences between Yoder, Barth and Hauerwas, see:
Cartwright, M. 2006. Practices, Politics, and Performances: Toward a Communal Hcrmeneutic for
Christian Ethics. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock. Also: Carter, Politics ofthe Cross, p. 61-90.
29 Hauerwas has shifted away from a sociological realist account of narrative in his most recent
writings (such as Hauerwas, S. 2005. Cross-Shattered Christ. Grand Rapids, Ml: Brazos Press). Yet in
many places, particularly where he draws on the writings of John Milbank (as in Hauerwas, S. 1997.
Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy. London: SCM Press.)
(and in Chapter 3 of Hauerwas, S. 2004. Performing the Faith. Grand Rapids, Ml: Brazos Press.)
Hauerwas moves back toward a metanarrative realism, which if not sociologically realist is, at the
very least, aesthetically so. In both cases he over-prioritizes contingency at the expense of the
ontological reality of the Christ event.
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While there are clear differences in the way that Hauerwas and Yoder respond to
Barth, there are also distinct similarities—similarities that set Hauerwas apart from
the rest of the Yale school. Hauerwas follows Yoder in his re-description of politics,
which entails a rejection of both Constantinianism and (thanks to Alasdair
Maclntyre) what Hauerwas identifies as its modern counter-part, liberalism. In place
of Constantinian and liberal descriptions of politics, Hauerwas develops a description
of the authentic politics of the church as discipleship. Drawing on Yoder's careful
Scriptural exegesis of the political character of the incarnation, ministry, cross,
resurrection, and ascension of Jesus, Hauerwas forays into territory previously
claimed by moral philosophy and secular ethics. He addresses issues including:
medical and bioethics (reproduction, the treatment of the sick, handicapped, elderly
and dying); sexual ethics (who to sleep with, how, and when); and, most extensively,
the relationship between Christians and the nations they are born into. In so doing,
Hauerwas reclaims moral territory by asserting, with Yoder, the authority of the
Lordship of Jesus over all other authorities, allowing theology to say something
intelligible to Christians. Such Christians, according to Hauerwas, have lived too
long with moral analytic autonomy—in other words, Christians have been separated
from their moral contexts, and/or embedded in moral contexts to which they ought
have no allegiance.
The specifics of Hauerwas' enterprise will be discussed at length throughout this
thesis; for now it is enough to realize that postliberalism gained a wider audience in
large part due to the writings of Hauerwas and his students, and that his version of
postliberalism is peculiar to him, thanks in large part to the influence of John Howard
Yoder.
Definitions
In the above sketch of the genesis of postliberalism in the work of Frei and Lindbeck,
several broad characteristics of postliberalism became evident. First, postliberalism
leans heavily upon neo-orthodoxy and in particular on the writings of Karl Barth.
Barth's Christocentricity and account of revelation, and the postliberal rejection of
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grand narratives, become tentative allies in the writings of Frei and Lindbeck. Barth
provides a theological exposition on the unintelligibility of any attempt to identify a
foundation (particularly human rationality) that exists prior to the claim that Jesus
Christ is Lord. Thus, any attempt to provide a framework or starting point, either
ontological or epistemological, which is prior to Christ is ultimately heresy. The first
tenet of postliberalism is the confession of the epistemological priority of the
Lordship of Christ and the rejection of alternative foundational accounts of human
knowing, including modern rationalism. It is important to remember however, that
for Barth and Frei, the rejection of foundations is not the rejection of external
contexts. Indeed, external frameworks (including human rationality) are important as
interpretative tools. These tools help Christians come to grips with what it means for
Jesus Christ to be Lord, and when used in this way the product is theological
reflection. The second major tenet of postliberalism is demonstrated most clearly in
Lindbeck's early work, as described above, namely his emphasis on community
(learned primarily from Geertz, but also from Wittgenstein). The whole reason for
Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic approach is to maintain the consistency of logic
internal to Christianity. Doctrinal disagreements need to be reconciled because
theology, at its most basic level, is communal self-description. The church's
theological reflection begins with the claim "Jesus is Lord," a claim that for
Lindbeck involves the rejection of all other foundations. From this starting point
Christians draw on a variety of interpretive tools, beginning a conversation about
what it means to be a community of people who found their lives upon that claim.
Despite the two most general attributes of postliberalism described above, there is
still a post-ness to postliberalism that does not quite take into account what liberalism
is, or in what sense it is post. Liberalism, for Frei and Lindbeck, was synonymous
with the identification of external logics as primal, as well as the attempt to atomize
individuals from community via differences in the Christian conversation and
ultimately dogmatic inconsistencies between those involved in the discourse.
Postliberalism is post, in the sense that external logics and atomistic individualism no
longer go unnoticed as enemies of honest Christian theological dialogue. In order to
help understand liberalism, as characterized by postliberals, as well as to show points
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of connection and disconnection between Hauerwas, Frei, and Lindbeck, it will be
useful to look more fully at the way in which John Yoder and Alasdair Maclntyre
talk about liberalism and the role of the church in resisting its tendencies. Indeed it is
the synthesis of Maclntyre and Yoder that leads Hauerwas to his distinctive
description of postliberalism, and the political activity (what he calls church) that
such a position entails; a position that has been consistently described as sectarian by
a host of critics. As Jeffrey Stout puts it, "it is Hauerwas's amalgam of themes from
Yoder and Maclntyre that generates the controversy."31 For Stout, and many critics
of Hauerwas, the relationship between Yoder and Maclntyre in Hauerwas represents
an "unholy alliance"32 in which Hauerwas synthesizes "Yoder's emphasis on the
church/world distinction with Maclntyre's critique of liberal modernity"33 resulting
in "a rigid and static line between Christian virtue and liberal vice."34
Maclntyre's Critique of the Enlightenment and Proposal for a Return to
Aristotle
The primary work of the next two sections is the exposition of Alasdair Maclntyre's
anti-liberal ontology and John Howard Yoder's Christology (ecclesiology and
description of Constantinianism), an effort that seeks to understand the synthesis of
the two within the writings of Stanley Hauerwas. What follows works to illuminate
the general philosophical, and particular theological, arguments that make possible
Hauerwas' description of postliberal politics. The exploration of the reflexive use to
which Hauerwas puts Maclntyre and Yoder's respective definitions of liberalism and
Constantinianism will be of particular importance. This section lays the groundwork
for understanding the inconsistent assertions made by Hauerwas in his later writings,
which will be the focus of chapter 3.
31
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33 Ibid.
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I begin with the exposition of Maclntyre's meta-ethical critique of the moral and
contextual fragmentation caused by liberalism—and his attempted recovery of the
virtue tradition as a way forward—as found in his magnum opus After Virtue35 Next,
I will explore John Howard Yoder's theological description of the church as a story-
formed, socially-embodied, community of the virtues, as well as the external enemy
to that tradition found in the Constantinian project. Finally, this section will conclude
by beginning the process of illuminating the synthesis and qualification of these two
thinkers in the postliberal political theology of Stanley Hauerwas. Yet, the peculiar
shape of Hauerwas' postliberal politics will be demonstrated fully in the next
chapter, via his polemic against Oliver O'Donovan, particularly in terms of their
disparate use of eschatological metaphors surrounding the reign ofChrist.
In her (1997) "Introduction" to Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition:
Christian Ethics after Maclntyre, Nancey Murphy argues that Maclntyre "has
accomplished three things of great value to Christian ethicists:" "he has revived the
virtue tradition of moral inquiry;" he has provided a "critique of Enlightenment
theories of ethics;" and he has rejected "universal judgments" in favor of
"particularity."36 As will be shown throughout the duration of this thesis not only
have such contributions been adopted by Stanley Hauerwas, but following the
publication of The Peaceable Kingdom, they are the framework upon which all of his
theological claims rest. That is to say, Maclntyre's After Virtue provides Hauerwas
not only with the philosophical schema and tools by which he produces later
arguments, but also lends his work a sense of consistency, direction, and style.37
35
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37 In the "Introduction" to A Better Hope (Hauerwas, S. 2000. A Better Hope. Grand Rapids, MI:
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Maclntyre begins After Virtue with "a disquieting suggestion" about the state of
moral language and discourse in contemporary society. Maclntyre helps elucidate
what he reveals to be the inconsistent and fragmented nature of moral language by
making an analogy with a fictitious world in which science is blamed for a great
catastrophe and epistemically obliterated: books are burned, scientists lynched, and
equipment is destroyed. Many years after this systematic destruction of the scientific
occurs, a group of "enlightened people seek to revive science" but unfortunately
all that they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached
from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them significance;
parts of theories unrelated either to the other bits and pieces of theory which
they possess or to experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten;
half-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible
because torn and charred.38
Yet still, the "enlightened people" attempt to reconstitute physics, chemistry, and
biology as meaningful practices. The adults debate partially understood theories one
against another (without comprehension of which are compatible and which are
mutually exclusive), while the children ritually recite the theorems of Euclid. In
Maclntyre's world:
Nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural
science in any proper sense at all. For everything that they do and say
conforms to certain canons of consistency and coherence and those contexts
which would be needed to make sense of what they are doing have been lost,
perhaps irretrievably.39
described by Maclntyre. It is the means by which Hauerwas attempts to identify what Maclntyre dubs
the "ultimate end"—a hierarchical ordering of goods toward which all right actions move in a
particular social context. One might argue then that Hauerwas' polemics is the right response to
alternative voices within a community of care (like the church) but is the wrong response to voices
outside that tradition; such as with other tradition based communities (like America), where
definitions of "the good" or "life in common" will often conflict with the definitions provided by the
church, due to the absence of a common context. (See Maclntyre, A. 1988. Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? Southbend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, p. 132. For a critical discussion of
Maclntyre's position see Dahl, N. O. "Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason" in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research. Vol. 51:1. (March 1991). pp. 153-157. p. 153.
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Moreover, the disorder and meaninglessness of the reconstituted practices of science
could never he exposed by analytic or existential philosophy. Analytic philosophy is
exposed as mathematics and logic in Maclntyre's world. While the argumentative
grammar may be intact, the semantic content of the terms/elements has been lost.
Validity remains, but there is no epistemic access to the true by which one could
ascertain the truth of premises, and so every argument, absurdly, is unsound.
Existentialism is exposed as always already nihilism. Existentialist philosophy fails
to identify the fragmentation of science because its concern is with subjective
meaning-making and so already presumes either the metaphysical absence of the
objective, or the lack of epistemic access to it - the nihilistic void, which is the
infinite distance between what is and our knowledge of it.
Maclntyre argues that this foray into the genre of science fiction creates an unlikely
analogy for the fragmented state ofmorality of which we are all a part. Not only is
moral language fragmented, but our memory of how to use moral terms, and the
contexts and roots of those terms, has been lost to us. Maclntyre states, "What we
possess, if this is...true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now
lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed
simulacra ofmorality, we continue to use many of the key expressions."40 However,
according to Maclntyre, we have lost our comprehension of the theory and practice
necessary for such expressions to make sense. If Maclntyre's analogy holds up, the
philosophers—analytic and existential—will not be able to help us realize the grave
state of our disorder, as their analysis of the structures of morality, both conceptual
and intentional, will be unchanged regardless of the context in which moral language
is used. The true test of the analogy, according to Maclntyre, is with the historians.
Surely, a catastrophe of such proportions would be remembered, yet there is no
record of such an event occurring within the history of our world. The only way such
an event could occur, according to Maclntyre, is if "the catastrophe... [was]...of
such a kind that it was not and has not been—except perhaps by a very few—
recognized as a catastrophe."41
40 Ibid. p. 2
41 Ibid. p. 3
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Maclntyre argues that such an event is possible, plausible even, if one addresses the
origin and nature of the discipline of academic history. As the discipline of academic
history is less than two centuries old, Maclntyre proposes that the disorder of moral
language in contemporary culture must have occurred before the inauguration of that
discipline and thus academic history itself is a system of that disorder. According to
Maclntyre, the trademark of academic history is its focus on the importance of value-
neutral observation. As this is the case, the very notion of moral disorder is
unintelligible:
[a]ll that the historian.. .will be allowed to perceive by the canons and
categories of his discipline will be one morality succeeding another:
seventeenth-century Puritanism, eighteenth-century hedonism, the Victorian
work ethic and so on, but the very language of order and disorder will not be
available to him.42
Indeed, ifMaclntyre is correct, any moral disorder would have to be all but invisible
to the academics of many disciplines as those very disciplines are defined by value-
neutral evaluation and observation—on an epistemological foundation that prizes
human faculties for reason alongside human experience and perception. Moreover,
on Maclntyre's analysis the existence of such disciplines is but a symptom of the
disorder itself.
In After Virtue, Maclntyre treks through the history of ideas identifying the
eighteenth-century as the time during which moral language becomes disordered.
The nature of this disorder, according to Maclntyre, is one of dislocation, that is to
say, the modern moral self has been "totally detached from all social particularity."43
This detachment of moral language from social context is the trademark of
modernity, and to understand it one must address the period from "1630 to 1850"
42 Ibid. Conversely, ancient and medieval historians were committed to making judgments through the
narrative interpretation of events. See Breisach, E. 2007. Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and
Modern. Third Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
43 Ibid. p. 32
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during which attempts were made "to provide a rational justification for morality."44
Maclntyre states:
In that period morality became the name for that particular sphere in which
rules of conduct which are neither theological nor legal nor aesthetic are
allowed a cultural space of their own. It is only in the later seventeenth... and
eighteenth century, when this distinguishing of the moral from the
theological, the legal and the aesthetic has become a received doctrine that
the project of an independent justification ofmorality becomes not merely the
concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European culture.45
Thus, the culture of the eighteenth century is the Enlightenment, while the agenda of
that culture is the Enlightenment project. It is the failure of this project that makes
intelligible, according to Maclntyre, our own situation.
For Maclntyre, the philosophical attempt to provide a space for practices
disassociated from their context is but a derivation of the Enlightenment project's
(thanks largely to Kant) primary role: to define a human as, first and foremost, an
autonomous individual. To ground, with Descartes and Kant, human existence and
certainty in the reasoning thinking-thing, is to separate the practices of humanity
from the contexts in which those acts take place. The result: that questioning what a
thing is for (Aristotelian telos) becomes unintelligible, while asking whether a thing
exists and how such an existence is knowable becomes the sole focus of
philosophical pursuit. The problem, as put by Brad Kallenberg, is that "[hjaving
rejected the received account of telos, the only remaining option upon which moral
principles might be grounded was the zwtutored human nature—the very thing in
need of guidance and, by nature, at odds with those guiding principles!"46 The
problem is particularly evident in Kant, as knowledge of the self is limited by what
can be reasoned about the self prior to context, so too human practice can only be
44 Ibid. p. 39
45 Ibid.
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judged reasonable or unreasonable in terms of the contextless actor.47 As Maclntyre
puts it:
To be a moral agent is, on this view precisely to be able to stand back from
any and every situation in which one is involved from any and every
characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgement on it from a purely
universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social
particularity. Anyone and everyone can thus be a moral agent, since it is in
the self and not in social roles or practices that moral agency has to be
located.48
Yet for Maclntyre, all the key Enlightenment philosophers (he includes in this list
Kant, Hume, Diderot and Kierkegaard) share a formula for attempting to account for
morality while at the same time dismissing telos and the particular contexts that
might provide it. Maclntyre notes:
all these writers share in the project of constructing valid arguments which
will move from premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be
to conclusions about the authority ofmoral rules and precepts. I want to argue
that any project of this form was bound to fail, because of an ineradicable
discrepancy between their shared conception of moral rules and precepts on
the one hand and what was shared—despite much larger divergences—in
their conception of human nature on the other. Both conceptions have a
history and their relationship can only be made intelligible in the light of that
history.49
For Maclntyre, the Enlightenment project was bound to fail precisely because the
philosophers involved attempted to use moral language with certitude without having
definitions for the terms involved. Without acknowledging the conceptual and
historical traditions, which define moral vocabulary, any use of terms like good,
justice, and rights become arbitrary utterances. It is precisely for this reason that
Maclntyre claims we should not be surprised at the shrill tenor of modern moral
debate, because "modern moral utterance and practice can only be understood as
series of fragmented survivals from an older past and the insoluble problems which
they have generated for modem moral theories will remain insoluble until this is well
47 See Maclntyre, After Virtue, pp. 43-47
48 Ibid. p. 30
49 Ibid. p. 52
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understood."50 That is to say, there can be no winner in a modern moral debate when
both sides use a different definition of good, nor when the debate requires those
involved to judge between two competing goods—there is simply no way to weigh
between them.
Furthermore, the attempt to substitute reason alone as a foundation for scientific
enquiry into the nature of the self (or morality) is ultimately an attempt to respond to
this fragmentation, while the cause of that fragmentation is the assumption that such
an enquiry is possible. The necessary failure of enlightenment thinking, for both
Maclntyre and Hauerwas, is that when the Enlightenment philosophers were
"[confronted by the fragmented character of our world... [they] undoubtedly tried to
secure a high ground that... [could] provide security, certainty, and peace."51 It was,
according to Hauerwas, "a worthy effort, but one doomed to fail, for such ground
lacks the ability to train our desires and direct our attention; to make us into moral
52
people." Maclntyre's alternative, which is essential to Hauerwas' program (albeit
in a much modified form), is a return to Aristotle—i.e., an uncovering of that "older
past" and its pre-modern moral sensibilities.
Upon realizing the failure of the Enlightenment project, Maclntyre argues that the
moral philosopher is left with two options: either dismiss, with Nietzsche, the very
possibility of morality, embrace the will to power and discard terms such as good,
justice, and right; or return to pre-modern modes of philosophy by excavating past
uses of moral terms, their function, and the particular contexts which gave them
meaning. Maclntyre opts for Aristotle.53
50 Ibid. pp. 110-11
51 Ibid. p. 11
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33 While Oliver O'Donovan is sympathetic to Maclntyre's overall critique of modernity, he argues
against Maclntyre's claim that the only premodern inheritance capable of repairing modernity is to be
found in Aristotelian philosophy. When Maclntyre says: "If a premodern view of morals and politics
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According to Maclntyre, the only way to understand Aristotle is by acknowledging
that particular context from which his philosophical enquiry into the nature of
morality, self, and society arises—i.e., the society of ancient Greece embodied in
Homeric literature. Maclntyre's apologetic for using literature, as opposed to
academic historical accounts of what "ancient Greece was really like" is two-fold:
(1) accounts of history provided by academic historians are always already internally
flawed due to their attempt to situate themselves as value-neutral observers of the
past, and (2) that the "chief means of moral education [among classical cultures] is
the telling of stories."54 As Maclntyre puts it,
What matters for my own argument is a relatively indisputable historical fact,
namely that such narratives did provide the historical memory, adequate or
inadequate, of the societies in which they were finally written down. More
than that they provide a moral background to contemporary debate in
classical societies, an account of a now-transcended or partly-transcended
moral order whose beliefs and concepts were still partially influential, but
which also provided an illuminating contrast to the present.55
Within the Homeric literature the basic values of society are already given, along
with the place, privilege, and duty of everyone within the social caste. The particular
social model evidenced in Homer is, according to Maclntyre, the heroic society. In
this society, each individual (self) is coterminous with his or her work (actions). To
judge a person as good or bad is to judge their performance within the social caste,
and the warrant for judgment is "his virtues and vices; for the virtues just are those
qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which manifest themselves in those
is to be vindicated against modernity, it will be something like Aristotelian in terms or not at all"
(After Virtue, p. Ill), O'Donovan responds by noting that "the earliest tradition of Christian moral
thought, owing comparatively little to Aristotle, was formed nevertheless, in a realist mould."
(O'Donovan, O. 1986. Resurrection and the Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics. Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, p. 18). While there were clearly Platonic influences
present in early Christian thought, the "debt to these sources" is secondary to what was received
"predominately from the reading of the Bible." (Ibid). Indeed, Scripture, including Torah, provided
the people of God with more than a list of commands and precepts; but also it created and sustained a
story-formed moral community that, despite its scattered character was able to live side-by-side with
pagan Greek (and Roman) storied-communities, while retaining its own distinctive identity and
practices.
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actions which his role requires."56 Virtue, therefore, is excellence in fulfilling one's
role within the larger polity. Moreover for those situated within the context of
Homeric society, the moral or virtuous choice was never in question. A meta-ethical
critique of the moral framework was impossible; an Athenian could never judge their
framework as good precisely because the description of "good" arose from within the
framework. That is to say, there was no way to "step outside" Homeric society in
order to launch a critique of it, because as Maclntyre notes, any person attempting to
do so "would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make himself disappear."57
It will be useful now to take a brief look at the principle modifications to a
description of telos, virtue and the virtuous life as provided by Aristotle. But first we
must address Maclntyre's understanding of Aristotle's "practical reason" which is
central not only to Maclntyre's project, but to Hauerwas' understanding of discipline
(discipleship), habit, and tradition.
According to Maclntyre, Aristotelian practical reason designates an argument that
terminates in an action. Practical reason understood in this way stands not in
opposition to theoretical reason, but as a partner to it. For Aristotle, theoretical
reason anticipated the speculative and contemplative moment, while practical reason
arrived principally in the polis. Maclntyre demonstrates the nature of this
interconnectedness most clearly by explaining the activity of practical reason as
performance toward a telos—with telos being knowable only through reasoned
contemplation on the nature of the good. As we will see, Maclntyre's example
illustrates what should happen if a disconnection between practical and theoretical
reason was to occur, namely unintelligibility of action between those in the polity
and the disconnected actor:
56 Ibid. p. 122
57 Ibid. p. 126. This notion is reflected in Hans-Georg Gadamer's reading of Giambattisto Vico,
namely that: "history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves
through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family,
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33
We should be puzzled for example by someone of whom we knew three
things: first that he wanted to keep healthy, secondly that he had sincerely
asserted both that to get cold and wet could be bad for his health and that the
only way to keep warm and dry in winter was to wear his overcoat, and
thirdly that he habitually in winter went out without his overcoat. For his
action appears to express a belief inconsistent with his other expressed
beliefs.58
Habitual or systematic inconsistency between act and belief illumines therefore a
disconnection of the relationship between contemplation and practice. Thus for
Maclntyre, we must say not only that practical reasoning moves one toward the right
action in a given situation, while theoretical reasoning illuminates a particular course
of action as right, but that the ability to form a habitually intelligible connection
between theoretical and practical reason constitutes moral judgment; yet the nature of
such judgment is entirely dependent upon the "moral virtues and vices [that]
compose his or her character."59 For Aristotle, the precise relationship between
reason and the virtues is elliptical insofar as contemplation provides a notion of telos\
practical reason exhorts an actor within the social context to move toward that
previously acknowledged account of telos, and yet the end of theoretical reason's
contemplation is always already affected by the virtuous or vice-like character of he
or she who is doing the contemplating. In short, she who contemplates always does
so already within not just the social context but within her place in that context—a
non-virtuous person will engage in theoretical reasoning (contemplation), and in so
doing make moral judgments, but such judgments will already be skewed by the
character of she who is doing the reasoning. This stands in direct contrast to a
Rawlsian reading of Aristotle, wherein theoretical reason is value-neutral
contemplation from "outside" while practical reason is the social implementation of
neutral-judgment.
Having outlined the teleological, practical (action-ended reason), and social
dimensions of moral judgment, practice, and thought in terms of Aristotelian virtue
language, Maclntyre extends the Aristotelian account by arguing for the existence of
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three conceptual stages necessary for virtue formation within any social context:
practice, narrative, and tradition. Maclntyre explains these stages, saying:
[t]he first stage requires a background account of what I shall call a practice,
the second an account of...the narrative order of a single human life and the
third an account...of what constitutes a moral tradition.. .Each earlier stage is
both modified by and reinterpreted in the light of, but also provides an
essential constituent of each later stage. The progress in the development of
the concept is closely related to, although it does not recapitulate in any
straightforward way, the history of the tradition of which it forms the core.60
Kallenberg has helpfully noted the Wittgensteinian nature of the interrelationship
between these concepts and how they reflexively work to illuminate one another as
well as the form and function of the virtues. He points out that "getting a handle on
his [Maclntyre's] explanation is not like building a house (which progresses
incrementally, brick by brick) but like watching the sun rise—the light draws
gradually over the whole."61 It will be useful to look at the way in which Maclntyre
defines each of these terms in order to see how Hauerwas modifies them in light of
Yoder.
Maclntyre defines a practice as:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends
and goods involved are systematically extended.
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Thus architecture, the sciences, farming, the arts, and chess are practices whereas
pouring cement, lighting a Bunsen burner, planting turnips, scribbling and tic-tac-toe
are not. The former have goods particular (internal) to those activities, which given
proper motivation and sufficient training (i.e., practice), a person may excel at; while
the latter may be performed with skill, they do not have goods internal to the activity
itself. The latter are technical skills; such skills are necessary for the performance of
practices, yet a practice is more than the sum of its parts. It should be noted therefore
that any goods arising from participation in technical skills are "externally and
contingently attached.. .by the accidents of social circumstance."63 This is to be
contrasted with practices that not only have certain goods internal to their activity,
but also standards of excellence and obedience already attached to that activity.
These standards are social prolegomena to the practice (even if they are not
represented in the society, they are knowable through the stories told by that society,
as illustrated by the moral discrepancies between Aristotle's and Homer's Greece).
Thus, "[t]o enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them."64 Finally, practices do not
occur as single events, but as part of a social-historical tapestry. Over time, practices
evolve, as do standards of excellence and a society's understanding of the goods
internal to those practices; this evolution often will require the acquisition of
different skill sets, along with alterations in training and discipline.
According to Maclntyre, the second concept necessary for a proper understanding of
the virtues is narrative. Narrative, according to Maclntyre, is the tool by which the
pre-modern self was unified: "birth to life to death...beginning to middle to end."65
Narrative provides consistency and context for the self, making intelligible the
inseparable relationship between a person, his or her social (and natural)
environment, and the roles he/she plays in that environment (i.e. one's activities).
Thus for Maclntyre, many narratives are embedded in other narratives, just as people
63 Ibid. p. 188
64 Ibid. p. 190
65 Ibid. p. 205
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are embedded in one another's lives. For Maclntyre, questions about who a person is
cannot help but be answered by appealing to his/her broader social-historical context.
For Maclntyre, the characters in a story cannot help but have a moral dimension;
habit, and consistency of act, illuminate patterns of behavior, and in so doing, the
character of a character. Thus, any person can be identified as virtuous or vice-
oriented by comparing his/her personal story, and in particular, the practices and
activities embodied within that story, to the larger stories in which he/she is
embedded. If the practices of the individual are in line with the teleological good of
the society as a whole, then his/her exemplary practices will be judged virtuous.
For Maclntyre, the historical memory of a society is embodied in its tradition. Just as
narrative is the storied unity of the self over time and space, tradition provides
narrative unity to society as whole. Therefore, Maclntyre defines tradition as a
"socially extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part
about the goods which constitute the tradition."66 Maclntyre expands on this
definition in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? noting that disputes over what
constitutes the social good, and the most exemplary practices for ensuring that good,
have two locations: (1) "internal interpretive debates through which the meaning and
rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose
progress a tradition is constituted," and (2) conflicts "with critics and enemies
f\7
external to the tradition." Indeed, tradition does represent the historical
evolutionary record of argument within a particular community, both with past
generations as well as with other traditions, but it is important to remember that it is a
context which extends not only backwards, but also into the future. That is to say,
traditions do sustain continuity between persons, their practices, history and social
contexts, but traditions are also sustained by the continued participation (individual
66 Ibid. p. 222
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and communal) of new generations in that shared context. The relationship between
the individual with her socially embodied historical history has two aspects: "On an
ontological level tradition contributes to the creation of agents' identity, while on the
epistemological level it determines the conditions for knowledge."68 For Maclntyre,
the only real "success" of the Enlightenment was the efficient disassociation of
present generations with the traditions from which they arose, leaving individuals in
the modern world in a state of context-less unintelligibility.
Yoder's Messianic Community and the Politics of Jesus
Perhaps the most famous passage of After Virtue—and definitely the most
illuminating for those attempting to understand the relationship between Yoder and
Maclntyre—occurs at the end of the first edition, where Maclntyre announces:
A crucial turning point in that earlier history occurred when men and women
of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium
and ceasing to identify the continuation of civility and moral community with
the maintenance of that imperium. What they set themselves to achieve
instead—often not recognizing fully what they are doing—was the
construction of new forms of community within which the moral life could be
sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of
barbarism and darkness. If my account of our moral condition is correct, we
ought also to conclude that for some time now we too have reached that
turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of
community within which civility and the intellectual and the moral life can be
sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the
tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages,
we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been
governing us for quite some time.69
Yoder's theology, when read through the lens of Maclntyre, can be most clearly
understood as an attempt to identify, sustain, and correct a community of virtue. The
moral community which he appeals to is not exactly new; Yoder's task is not one of
construction therefore, but of recovery. In particular, this recovery involves the
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excavation of authentic (i.e., faithful) forms of community capable, at the very least,
of having a conversation about the moral life as illumined by the Christ narrative. In
the first part of what follows I will look at Yoder's account of the self, society, social
practices, and the way narrative operates within the Christian tradition; the second
part of this section acknowledges Yoder's commitment to a moral community who is
already held captive, politically, by the barbarians.
During his lifetime, Yoder eschewed attempts to systematize his work. He wrote
occasional essays rather than systematic treatises, and did not think that theology
could begin "from scratch" or by laying "a foundation;" that is to say, Yoder did not
believe that theology could begin "with a tabula rasa" in the "mind or in society."
Rather, Yoder, like the Yale School, opted to do theology nonfoundationally; this
consisted of rejecting, like Maclntyre, the "methodologism" inherent in scholastic
and Cartesian foundationalism, as well as modern rationalism.70 Yet Yoder's
theological nonfoundationalism, i.e., his rejection of systematic and rational analyses
of revelation, was not a call to relativism. For Yoder, theology and Scriptural
exegesis were neither irrational nor unsystematic. Rather, he desired to let Scripture
say what it meant without "subjecting it to the superior authority" of the
"contemporary hermeneutic framework."71 Harry Huebner puts it nicely, noting that
Yoder does not take the view of method that
is typical among scholars—namely, as universal form housing particular
content. Yoder offers an alternative to this understanding, something one
might call an epistemology of peace or a methodology of patience. For
Yoder, discipleship is not the deduction of a method properly applied; rather,
discipleship informs the method appropriate to knowing Jesus Christ.
Alternatively, the legitimation of violence is not the conclusion of a neutral
way of thinking about the world as it is, but rather it is the outworking and
inevitable result of controlling and manipulative epistemologies.72
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It is precisely this redefinition of method in terms of Christology and discipleship
that is central to understanding both Yoder's, and in turn Hauerwas', writings. As
Huebner observes, "Yoder does not mean that method doesn't matter," rather "it is
precisely because it matters that we must examine and critique the way it gets cast in
n'l
Enlightenment foundationalist epistemologies." Thus for Yoder, epistemic access
to the truth is not limited to revelation (in the form of Jesus or in Scripture), rather
Yoder argues that it is simply the case that the truth which is in Jesus, "is the truth
that matters the most, which must therefore regulate our reception and recognition of
other kinds and levels of truth rather than being set in parallel or subordinated
thereto."74
Rejecting Enlightenment modes of theology and philosophy (those that began with
the alienated human subject or the state of nature), Yoder argues that all theology
was a dialogue—a part of an ongoing conversation within history. According to
Yoder, the nature of that historical collaboration is dialectical and argumentative, and
limited by the linguistic capabilities and rational prowess of each generation. Thus,
Yoder rejects attempts to talk about universal and metaethical norms in moral
theology, preferring instead to discuss the day-to-day practice of specific historical
communities: particularly those of Jews and Christians. Moreover, Yoder identifies
this nonfoundationalist account of theology as "Biblical Realism." According to
Yoder, it is his commitment to Biblical Realism that qualifies his analysis of the form
and function of theology, placing theology first in the service of the canon. (Of
particular interest is Yoder's exaltation of the canon as the standard bearer of
Christian virtue, which is extremely reminiscent ofMaclntyre turning to the Homeric
literature in order to understand the narrative context ofAristotle's Greece).
In order to understand the practice of theology, Yoder first addresses the role of the
theologian within the traditional social context of the church. Drawing on the role of
the teacher (didaskalos) in the New Testament church, Yoder begins to lay out a list
73 Ibid. p. 25.
74 Ibid.
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of skill sets, standards, and practices of discipline involved in being an exemplary
theologian. According to Yoder, in Scripture there are two seemingly different
notions as to what the role of the teacher should be: the first belongs to that of St.
James the brother of Jesus, the second to St. Paul. According to James, the role of the
didaskalos "is a risky function which not many should seek to discharge" while Paul
encourages all Christians to seek all of the gifts.75 Both nuance the account of the
theologian that Yoder develops.
James' cautionary to the Jewish Christian churches in Palestine regarding the role of
the didaskalos is as follows:
Not many of you should become teachers, my brothers and sisters, for you
know that we who teach will be judged with greater strictness. For all of us
make many mistakes. Anyone who makes no mistakes in speaking is perfect,
able to keep the whole body in check with a bridle (3:1-3).76
The danger for the teacher, and for all Christians, is the unruly nature of the tongue.
Yoder points out that in many Bible-based traditions the tongue signifies the speech
of an individual Christian, while the unruliness signifies a lack of piety: i.e., gossip,
cursing, or unkind speech. Yoder argues that it is a mistake to modernize James in
this way, rather:
The "tongue" in any Aryan language means the language, the phenomenon of
language, and the social reality of communication. Language is unruly in that
playing with issues by defining terms is a constant source of contestation and
confusion.77
Yoder affirms this by pointing to the Pauline warning, namely that Timothy must
hold to "the standard of sound teaching" (2 Tim 1:13) and avoid "wrangling over
words" because it "only ruins those who are listening" (2 Tim. 2:14). This warning,
like that offered by James, cautions the teacher to take care regarding constructed
verbal formulations. In the words of Yoder:
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It is with language as it is with the rudder of a ship, the bit in the horse's
mouth, or the flame igniting a forest: there is a multiplication effect whereby
any mistake in balance or aim produces greater damage through the leverage
of language.78
Moreover:
The wording of the Bible is not an empowering ratification giving the
theologian a special advantage in the knowledge of truths qualitatively
different from the truths other people can know. The Bible is, rather, the
victim of the corrosive and distorting effect of the leverage of language, and
the theologian is its defender.79
It is important to note that for Yoder, the difference between Paul and James is the
difference between two separate yet similar types of theology: catechetical and
corrective. They are similar in the sense that both Paul and James offer a caution
regarding the role of the teacher. They are separate in that Paul identifies teaching,
i.e., indoctrination into the new community, as an ongoing day-to-day occurrence in
the life of the believer. Yoder describes this Pauline formulation as that which
encourages all Christians "to read the Bible.. .and.. .to be free to interpret it soberly
80
in relevance to their own situations." Indeed, Yoder would argue that for Paul, both
witness and evangelism require every Christian to teach basic theology to all
converts. This theology is ultimately realized as the most fundamental level of
Christian culture that permeates the community of believers.
Supplementing the catechetical theology that is the gift and rule of life for the church
catholic, there is a vocational role held by specific individuals within the church: the
didaskalos. The function of the didaskalos is that of defender and corrector. Yoder
argues:
It is...the abuse to which canonical texts are subject that calls upon the
teacher to be more restrained than the poets and prophets in the
78 Ibid.
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interpretations which he or she allows people to commend toward one
another...
What we need the didaskalos for is to defend the historical objectivity
of what the text said in the first place against the leverage of overly confident
or "relevant" applications. Already in the early church this was a task that
called for linguistic sophistication.. .There are forms of articulation which are
fruitlessly speculative, destructively relativizing, or unwholesomely
accommodating. The task of the didaskalos is to defend the difference
between the organic fidelity of our interpretation now and the meaning of the
message then, as well as to oppose other "adaptations" or "applications"
which constitute betrayal.
The fact that people are tempted to abuse Scripture by calling upon it
to support whatever they believe is one of the reasons it is inappropriate most
of the time to think that the primary theological debate is about whether the
biblical text is authoritative or not...The theologians' task is more often to
defend the text against a wrong claim to its authority than to affirm in some
01
timeless and case-free way that it has authority.
Therefore, while it is good for every Christian to teach and theologize to both
unbelievers and in the midst of the peculiarly Christian culture of the church, it is the
job of the didaskalos to ensure that the theology used for catechism and within the
culture is faithful to Scripture and not tainted by contemporary circumstances. The
didaskalos ensures the faithful collaborative embodiment of Christian life
...construed as the interpretative performance of Scripture...[because] The
poles of Christian interpretation are not, in the last analysis, written
texts...but patterns of human action: We talk of'holy' scripture, and for good
reason. And yet it is not, in fact the script that is 'holy' but the people: the
82
company who performs the script.
This is true for Yoder because, "[t]o ask how the Bible functions in theology is like
ST
asking how the ground floor functions in a house." Teachers and theologians must
correct any theology which is not faithful to the canon of Scripture, i.e., in the
communal performance of that Scripture. Yet by far the most common teaching of
theology happens in the catechism ofChristian culture.84
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Yoder's ability to rationalize nonfoundationally becomes apparent via his description
of the authority of Scripture. For Yoder, "there is no need to theorize about why the
Bible has authority when one finds oneself living in a community in which that
authority is presupposed and which is constantly being renewed through the simple
experience of its operation."85 There is no need to confirm the authority of Scripture
via philosophical or genealogical argumentation rather one can find evidence for its
authority in the middle of the community which that authority guides. Thus the
authority of Scripture is both dogmatically and practically assumed. (Wolfgang
Schrage reflects this perspective, noting that "The real subject of New Testament
ethics is neither society nor the individual, but the community."86). Yoder's account
of the didaskalos rests on the basis of that assumed authority. Thus the theologian
limits and corrects the practices and language of the community by appealing to and
arguing from the basic authoritative cannon. Yet the necessity for the theologians
work, either polemical or irenical, should be a rarity in the life of a church that is
properly founded in Scripture. For Yoder, it is "simply and descriptively the case that
Christians gather around the words of the Word and its message bears fruit.. .without
needing constantly to be pulled up by the roots in order to see why it should be
working that way."87 When the corrective task of the theologian becomes necessary,
it is response to a brokenness, corruption, or failure within the community to
faithfully live the Word. Yoder observes:
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This is true of the theologian serving the readers of a particular culture and
class. When a culture is preoccupied by fear of the dark powers which rule
the world, one will especially find the message of release from that fear.
When a society is preoccupied with death, one will hear the message of
resurrection and eternal life. When a society is anomic it will be open to be
illuminated and disciplined by Torah.88
For Yoder, this emphasis on particular Scriptural and theological correctives within
particular situations can be identified as a canon within the canon. Yet for Yoder,
"[t]he ultimate canon within the canon must...be the person of Jesus and, in a
broader sense, the narration of the saving acts of God"89 - God's love in and for the
world.
The connection that Yoder draws between Jesus as the "canon within the canon" and
the church is illustrated perhaps most clearly in the relationship between his books
(1972) The Politics of Jesus and (2002) Preface to Theology. Preface remained
unpublished until 2002, yet was developed as a series of lectures to students at the
Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminaries in Elkhart, Indiana in the 1960's (before
Politics). In the "Introduction" to Preface, Hauerwas and Sider observe that:
[i]t is important for him [Yoder] that we understand the work the creeds
should do. Christians do not become "creedal" because we need to get our
theology straight as an end in and of itself. Rather, in Preface to Theology
Yoder helps us see that Christians become creedal because of the kind of life
they must lead to be faithful disciples of Jesus. The early "Christologies"
developed in the New Testament were expressions required when followers
of Jesus confronted the challenge of making their way of life, a way of life
shaped by following Jesus' teachings, intelligible in contexts that had no way
of imagining how God could be found in this Galilean.90
Preface to Theology is exactly that, a discussion of what criteria theology must fit in
order to be faithful theology, and a description of the way in which Christianity has
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faithful ways. In Preface, Yoder elucidates a narrative description of the theological
moves made by the didaskalos of the early church, noting why theological correction
was required in each instance and whether it was faithful and effective. Hauerwas
and Sider have rightly pointed out that for Yoder the criteria and key to faithfulness
in the practice of theology is always already qualified by the claim that the
theological endeavor must make possible faithful discipleship within the church.
Theology flourishes in the day-to-day life and practices of the church. Furthermore,
theology qua Yoder is itself a practice of the church. As such, when undertaken by
the didaskalos (i.e., theology in its formal form), the practice of theology not only
sets standards of excellence but also obedience; a central facet of formal theology
then is corrective (or disciplinary) character. It should be no surprise therefore, that
in many of Yoder's works—and this is particularly true for Politics—he proceeds in
a formal manner offering the informal-catechetical-cultural theology of a particular
(local) church opportunity for correction and repair.91 According to Yoder:
When the later, more "theological" New Testament writings formulated the
claim to preexistence and cosmic preeminence for the divine Son or Word
(John 1:1-4; Col. 1:15ff.; Heb. l:2ff.) the intent of this language was not to
consecrate beside Jesus some other way of perceiving the external Word,
through reason or history or nature, but rather to affirm the exclusivity of the
revelation claim they were making for Jesus. The same must be said for later
development of the classic ideas of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
"Incarnation" does not originally mean (as it tends to today in some
theologies of history, and in some kinds of Anglican theology) that God took
all of human nature as it was, put his seal of approval on it, and thereby
ratified nature as revelation. The point is just the opposite; that God broke
through the borders of our standard definition of what is human, and gave a
new definition in Jesus. "Trinity" did not originally mean, as it does for some
later, that there are three kinds of revelation, the Father speaking through
creation and the Spirit through experience, by which the words and example
of the Son must be corrected; it meant rather that language must be found and
91 This distinction between formal/informal theological practices answers most succinctly the charge
leveled against Hauerwas by Duncan Forrester, namely that Hauerwas' ecclesiology has the tendency
to blur the distinction between church in the eschatological sense and church in the present tense.
Hauerwas could respond to Forrester by appealing to this formal/informal dichotomy in Yoder, thus
making a distinction between church theological practice in desperate need of imperative correction,
and nagging interrogation by the Texan gadfly: "are we there yet?" (Forrester, D. B. "The Church and
the Concentration Camp: Some Reflections on Moral Community" in Nation, M. T., and S. Wells.
2000. Faithfulness and Fortitude: In Conversation with the Theological Ethics ofStanley Hauerwas.
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definitions created so that Christians, who believe in only one God, can
affirm that God is most adequately and bindingly known in Jesus.92
There are three important characteristics of Yoder's claim that should be mentioned:
(1) creedal affirmations are not merely dogmatic assertions but illustrations of
historical corrective action, implemented in order to discipline certain voices internal
to the tradition; (2) the creeds demonstrate that in many cases theology invents new
and creative ways of thinking in order to resolve conflicts within the tradition; and
(3) the creeds illustrate the connection between dogmatics and ethics. For Yoder
therefore, all theology, including creedal theology, can only be considered faithful if
it ensures that no separation is placed between belief and discipleship.
Informal/catechetical/cultural theology is a kind of Aristotelian practical reason
insofar as it ends in an act. Yet all theology is act-oriented in that even if it is not
engaged in the task of inventing it is at the very least correcting belief or practice.
Just as there can be no disconnection between theoretical and practical reason, there
can be no disconnection between belief and practice; beliefs inform practices just as
practices shape belief. Thus Hauerwas and Sider are able to note that any attempt to
see Politics as merely the recitation, or qualification of dogmatic belief, would be
mistaken insofar as "belief is [unintelligible apart from a faithfully lived life."93
Yoder goes on to note that the "canon within the canon" the didaskalos argues from
is Jesus, and the purpose of this argument/teaching is to make more faithful the
theological life and culture of the church that is already worshiping. Yoder explains
that teaching from Jesus and Christology is teaching in the Spirit, and a much better
alternative than the scholastic practice of deriving from Scripture a set of
deontological propositions that must be contemporized every few years:
It is most lively and productive to think of one body of literature, the Bible,
representing in any time and place the testimony of the narrative stretching
from Abraham to the Apostles, which can be juxtaposed to any other age by
its psalms being sung again, its letters being read again, its stories and
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parables being retold. Then in the juxtaposition of those stories with our
stories there leaps the spark of the Spirit, illuminating parallels and contrasts,
to give us the grace to see our age in God's light and God's truth in our
words.94
In short, the corrective work of the didaskalos ought not to be seen as top-down
dictation, but as the fulfillment of one role within Christian polity; indeed, Yoder
prefers the language of ministry, noting that the systematization of theology is not
valuable in its own right as, "consistency or completeness are only valuable" insofar
as they make the life of the Body more healthy—more faithful to the overall
narrative account of who Christ is.95 The work that the creeds do was, and is,
valuable precisely because they help constitute and sustain the tradition by
continually correcting, ministering to, and disciplining the Body into more faithful
forms.
Moreover, the Scriptural canon upon which theology is based is able to be corrective
not just in terms of content but also in terms of method. In the words of Yoder:
The Bible itself can be a safeguard against theology as a system becoming
idolatrous or an end unto itself, since the Bible itself is not what we would
call theological in its style. It speaks about God faithfully in pastoral,
ministerial, and argumentative contexts, not in systematic or historical or
expository ways.96
While theology can still be done in systematic ways, such systematicity is not done
in an effort to figure it all out but to "remind us to keep those
operations...subordinate" to the reason that theology is being done in the first
place.97 Yoder's criticism of theologians, or types of theology (like Scholasticism)
that attempt to lay foundations, write metanarratives, or create elaborate ontological
systems, is the philosophical point of connect for Hauerwas between Yoder and
Maclntyre. That Hauerwas adopts this position sets him on a very particular side of
94





the Christian tradition's argument over the character of theology. It will be
worthwhile to quote Yoder at length:
We are accustomed to considering as "theological" those forms of expression
that seek abstraction and generality. The Bible itselfwas not written that way.
I do not argue that the reflexes of abstraction and generalization have no
function at all, but we need to be more honest about their derivative quality
and about the normalness of narrative or hortatory genres as good theology.
The scandal of particularity and the vulnerability of faith as not being
coercive are intrinsic to the gospel, and they are made more evident by the
occasionalistic quality of the literature. When for the sake of apologetic or
missionary comprehensibility or for the sake of internal coherence, we step
back from that concreteness and express ourselves in more general terms, it
must not be with the thought that this will make the faith more credible...
The real foundation, both formally and materially, for Christian
witness is the historic objectivity of Jesus and the community he creates.98
Such a position is central to Hauerwas' pragmatism and yet it makes enemies of
other non-foundationalist, or seemingly postliberal thinkers, such as Lindbeck and
Milbank. For Yoder as well for Hauerwas, theological contemplation for its own
sake—abstracted from the historical incarnation of Jesus in history—is not theology
at all. Without the narrative context of the canon, reason is divorced from act across
both time (historical extension of the narrative) and space (local social embodiment).
One key feature of holding the practice of theology so close to its canonical origins
(in Jesus) is that it keeps theology humble. By constantly, consistently, and
habitually recounting the historical narrative of the church, the church is able to
remember that historically a great deal of theology has been needed. That is to say,
much correction and discipline have been required because of historical tragedies
perpetrated (or allowed) by churches—a list of failures that include the Crusades and
the failure of the churches in Germany to name the Holocaust for what it was. For
Yoder, Christian historical humiliation ought to lead, at the very least, to a sense of
humility among the informal theological culture of the church, as well as those
formal practitioners of correction and ministry.
98 Ibid. p. 80
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In later chapters it will become obvious that the difference between the formal
theology of Yoder and Hauerwas, when compared to that of other theologians like
O'Donovan and Milbank, is the difference between modesty and triumph. For Yoder:
[s]uch modesty leads appropriately, in the face of the choice which God
obviously made to become manifest through a multiplicity of literary forms
that are mostly narrative in framework and doxological in tone, to skepticism
about the adequacy of any system-building of our own. Only in that way can
the Bible be served and not become the servant in a communication event."
Milbank and O'Donovan, on the other hand are Christendom theologians who begin
with an account of eschatological triumph. Indeed, discrepancies in the use of
eschatological metaphor and the implications for the differing political theologies of
Hauerwas and O'Donovan will be the subject of the next chapter; for now it is
enough to note that Milbank's theology is peculiarly Anglican in that the legs of the
tripod of theological method—Scripture, Sacred Tradition and Reason—work
together in order to provide a single, grand, comprehensive story: a Christian
metanarrative. The story of Christ (and the continuation of the story of Christ in the
church) is a story that locates and subordinates all the other little narratives of the
world beneath the Kingship of Christ. Yoder differs from Milbank in that his
description of the royalty of Christ centers not on narrative domination but on the
redefinition ofpower by the Prince ofPeace. Yoder rightly remembers that the Bible
is ta biblia (the little scrolls). They do not represent a grand all conquering narrative
but a modest collection of occasionalist writings about those men and women who
experienced the historical working of the God-who-is-above-all-other-gods. For
Yoder, the little narratives of Scripture do not provide us with a comprehensive and
systematic vision for conquering the philosophies of the world. Jesus is not a
metanarrative that positions other lesser narratives, but is a hermeneutic for
understanding the grain of the universe.
For Yoder, the chief external rival to the maintenance of peculiarly Christian,
narrative-formed moral communities is Constantinianism. Yoder defines
Constantinianism as the name given to the restructuring of the state around the
99 Ibid. But as we will see in the next chapter, as well as in chapter 4, there are clear and important
differences between what Yoder and Hauerwas believe constitutes the Scriptural service to the world.
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church, as well as the effect such a restructuring of the state has had historically (and
continues to have) on the church itself. Reimer notes of Yoder's use of the term, that
his definition "reflects] in good part the historical Radical Protestant position: the
identification of the Fall of the church with the Constantinian synthesis of church and
state."100 It is important to note that Yoder's
concern is not with Constantine the man—how sincere his conversion was,
what he believed, how he intended to use the church. Nor do we suggest that
the year 311 represented an immediate reversal without preparation or
unfolding. The great reversal certainly began earlier and took generations to
work itself out...What this means, of course, is that the meaning of the word
"Christian" has changed. Its moral, emotional, and even intellectual meanings
were changed by the reversal of the sociological and political pressures.101
For Yoder, the restructuring manifested in Constantinianism is the practical result of
an eschatological heresy, which has, at various times in history (and most memorably
in the fourth century) simultaneously captured the imagination of both church and
world.
That Constantinianism is a heresy, according to Yoder, means that the correction of
that heresy within the life of the community is the work of the didaskalos. When
placed against the backdrop of Maclntyre's analysis, Constantinianism names that
shift away from the maintenance of the moral tradition and toward the subversion of
community life by external forces, ending in the fragmentation of a consistent
account of the moral life.
The theological nature of this heresy will be addressed at length in later chapters—
there filtered through the lens of Hauerwas—but for now it is enough to recognize
the telos ofConstantinianism, is for Yoder, the dissolution of the faithful community;
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that is to say, it represents a replacement of the particular with the universal.102
Putting it in a phrase, Yoder says,
[bjefore Constantine, one knew as a fact of everyday experience that there
was a believing Christian community but one had to "take it on faith" that
God was governing history. After Constantine, one had to believe without
seeing that there was a community of believers, within the larger nominally
Christian mass, but one knew for a fact that God was in control of history.103
Jacques Ellul describes the chief sociological characteristic of this shift as the
"subversion of.. .Christianity into the very opposite of the revelation of God in Jesus
Christ."104 For Yoder, as for Ellul, it is the very success of the church that results in
its abolishment.105 When the masses of the Roman Empire were named Christian,
Christianity as a sect was forever abolished. Rather than question the most faithful
method by which to be "the leaven in the dough, the salt in the soup, [or] the sheep
among wolves,"106 the church was forced to ask: "How to incorporate them [the
masses]? How to verify their seriousness?"107 The result was the construction of a
religion with a well-ordered hierarchical structure so that eventually
"Christianity.. .became the most solid buttress of the Roman world."108 The church
solidified the Roman Empire and provided "social cohesion" in the form of a "moral
system."109 Ellul notes: "[constantly in what became Christendom.. .an effort is
made to achieve objective conduct without reference to the spiritual life."110 The
result, according to Ellul, is that
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Christianity became what one might call the structural ideology of this
particular society. It ceased to be an explosive ferment calling everything into
question in the name of the truth that is in Jesus Christ, in the name of the
incarnation. It gave a new basis and vitality to what was in difficulties in the
empire. It restored the taste for life and culture. The problem is not merely
that of the transformation ofChristianity into a state religion but the diffusion
of this faith that has stopped being a faith and has become a collective
ideology, a kind of manifestation of thought that collects all the
commonplaces, the legends, the miracles, the "prophecies," the apocalypses,
the thaumaturgies, and formulates for the people a facile, moralistic, and
constructive set of beliefs.111
Thus the distinction between church and world blurs, each accommodating the other:
the mechanisms of the state (particularly violent and economic) which the church (by
virtue of its narrative canon) ought to oppose are adopted and put to work defending
and sustaining both church and state; power, coupled with conviction, leads the
church to attempt the task of making history (and society) come out right. In short,
for Yoder, the Constantinian shift represents "a fundamental flaw of structure and
112
strategy" in the very make-up of the church.
Finally, it is important to note the similarities between the role of the Enlightenment
in Maclntyre's description of the contemporary state of moral fragmentation and
confusion—a dislocation of individuals from the contexts that they inhabit—and the
similar confusion resulting from the dilution of particularity in Constantinianism. A
dilution that occurs when a Christian, embedded within his/her social and narrative
context, is simultaneously embedded in a competing socially embodied narrative
context. The resulting actions are unintelligible not only because the individual's
activities are informed by competing accounts of the good, competing lists of the
virtues, etc., but also because the hermeneutical criteria by which a person's actions
can be judged are similarly convoluted and competing. As Yoder puts it,
"'Syncretism' is probably not the best label for the resulting mixture, since there is
111 Ibid. pp. 39-40
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not so much genuine fusion and reconception as there is an overlaying of two
cultures."113
Hauerwas' Synthesis
Up until now in this section I have gone about the task of expounding, first the
philosophical critique of liberalism in Maclntyre (which names liberalism as the
fragmentation of individuals from their social and narrative contexts), and second,
Yoder's description of a Christologically centered moral community (called church)
capable of offering a consistent social embodiment of the narrative which stories that
community. In the remainder of this chapter I will offer a description of the specific
shape that a synthesis of the two takes in the early writings of Hauerwas—a
description of postliberal politics that will be demonstrated fully in the following
chapter.
Sam Wells has described this Hauerwasian synthesis, albeit problematically, noting
that:
Yoder's work encourages Hauerwas to maintain that the distinctive Christian
ethic rests on its distinctive community and corresponding practices. [And] In
a curious way the philosopher Maclntyre has created the space for Yoder, the
unashamed theologian, to be taken seriously on sociological grounds.114
According to Wells, Yoder is read through the philosophical lens provided by
Maclntyre in order to provide a systematic meta-ethical framework or ontology,
upon which the particular analysis of Christian moral community in Yoder is
validated. This is problematic precisely because it is not entirely clear that Hauerwas
or Yoder would want, or should want, to be taken seriously by a discipline grounded
on something other than Christological truth claims. (This aspect of Hauerwas' self-
proclaimed sectarianism will become clear when read against his arguments in After
Christendom and Against the Nations). In the Hauerwasian synthesis, a clearer
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benefit occurs via the Yoderian particularization of Maclntyre's thought. Yoder's
description of a specific literature, a particular community, and a common antithesis,
fleshes out the Aristotelian philosophical framework provided by Maclntyre. Thus in
Hauerwas, Maclntyre's meta-ethical program becomes particularized so that, upon
acknowledging the need for thickly descriptive moral language, a person/community
is able to actually define words like good, right, and justice in light of the stories that
tell him/her/them "who they are supposed to be" and "what their role is."
Yet it is not clear why Hauerwas needs Maclntyre's philosophical account at all.
Maclntyre's meta-ethical critique of modern liberalism ends with an exhortation to
particular forms of moral community whose individual members cannot imagine the
possibility ofmeta-ethical critique because they are incapable of stepping outside the
system of which they are a part. As we saw earlier, Yoder is able to make critiques of
external competitive narratives (Constantinianism) but always from a place already
inside his particular social context. The only reason to adopt Maclntyre is if a
systematic (meta-ethical) critique of external narratives (or at the very least an
internal apologetic) is desired. Yet Hauerwas has judged the work of Maclntyre as
"substantial and frequently brilliant" noting that "as theologians.. .we have a duty to
take up the conversation about ethics these philosophers have begun."115 The unique
aspect of Hauerwas' synthesis then is that philosophical method is adopted from
Maclntyre and paired with the theological particularity of Yoder. Hauerwas agrees
with John Milbank's critique of Maclntyre, namely that "the arguments put forward
against nihilism and a philosophy of difference are made in the name of virtue,
dialectics and the notion of tradition in general."116 For Maclntyre, dialectics
represents a "general mode of procedure"117 that might be used to develop a viable
Aristotelian, Augustinian, Thomist, or Humean account of the virtues.118 As Milbank
puts it, in Maclntyre's analysis all of these are "'traditioned' discourses, over against
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foundationalist versions of liberalism on the one hand, and nihilism on the other."119
Yet for Hauerwas any "move toward universality" that gives pride of place to
dialectic qua an account of the virtues must necessarily be a mistake.120 What is
required then, is not an account of virtue, as such, but an account of Christian virtue
(a la Yoder), which is central to maintaining the moral integrity of the church.
Maclntyre's affirmation of dialectic as a universal principle, external to any
particular narrative, outlines one chief attribute of his philosophical enquiry into the
nature of tradition that has yet to be discussed, namely the relation between
incommensurability and rationality as it relates to dialogue between rival traditions.
In a paper on the differences between Maclntyre's and Imre Lakotos' enquiries into
theory-change, Robert Miner has described the partial incommensurability of
Maclntyre's thesis, arguing that Maclntyre affirms the incommensurability of
meaning insofar as there is "no shared criteria that enable[s] rational adjudication."121
Yet Maclntyre does posit "a higher-level language in which a common subject-
matter" makes certain terms and goals intelligible between disparate communities in
which the criteria for determining the worth of those (shared) goals is "too weak" (or
absent) "to provide ground for rational choice between them."122 In Maclntyre, that
higher level language is manifested most clearly in his description of dialectic, but
also in terms such as tradition, virtue, narrative, etc. For Maclntyre these are
conceptual sociological (univocal) structures prior to the social communities (and the
practices of those communities) themselves. Partial incommensurability is mandatory
for Maclntyre because he wants to both affirm contextual particular goals while at
the same time provide a meta-ethical critique of modernity based upon its failure to
meet particular criteria necessary for establishing goals in the first place. Indeed,
many of the differences between post-liberal (in the chronological sense) theologians
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can be attributed to the varying degrees to which they accept (or deny) the
incommensurability of Christianity in relationship to the world. Enlightenment
theologians and philosophers, and those working within that vein, deny
incommensurability altogether while others (among whom I will argue Hauerwas
numbers, at least in most of his work) adopt it as the chief characteristic of Christian
particularity—most fall, like Maclntyre (and as we will see, O'Donovan) somewhere
in the middle of Frei's scale. Hauerwas' brand of incommensurability theory will be
demonstrated fully in the next chapter via his critique of O'Donovan, and his
alternative description of Christian particularity. What will be important to
understand as this thesis proceeds is that postliberalism, for Hauerwas, is more than
anti-liberalism, it is the complete incommensurability of language between the
church and the world. Yoder's contribution to Hauerwas' description of
incommensurability theory will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
It should be noted however that "incommensurability" as I am using it, is to be
distinguished from both Maclntyre's account of "perspectivism" and "relativism."
Maclntyre notes:
The first [conclusion] is that at any fundamental level no rational debate
between, rather than within, traditions can occur. The adherents of conflicting
tendencies within a tradition may still share enough in the way of
fundamental belief to conduct such debate, but the protagonists of rival
traditions will be precluded at any fundamental level, not only from justifying
their views to the members of any rival tradition, but even from learning how
to modify their own tradition in any radical way.
Yet if this is so, a second conclusion seems to be in order. Given that
each tradition will frame its own standpoint in terms of its own idiosyncratic
concepts, and given that no fundamental correction of its conceptual scheme
from such external standpoint is possible,.. .a social universe composed
exclusively of rival traditions, so it may seem, will be one in which there are
a number of contending, incompatible, but only partially and inadequately
communicating, overall views of that universe, each tradition within which is
unable to justify its claims over against those of its rivals except to those who
already accept them.
Relativism on the one hand, responds to the Enlightenment project's failure to find a
universal truth by asserting that no such truth is possible, while perspectivism, on the
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other, understands truth to be available, but only as mediated through the particular
worldviews of individual communities. Such accounts of relationship between truth,
community, and narrative are found predominately in French postmodern
philosophy, demonstrated originally in Lyotard's account of the petit recits (little
stories), whose truths, characters, contexts, and languages, now freed from the
organizing logic of the Enlightenment, bump into one another arbitrarily, locally, and
accidentally. Milbank's response to this has been to construct an organizing,
premodern Christian logic to replace that of modernity—the evangelical draw of
which is its beautiful aesthetic. Hauerwas on the other hand, takes a less triumphant
position, speaking of incommensurability in terms of language rather than truth. For
Flauerwas, Jesus Christ is truth, but because Christian language is always first the
responsive confession, "Christ is Lord," there can be no Christian understanding of
languages that do not proceed from that confession. What Christians are left with, in
Hauerwas' account, is not an agreement to disagree on matters of belief, "[ijnstead
we are left with the very character of our lives, which.. .gives us a basis for thinking
that Christians might be creatures with purposes we ourselves did not create." 124
While such references to "the very character of our lives" may sound like Milbank's
reliance on aesthetic to understand the attractive character of tradition-change, i.e.,
witness/conversion, Hauerwas prefers to ground witness in the practical reality of the
1 9 S
church: "that our lives are at once.. .captured by sin and yet sustained by a hope."
The kind of witnesses we need, according to Hauerwas, can be best understood by
examining lives lived like those of the Brethren German "Dunkards" and their
witness to the Indians in Morrison's Cove, Pennsylvania, during the French and
Indian Wars. Drawing on Rufus Bowman's reading of U. J. Jones's History of the
Early Settlement of the Juniata Valley, Hauerwas notes with Bowman the
unintelligibility, indeed irrationality, of the Brethren response to the threat of
imminent extinction. Jones describes one raid in particular noting that:
On their first expedition they would have few scalps to grace their belts, had
the Dunkards taken the advice of more sagacious people, and fled, too; this,
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however, they would not do. They would follow but half of Cromwell's
advice; they were willing to put their "trust in God," but they would not
"keep their powder dry." In short, it was a compound they did not use at all.
The savages swept down through the Cove with all the ferocity with
which a pack of wolves would descend from the mountain upon a flock of
sheep. Some few of the Dunkards, who evidently had a latent spark of love of
life, hid themselves away; but by far the most of them stood by and witnessed
the butchery of wives and children, merely saying, "Gottes wille sei getan."
How many Dunkard scalps they carried to Detroit cannot now be, and
probably never has been clearly ascertained—not less than thirty, according
to the best authority. In addition to this they loaded themselves with plunder,
stole a number of horses, and under cover of night the triumphant warriors
marched bravely away.126
Bowman and Hauerwas point out that Jones ends his account with a brief aside, "the
significance of which Jones completely missed."127 During the massacre, the
Brethren cries of "Gottes wille sei getan" were so often repeated that the Indians
believed that "strange tribe" to have been called "Gotswiltahns." The Brethren must
have left quite an impression on the Indians for, later, when some of those involved
in the raid were captured they asked whether the "Gotswiltahns" still inhabited that
region. For Hauerwas, the witness performed by the Brethren is different from that
imagined by Milbank. There is true beauty in such examples and yet it is a beauty
only knowable through the person of Christ. Perhaps the greatest difficulty for
Hauerwas in accepting Milbank's call to tell a better story than that offered by the
world, is that such a position assumes that beauty is a category, an instance of a
higher-level language, prior to the revelation of Christ.128
Finally it should be noted that, while Yoder's Christological foundation is central to
Hauerwas' own account, Yoder's broader philosophical framework (an ontology of
Fall and Redemption) is the prolegomena to Hauerwas' description of the timeful
location of the church. For Hauerwas, Constantinianism (and powers language as we
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will see in chapter 4), is a kind of missing link in the historical evolution of Christian
tradition; it is the analogical precursor to the battle taking place in modern circles
(both academic and lay) between the liberals and the postliberals. What is extremely
important to note here, is that for Hauerwas, Yoder's description of the early
church's accommodation to Rome (a loss of particularity) finds its apotheosis in
Maclntyre's description of liberalism's attempt to destroy particularity altogether.
That is to say, the telos of both Constantinianism and liberalism is generalization (to
disrupt particularity), while the chief virtue is accommodation—this is historically
demonstrated first by accommodation to a violent state and second by
accommodation to a violent philosophy. For Hauerwas, liberalism is the new
Constantinianism. Indeed, the much noted tendency in Yoder's writings, that is, to
129
use Constantinianism as a catch-all phrase or "shibboleth for all that is bad" has
been appropriated by Hauerwas as well. The only major difference is in the naming:
in Hauerwas, Constantinianism (or neo-Constantinianism) too falls under a still
broader umbrella, (pre)liberalism.130 Indeed, this will be shown to be due to his
implicit reliance on complete incommensurability—the church cannot help but be
unintelligible to the world in its language, practices, goals, and in its criteria for
defining each.
In the next chapter I will critically examine the details of Hauerwas' description of
Christian postliberal politics, wherein it will become clear that the chief
characteristic of liberal theology, on Hauerwas' account, is the tendency to
accommodate, justify, and legitimate the state—and this legitimating is precisely
what he is post, or perhaps more properly anti. This definition of a Hauerwasian
political theology will be demonstrated through the polemical dialogue between
Hauerwas and O'Donovan in terms of their contrasting use of eschatological
metaphors concerning the reign of Christ.
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130 In this way liberalism, like postliberalism, does not necessarily refer to a chronological period of
thought, but to a mode of thought and action antithetical to Christianity.
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Chapter 2
Between Triumph and Reticence
"Politics" and Eschatological Metaphor in Hauerwas and O'Donovan
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize Hauerwas' occasional rhetorical
expositions of the shape of postliberal politics, and to juxtapose this summary
alongside the brilliant and exhaustive study of political theology undertaken by
Oliver O'Donovan. The reasons for such a pairing may not be obvious at first. One
might wonder: why not, in a study of Hauerwas, focus only on developing an
understanding of Hauerwas' theology? Why invite O'Donovan to the discussion at
all, when by definition the kind of work undertaken in this study should be (if done
well) the exposition of a narrow and creative expertise? The answers are numerous.
First, while there are many places in Hauerwas' work that provide insight into what a
loving postliberal politics involves, his work on the whole is amethodological,
occasional, and unsystematic (the frustrating importance of which he learned from
Yoder). Second, Hauerwas' writings are almost always polemical. (There is an
argument to be made that he also learned polemic from Yoder). For Hauerwas the
task of the theologian is part didaskalos (corrector and disciplinarian) and part myops
(gadfly). Anyone who has read three of Hauerwas' essays in a row should be able to
attest to the fact that he works out his own commitment to the peace of Christ by
posing irritating questions and making novel distinctions. It is as if, for Hauerwas, a
commitment to speaking the truth, when coupled with a rejection of violence and
coercion, can only work itself out through prolific dissent. Third, O'Donovan and
Hauerwas have engaged each other directly, and while there are striking similarities
(particularly insofar as each rejects the Enlightenment project as described by
Maclntyre), there are also crucial differences. The differences may be due in part to
the fact that Hauerwas writes (for the majority of his career) from within the tradition
of American Protestantism (although more recently has formally become an
Episcopalian), while O'Donovan is English and an Anglican (which historically was
more of a rejection than a protest). Whatever the cause, Hauerwas' work rejects the
Constantinian impulse, whereas O'Donovan celebrates it (the ecclesial desire if not
the historical form). Finally, O'Donovan's treatment of political theology is
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extensive and plumbs not only the Christian tradition, but also Christian Scripture.
This is useful because Hauerwas often draws upon the tradition but rarely upon the
Bible (a trick he learned from the Yale school in opposition to Yoder). It will be
useful to have O'Donovan's masterwork as a backdrop against which to judge
Hauerwas' own project. The key will be in distinguishing between O'Donovan's
exposition of Scripture and tradition and O'Donovan's own reasoning as to what
both mean for the Christian ecclesiological imagination. It will also be useful, in the
final chapter, to analyze the concept of gathering (and the church as God's politics-
of-love) as a constructive (as opposed to polemical) Hauerwasian response to
O'Donovan's political theology.
In this chapter I begin with a brief discussion of the Hauerwasian claim that the
church is politics, and then moves on to provide a careful reading of Oliver
O'Donovan's systematic and comprehensive treatise on political theology: Desire of
the Nations. I then rehearse Hauerwas' specific response to O'Donovan and use that
response as a means of framing many of his other more scattered insights and
examples, in order to show where differences in reasoning between the two arise. In
short, I put flesh to the Yoder/Maclntyre synthesis discussed in the last chapter by
analyzing the polemic between Hauerwas and O'Donovan as a means for coming to
grips with what Hauerwas means (and does not mean) by the phrase postliberal.
The Church is Politics
In 1998, Sam Wells published Transforming Fate into Destiny, a critical evaluation
of Hauerwas' work from 1969 to 1997. Wells' book charts the theological
development of Hauerwas' move from virtue ethics (questions regarding moral
formation and the character of the self) to narrative (story-based) theology, and the
practices of, and challenges to, the Christian community that attempts to perform that
story in the midst of the world. Moreover, Wells goes beyond Hauerwas' own
account by providing interesting responses to a variety of criticisms of Hauerwas'
work. Whether or not Wells successfully responds to charges of sectarianism,
fideism, and a neglect of creation theology will be addressed at greater length in what
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follows. For now it will be useful to look at Wells' description of Hauerwas' account
of "politics" at this point in his career.
Wells argues that the best summary of the ethical foundations of Hauerwas' work
can be found in Hauerwas' claim that
[t]he first social ethical task of the church is to be the church - the servant
community. Such a claim may sound self-serving until we remember that
what makes the church the church is its faithful manifestation of the
peaceable kingdom in the world. As such the church does not have a social
ethic: the church is a social ethic.131
According to Wells, this may sound like a typically Hauerwasian play on words, but
it would be dangerous to dismiss it as such. What is really going on, in Wells'
estimation, is a deft theological move that only becomes intelligible if one takes into
account the three-fold political nature of the polity called church—a framework that
structures the whole of Hauerwas' project. Wells explains that for Hauerwas, there
are three activities that the church dubs "political": (1) politics inside the church, (2)
politics between the church and the world, and (3) politics between various parties
132within the world. Before discussing the merit of this three-fold distinction, and
each in greater depth, it should be said that Wells is right to move from the language
of "social ethic" to the language of "politics." Hauerwas leaves behind the language
of social ethics in his middle and later writings primarily because "the phrase
reproduces the liberal distinction between personal and social."133 If every use of
"social ethic(s)" is replaced with "politic(s)" then the church does not have a politics,
it is a politics. It is from this reconstruction that Wells' three-fold distinction arises.
The problem however, is that the framework that Wells imposes on Hauerwas in
order to make sense of the quote describes three different types of politics: church-
church, church-world, and world-world. As we will see, O'Donovan would be more
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sympathetic to this kind of framework than Hauerwas. For O'Donovan, politics is a
(ontologically) prior category to church, while for Hauerwas (who claims to be
following Augustine and Yoder at this point) politics is (ontologically and
numerically identical to) the church. Here it important to note that for Hauerwas, it is
not that politics between different authorities (or powers) in the world is
uninteresting,134 it is that such activities are not really politics at all. As Hauerwas
puts it, "[wjhat the world calls politics is a simulacra of the church, if we understand
that the church is the only true politic, a politic founded in worship, then the church
cannot help but stand in judgment on what the world calls politics."135 Wells touches
on this when he notes that ifHauerwas
[djoes address such issues - for instance in some of his essays on medical
ethics -he often does so in order to show the poverty of the 'politics of the
world, particularly when it is based on liberal-democratic principles.. .this
appears to some like a sectarian concentration on the Christian community
1
and downgrading of the world in general.
Indeed, if the first task of the church is to be the church, i.e., to be politics, then the
church, as the only true politic, must stand in judgment not only on the activities of
worldly politics, but on the political terminology of the world as well. O'Donovan, as
we will see, argues that the church must embrace its political nature because Christ is
reigning over all the nations of the earth, and so must begin to think carefully about
what it means to be part of God's kingdom. Yet if Hauerwas is correct, then the
church's definition of politics cannot help but be rooted in more than a Christological
affirmation of the triumphant reign of God. Indeed, every political notion, including
"triumph" and "reign" must be reevaluated by the transformed description of politics
found in the church, and the God that the church worships. In summary, it is
important to note that perhaps the most fundamental difference between
O'Donovan's description of political theology and the theological politics of
Hauerwas comes from whose definition of politics is being used. Is politics
something that the world and church must participate in (the church being the people
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who point to the correct authority), or is the church the true form of politics given to
a world that does not know how to relate to itself?
The debate between Hauerwas and O'Donovan that follows will begin by addressing
how each of them reads Scripture, with emphasis given to the eschatological
metaphors adopted by one or the other. Furthermore, this chapter works to illuminate
the ways in which the reticence of Hauerwas' approach stands in stark contrast to
O'Donovan's description of the triumphant reign of God. As alluded to above, it
should become clear that Hauerwas spends his time redefining the language of
Christian discourse (and the possibilities of knowledge) by identifying Lordship with
Martyrdom, instead of Caesar-like sovereignty. On the other hand, O'Donovan
attempts to recover the notion of authority for political theology, and provides an
account of obligation, responsibility, and judgment, when faced with competing, or
shared, authorities. The first section outlines O'Donovan's description of Christian
politics in full. The second focuses on Hauerwas' reading of O'Donovan as well as
the difference in the definitions provided by each when faced with similar Christian
vocabulary - definitions based in alternate structures of eschatological knowing.
The Word Made Strange
In 1994, Arne Rasmusson published his Ph.D. through Lund University Press
entitled The Church as PoIis.ni In his book, Rasmusson describes political theology
as:
the attempt to positively meet the challenges of modernity, characterized by
industrialization, urbanization, science, technology, market economy and a
growing state and its various ideological backbones in liberalism and
socialism, with their common beliefs in progress and in politics as a means
1 "3 Q
for consciously forming the future".
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Rasmusson defines political theology as just another mode of apologetics taken up
by the church in order to make her faith more comfortable to the modern world.
Dissatisfied with both modernity and political theology, Rasmusson seeks an
alternative in the writings of Stanley Hauerwas. According to Rasmusson, the
Hauerwasian difference is in the prioritization of the theological over the political.
Instead of a political theology, the church should have a theological politics. For
Rasmusson, Hauerwas' theological politics provides a description of the church as a
counter polis, or civitas, which is constituted "by the new reality of the kingdom of
God as seen in the life and destiny of Jesus. [Hauerwas].. .therefore understands the
139
politics of the world, and relates to it, in light of this new politics." Thus, a
theological politics does not allow itself to be situated and interpreted within a pre-
theological story about the political struggle for emancipation, rather it makes the
church's story a counter story, situating and interpreting the politics (and political
arrangements) of the world. In short, the move from political theology to theological
politics requires the redefinition and relocation of politics by (and in) the church.
Rasmusson's argument that Hauerwas' writings constitute a shift from political
theology to theological politics is a reading explicitly approved (in 1995) by
Hauerwas in a collection of essays titled, In Good Company (a collection which
identified itself as a direct response to Rasmusson).140
In 1996, one year after Hauerwas released In Good Company, Oliver O'Donovan
published his stunning defense of political theology entitled, The Desire of the
Nations: Rediscovering the roots of political theology.'41 O'Donovan begins his
139 Ibid. pp. 187-88
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argument with a definition of political theology (to avoid its caricature). According
to O'Donovan, political theology does not suppose a "literal synonymity" between
soteriological political language and the secular use of the same political terms.
Rather,
[i]t postulates an analogy - not a rhetorical metaphor only, or a poetic image,
but an analogy grounded in reality - between the acts of God and human acts,
both of them taking place within the one public history which is the theatre of
God's saving purposes and mankind's social undertakings.142
In the prologue to Desire, O'Donovan begins by noting the plethora of political
theology present within the second stanza of the Te Deum, pointing out that it is not
the case that words like "king," "judge," "glory," and "overcome" reduce the
"semiotic range of speech about God" to the vernacular of political commentary, but
that political theology pushes "back the horizon of commonplace politics and open[s]
it up to the activity of God."143 According to O'Donovan, political theology must
look eschatologically to the "horizon of God's redemptive purposes," for it is only in
sight of the exalted Christ that both politics and theology can find their telos. In order
to understand the totality of God's saving work, a conceptual system is needed that
takes into account God's redemption of human sociality and the structures that
govern it:
Theology needs more than scattered political images; it needs a full political
conceptually. The two are concerned with the one history that finds its goal
in Christ, 'the desire of the nations'.144
The criticism of occasional and non-systematic theologies of the political is clear. At
this point the criticism is not of Hauerwas per se, but more generally of those
unwilling to think about the public consequences of Christ's redemptive act. While
O'Donovan acknowledges the truth of individual salvation, he is concerned that the
imagery of "kingdom" and "reign" has been lost. Salvation has been sequestered and
privatized; it has lost its transformative and conceptual power for shaping the public
142




life - life together. O'Donovan's enterprise rejects modernity insofar as it is the
antithesis of political theology. For O'Donovan, the task of political theology is the
redefinition of the possibilities of politics. Where modernity goes wrong is in its
attempt to limit those possibilities by confining politics to the sphere of private
human reason, making theology and politics utterly separate (an attempt that
O'Donovan describes as "forced and unnatural").145
While O'Donovan and Hauerwas both follow Maclntyre in rejecting modernity, they
disagree about what "politics" and "possibility" mean. The Flauerwasian question
posed to O'Donovan's project is: if the horizon of commonplace politics is forced to
find a new telos in the eschatological activity of Christ, what provision is O'Donovan
willing to make to ensure that political language (like "king," "reign," etc.) is defined
in distinctively Christian terms? That is to say, in what way does the notion of the
"Kingdom of God" imitate or differ from the meaning and uses of "kingdom" as
found in commonplace political commentary? As we will see, for Hauerwas the
Christ-event exposes the impossibility of politics (life in common) in the world;
where politics becomes possible (where salvation is located) is in the church - a new
sociality that replicates, participates in, and is sustained by the God-who-is-love. For
O'Donovan, God's redemption opens up new possibilities for every human
relationship, every sociality, and every politics. The difference between them is the
difference between political theology and theological politics. These designations do
not represent merely a preference in phrasing, rather they underscore fundamental
difference in the way each understands the character of God and His activity in the
world. Finally it should be noted that the account of O'Donovan's failures and
successes that follows is crucial for the project to which the second half of this thesis
is committed: the construction of a (Hauerwasian) gathered politics-of-love - a
politics whose own life together is a participation in the life of the Trinity qua
peaceable difference and being-in-communion.
145 Ibid. p. 3
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O'Donovan: Exaltation, Authorization, Christendom
In the first chapter ofDesire, O'Donovan sets as his central thesis the recovery of the
concept of authority for a theological account of the reign of God.146 According to
O'Donovan, if the reign of God is to be the starting point for political theology, then
political history, generally, must be subsumed within the history of God's reign
particularly.147 That is to say, there is no history of politics separate from the story of
God's reign, i.e., the history of salvation. Therefore O'Donovan's hermeneutic for
reading Scripture, i.e., for reading salvation history, begins with the recovery of
146
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Lordship of Christ and his reign.
147 This is O'Donovan's claim for the last third of the first chapter as he discusses the inclusion of all
political history in redemption history by looking closely at what it means for Israel's political
categories to become normative for the whole world. This claim runs parallel to that made by
Cullman, as will be discussed in chapter 4, namely, that the redemption of the nations is reliant upon
the reintegration of the general timeline and the redemptive timeline. For O'Donovan, the general
timeline can only begin to cross back into the redemptive timeline if it begins to see itself as a
derivative of Israel. That is to say, for O'Donovan the separation between Fallen and redeemed
politics begins in the Fall, and it is through God's working in history that redeemed politics begin to
come to the fore in Israel. Moreover, after Christ it can only be the case that the church begins to see
"Israel's political categories" as "the paradigm for all others. Jesus belonged to Israel; and Israel was,
for him as for his followers, the theatre of God's self-disclosure as the ruler of nations." (23).
Therefore, for O'Donovan, the Lordship, or exaltation of Jesus, can only be interpreted in light of
Israel's own political categories, namely that, "the hope of a new national life for Israel was the hope
of a restored world order." (Ibid). The history of redemption, begun in Israel and realized in Jesus, is
mirrored, albeit darkly, in the fragmentary, clouded, political categories that though annexed by the
world and the general timeline, are nevertheless critical if theology is to begin to recover an authentic
account of itself as political. For O'Donovan, this task cannot help but include evangelism, which is of
course reminding the world of the theological underpinning of their political terminology. Flelping the
nations to honestly reflect on the historical origins of their own political terms can point nowhere but
to Israel and Jesus. Thus the evangelical work of Desire begins by exhorting the nations to be better
than they are and to "make [the] politics [of the nations] more honest without presuming to make...
[their politics] more divine." (3).
The difficulty with all of this is that it is founded on O'Donovan's claim that: "Theology needs more
than scattered political images; it needs a full political conceptually. And politics, for its part, needs a
theological conceptuality." (2). Here O'Donovan reinforces the modern separation between politics
and theology (whilst arguing against that separation), on the grounds that theology and politics really
do need one another. The problem is not that they need one another, yet have been separated; it is that
theology and politics are seen to be referring to two different activities, or perhaps a general activity
and a more particular use of that activity. Rather as will be argued throughout this thesis, theology
doesn't need politics because theology is politics. Any politics that does not have the shape of
theological orthodoxy, or for that matter Jesus Christ, is still theological insofar as it merely adopts a
different theology (possibly secular). This is the point that Milbank makes against philosophy and
sociology in Theology as Social Theory. Conversely, any theology which is not political, falls, as
O'Donovan notes, into the modern Kantian trap (2). Yoder's account of the theological task as
didaskalos is particularly helpful in establishing every theological articulation as a political act, either
as evangelism (to the nations) or discipline (within the church).
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political concepts within Scripture itself. According to O'Donovan, the only way to
construct the full political conceptuality needed by theology is via the authorization
of Scripture. Thus political theological concepts cannot be arbitrary, but must reflect
the revealed character of the kingdom of God.
The exegesis of these concepts begins in the analogy between God's rule and human
rule—the reign of God. This analogy, according to biblical scholar Gerhard Lohfink,
is implicit in the very logic of creation, describing the salvation of the whole world
which begins with a particular people:
[H]ow can anyone change the world and society at its roots without taking away
freedom? It can only be that God begins in a small way, at one single place in
the world. There must be a place, visible, tangible, where the salvation of the
world can begin: that is, where the world becomes what it is supposed to be
according to God's plan. Beginning at that place, the new thing can spread
abroad, but not through persuasion, not through indoctrination, not through
violence. Everyone must have the opportunity to come and see. All must have
the chance to behold and test this new thing. Then, if they want to, they can
allow themselves to be drawn into the history of salvation that God is creating...
What drives them to the new thing cannot be force, not even moral pressure, but
only the fascination of a world that is changed.148
It is therefore from the analogy between God and the world that O'Donovan begins
to draw the political concepts of the kingdom of God; a kingdom embodied in Israel
and fulfilled in Jesus.149 So it is that O'Donovan's argument deftly moves between
reading Scripture as revealed history "and the formation of political concepts aimed
at the distinct theological task of providing an account of God's will and way."150
The method for O'Donovan's project is the formation of a "unifying conceptual
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structure" which connects political themes with both eschatology and salvation
history.151 O'Donovan's search for "true political concepts" begins with the notion of
authority and extends to the manifestation of that authority in the history of God's
reign.
According to O'Donovan, the concept of authority has "wasted away into
unintelligibility, and with it the idea of political activity as kingly."152 And it is this
notion (that the reign of God actually describes God's ruling over the lives of men)
that O'Donovan notes is so appalling to Western sensibilities. This is precisely why
William Schweiker, in "Freedom and Authority in Political Theology," begins his
exploration of O'Donovan's work with the words: "it is hard to imagine in the light
of biblical claims about God's reign that any legitimate authority could be tyrannous.
God is free and God rules, but the divine Lordship can only be understood in non-
tyrannous ways."153 Schweiker's disagreement with O'Donovan revolves around
O'Donovan's lack of attention to the "experience" of the church and its members.
For Schweiker, it is dangerous to: (1) make monolithic statements about the nature of
secular politics, and (2) make dogmatic assertions about orthodox Christian belief in
such a pluralistic age. Interestingly, Schweiker ascribes this conservatism in
O'Donovan as being reducible to his lack of concern for "individual" experience. Yet
as O'Donovan notes in his response to Schweiker entitled "Deliberation, History and
Reading," the objections Schweiker raises are rooted in the very modernity that seeks
to separate theology from politics. According to O'Donovan:
[Ejxperience cannot be our starting-point, since experience is what is
problematised in a deliberative enquiry. We do not know how to experience
events. That is to say, we have to learn to conceive what we live through.
Experience is mediated through conception; but in late-modern political
culture the conceptions are either lacking or in disarray. So political
experience needs to be puzzled over...in conceiving of theology as
deliberative reasoning, encountering experience where philosophy has always
131
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encountered it, not as 'source' but as quaestio, a puzzle that insists on being
addressed.154
The danger with encountering experience "where philosophy has," is the danger of
attempting to step "outside" or "behind" one's experience. This is also the danger of
modernity. The more modest approach that O'Donovan seems to suggest in Desire
ought to be the mediation of our conceptions via our experience—a kind of
epistemological constructionism. Yet such a position requires an account of
collective experience or tradition that surely extends beyond that of the individual.
To put it more bluntly, if O'Donovan wants redemptive history to be the truth-tester
of political concepts, then one cannot begin to puzzle at that historic experience of
God's working, except from in the middle of it.
In his attempt to recover authority as the foundation of God's kingly activity,
O'Donovan contrasts "historicism" with "historical." Historicism, O'Donovan states,
is the concept that "makes the process of history the sole content of history."155 It
looks forward to the resolution of human aspirations within the history of the world;
it dubs progress as real.156 The past, therefore, can have no meaning for those in the
present, except as a memory of what the present has escaped from. This Hegelian
historicism recalls past memory merely to justify the present, vindicating all
progressive moves toward the future. To escape this, O'Donovan places political
history within the history of God's kingly reign so that three elements are added that
remove politics from the grasp of historicism: (1) politics becomes an activity within
the order of an eschatological creation;157 (2) political content is removed from
institutions and authority is given to the political act (the political act, i.e., "the
divinely authorised act," becomes the subject of political theology rather than
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divinely authorized institutions158); and (3) politics is given a starting point (namely
the revealed history of Israel).159 Thus for O'Donovan, it is the goal of political
theology to be historical. By attending to the history of divine rule, and attempting to
situate that rule within the logic of the particular history of God's people, it becomes
possible for O'Donovan to treat the historical political experience of God's people as
normative.
By carefully examining the narrative shape of the Old Testament, O'Donovan begins
to trace out the unifying political concepts employed by the various authors, using
these to interpret the narrative and make it politically intelligible. Indeed,
"O'Donovan develops his analysis of the kingdom of God by identifying four
leading political terms associated with it—salvation, judgment, possession and praise
(Israel's response)."160 Moreover, according to O'Donovan, the full conceptually of
these four terms begins to provide the framework necessary for exploring the
questions (and misgivings) about authority posed by the Western tradition.
Nicholas Wolterstorff has noted several important characteristics of the kingship of
Yhwh in explication of O'Donovan's four terms. Firstly, one of the manifestations
of Yhwh's kingship was the execution of judgment in Israel, the medium of which
was two-fold: "the emergence of a body of law, understood as YHWH's law, and the
work of those who decide cases in accord with the law."161 Secondly, the refrain
"Yhwh, King of Israel" was understood as denoting Yhwh not only as deliverer but
also protector of Israel. And thirdly, "the refrain was understood as proclaiming that
Yhwh had secured to Israel those fundamental possessions whose handing-on made
its life as this particular people possible—namely, law and land."162 From this
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discussion, Wolterstorff accurately summarizes O'Donovan's use of the concept of
authority which becomes the over-arching framework upon which Desire's political
theology ultimately rests.163 As Wolterstorff puts it, O'Donovan's definition of
authority has four parts: (1) political existence rests upon structures of command and
obedience;164 (2) the political rule obeyed must first be authorized; (3) the human
political act can only be divinely authorized;165 and (4) authorized political rule over
a people must protect them from danger, promote their heritage, and judge cases
which arise among the people.166 Therefore the covenant between Yhwh and Israel
is the rubric upon which any discussion of authority and divine rule must be based.
This is true for O'Donovan precisely because, "Out of the self-possession of this
people [Israel] in their relation to God springs the possibility of other peoples'
possessing themselves in God."167 This is the heart of the Isaiahic proclamation:
"Yhwh is our judge! Yhwh is our lawgiver! Yhwh is our king! He it is that will
save us" (Isaiah 33:22). This proclamation must be acknowledged not as belonging
to Israel alone, but to the heart of all political conceptuality, including that of the
nations.
Upon his exegesis of these four biblical concepts, O'Donovan goes on to articulate
six theorems which he claims summarize Israel's political experience under the reign
ofYhwh, and which can be extrapolated to articulate the truth of politics among the
nations as well. According to O'Donovan, these theorems provide the necessary
163 O'Donovan eventually argues that this notion of authority is the hermeneutic via which the
exegesis of Scripture should occur. As noted by Colin Greene, "It is the primacy of such a notion of
authority based on the idea of divine rule that O'Donovan vigorously defends as both ontologically
prior and superior to other possible Old Testament political categories such as covenant, law and
land." (Greene, "Revisiting Christendom," p. 316). For O'Donovan, authority is prior precisely
because it is the category into which all other concepts are subsumed. That is to say, it is only through
the notion of political authority under divine rule, i.e., in salvation history, that covenant, law and land
become meaningful rather than arbitrary. If O'Donovan used the language of the Lordship ofChrist he
would be encouraging an almost Anabaptist reading of the Old Testament.
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"framework for exploring the major questions about authority posed by the Western
168tradition." The six theorems are as follows:
1. Political authority arises where power, the execution of right, and the
perpetuation of tradition are assured together in one co-ordinated
169
agency.
2. That any regime should actually come to hold authority, and should
continue to hold it, is a work of divine providence in history, not a mere
1 70
accomplishment of the human task ofpolitical service.
3. In acknowledging political authority, society proves its political
identity.171
4. The authority of a human regime mediates divine authority in a unitary
structure, but is subject to the authority of law within the community,
which bears independent witness to the divine command.172
5. The appropriate unifying element in international order is law rather than
173
government.
6. The conscience of the individual members of a community is a repository
of the moral understanding which shaped it, and may serve to perpetuate
it in a crisis of collapsing morale or institution.174
For our purposes it is most important to look at the combination of theorems 2, 4,
and 6 as they relate to Israel's exile, because it is in the exile that O'Donovan first
locates the biblical conception of dual authority. While all of the theorems disclose
something specific about Israel's experience of Yhwh's reign, it is during the exile
that 2, 4, and 6 especially represent Israel's attempt to make intelligible "two
168 Ibid. p. 45
169 Ibid. p. 46
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171 Ibid. p. 47
172 Ibid. p. 65
173 Ibid. p. 72
174 Ibid. p. 80
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authorities, two rules, indeed two conflicting political realities - Jerusalem and
Babylon."175 As noted by O'Donovan:
Augustine did not misread the text in taking it as the model for his conception
of two political entities coexistent in one time and space (C. Faustum XII.36;
City of God 19.26). We need only enter the caveat that there are two ways of
identifying the duality in this situation: on the one hand, there are two 'cities'
the social entities of Israel and Babylon which live side by side; on the other,
there are the two 'rules' under which Israel finds itself, that of Babylon and
that ofYhwh.176
For O'Donovan, this perception of dual authority will persist among the people of
God until the Eschaton}11 In opposition to O'Donovan's view, Craig Bartholomew
points out that there are Old Testament texts, such as Second Isaiah, which describe a
return to Israel, "a recovery of one kingdom under one rule - that of Yahweh."178
While theorems 2, 4, and 6 particularly reflect the relationship between Israel and the
nations during the exile, it is clear by his generalized phrasing of the theorems that
O'Donovan intends to use them as the basis for the way the church acts towards the
nations. There may of course be changes insofar as the church has, at various times,
found itself sometimes in exile and sometimes in Christendom. At least it should
raise suspicions, insofar as to some extent O'Donovan seems to be, as Yoder would
put it, getting an "ought" from an "is." While this could be argued in many respects,
it is clearly true in O'Donovan's implied claim in 2, 4, and 6, similar to that found
(as we will see in Chapter 4) in Cullman and Yoder, which says that God's
providence ensures, or at least vindicates, the divine right of rulers, outside the
community identified as God's people, precisely because they are ruling.
For O'Donovan, the fulfillment of Isaiah's prophecy is realized in Jesus Christ, for it
is in him that "the kingdom ofGod has come near" (Mark 1:15). Thus the disclosure
175
Greene, "Revisiting Christendom," p. 316. See Jeremiah, Esther, and Daniel.
176
O'Donovan, Desire ofthe Nations, p. 83
177
Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds, p. 93
17s
Bartholomew, "Introduction," p. 30
76
of the reign of God is both proclaimed and embodied in Jesus.179 It is Jesus of
Nazareth who completely reconfigures the political landscape of Israel's "Two
Kingdom's" conception via His proclamation of a new order—an order which
completely sweeps away existing forms of government.180 If Christ is the
embodiment of God's authority, then His existence relativizes all other forms of
governance. For O'Donovan, the mediation of God's political authority in Jesus is
manifested in four central themes of the Christ-event: Advent, Passion, Resurrection,
and Exaltation. As noted by Greene:
advent exemplified not primarily by the birth narratives found only in Luke
and Matthew, but by the baptism of Jesus common to all the gospels,
discloses that this 'event is focused upon the divine act of authorisation'. Not
surprisingly the passion constitutes the confrontation of divine authority,
representatively expressed in the person of Jesus, with all other authorities
and rulers who challenged his embodiment of the sovereignty of God's
kingdom.181
In Desire's prequel, Resurrection and Moral Order, O'Donovan notes that it is
through Christ's "triumphant rising from the grave" in the resurrection, that God's
created order is vindicated (and restored).182 It is the "invisibility of the ascension
[exaltation]" that "reminds us of what is still to come."183 Just as creation is
vindicated, so also is Jesus (as the mediator of God's authority in heaven and on
earth), by the coronation language used to describe His exaltation. For, according to
O'Donovan, "It was not a private vindication but a public one; it was the fulfillment
of the political promise which Jesus had come to bring, and his own authorisation as
the representative of the Kingdom ofGod."184 Thus, Christ subdues the nations.
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Yet O'Donovan resists the urge to let the story end in the Gospels, and so turns to the
rest of the New Testament. He begins by quoting St Paul's proclamation that God
has "disarmed the principalities and powers and made a public show of them in
Christ's triumphal procession" (Col 2:15). According to O'Donovan, there are two
eschatological assumptions made by Paul about these principalities: (1) the
authorities of the world have been made subject to God's sovereignty in the
exaltation; and (2) the truth of this is apocalyptic, awaiting the final parousia of
Christ to become fully visible. It is, O'Donovan continues, "Within the framework of
these two assertions" that there opens up "an account of secular authority which
presumes neither that the Christ-event never occurred nor that the sovereignty of
Christ is now transparent and uncontested."185 For O'Donovan the fine line between
"already" and "not yet" is made manifest in the post-Easter proclamation, not that the
kingdom was at hand, but that the kingdom had come in Christ. Moreover for
O'Donovan, all descriptions of secular authority in the New Testament must spring
forth from the primacy of Christ's authority, the annunciation ofwhich, in word and
deed, is the mission of the church; conversely, Christ's dispensation of authority to
the nations is his authorization of a particular task. Thus O'Donovan poses the
question: is secular authority compatible with the church's mission, and assuming it
is, in what sense is that authority reauthorized by it? The answer: "If the mission of
the church needs a certain social space, for men and women of every nation to be
drawn into the governed community of God's Kingdom, then secular authority is
186authorised to provide and ensure that space." In defense of his claim that the Two
Kingdoms conception has been reauthorized, with the caveat that all authority is now
under Christ, O'Donovan turns first to 1 Timothy 2:1, and then to Romans 13:1-7.
While O'Donovan's account sounds extraordinarily similar to that provided by
Yoder in The Politics of Jesus, it should be noted that there is one important
difference between them, namely, O'Donovan does not believe that all the powers
187
are demonic. O'Donovan's discussion of the powers prefers to use the word
185 Ibid. p. 146
186 Ibid.
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"authorities," and notes that there are at least two kinds, "political and demonic."188
That is not to say that an authority cannot be both political and demonic, but that the
possibility exists that an authority be either/or. What this seems to imply is that not
all the powers, or authorities, were Fallen; at the very least, not all of the authorities
usurp or supplant the good of God after the exaltation. This is made clear in
O'Donovan's objection to Yoder's The Christian Witness to the State, where he
notes an absence of reference "to Christ's triumph and the state's subjection, or
189
semisubjection." Rather, "[t]he language of principalities and powers was invoked
solely to point up the demonic character of the state, requiring 'at best
acquiescence'."190 For O'Donovan, the subjection of the state, or its semisubjection,
results in the state no longer possessing demonic (or Fallen) qualities. Rather the
self-positing demonism of the authorities/powers has been replaced by divine
authorization. In this way the authorities/powers cease to be demonic, and in light of
their new task become political tools of the exalted Christ. Yet if God reauthorizes
the authorities/powers as they are, then it is unclear what was Fallen about them in
the first place.191 There is never a time when the authorities voluntary give up their
authority to the exalted Christ, who then reauthorizes them for a particular task.
Rather it seems that on O'Donovan's analysis, the powers are authorized to do a
187 This is not to make a differentiation between privative and positive accounts of evil. When I use
the word "demonic" it refers to the usurpation of authority.
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particular task in their Fallenness. That is to say, the means/methods of the
authorities, i.e., the use of the sword, are not called in to question in regards to their
authorized task. So if not all the powers are demonic/Fallen after the exaltation, yet
God authorizes them to a particular task as they are (without calling them to the
fullness of discipleship in the church), then it must be the case that not all the
authorities/powers were Fallen in the first place. It will be useful to look at the
Scriptural basis for O'Donovan's account of the relationship between the reign of the
exalted Christ and the secular authorities in order to better understand any
inconsistencies in O'Donovan's position.
In his first letter to Timothy, St. Paul writes:
First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and
thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all who are in high
positions, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and
dignity. (1 Timothy 2:1, 2).
O'Donovan argues that these prayers and intercessions occur on behalf of all
humanity, by that portion of humanity which represents mankind under the rule of
God's authority: the church.192 While ultimately the church prays for the Master's
return, it more immediately prays for kings and all in authority.193 Here O'Donovan
raises the question: How is it that the immediate prayer for kings is subsumed under
"the ultimate horizon" of God's saving purposes? The answer: by providing their
subjects with "a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and dignity" (presumably
through the extermination of the noisy barbarians) through which the church can
accomplish its mission.194 He closes with Paul's affirmation that this "is right and
acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who desires everyone to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:3, 4). Although he does point out that
192 There are definitely parallels here with Cullman's notion of election as found in Christ and Time
(Cullman, O. 1949. Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History. Trans.
F.V. Filson. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press.). It would be interesting to look beyond Cullman's
soteriological uses of the term by looking at the political significance of the concept, particularly as
used by O'Donovan.
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it is not clear whether it is the work of kings, or the church's prayers for them, which
are approved of, O'Donovan claims that the principle is the same either way.
Yet O'Donovan's argument is not entirely convincing on two fronts. Firstly, it seems
most likely that St. Paul is referring to the church's prayers as "right" and
"acceptable," rather than the kings themselves, for directly following verse 4, Paul
reaffirms the sole authority of Christ: "For there is one God; there is also one
mediator between God and humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human, who gave
himself a ransom for all" (1 Tim. 2:5, 6). While naming Jesus as the sole mediator
between God and humankind does not necessarily refute the possibility of secular
government having a place (or at least a function to fill) in the reign of God, chapter
2, verses 5 and 6, make it quite clear that it is for the function of the church, and
salvation of mankind, that these prayers are offered, not for the wellbeing of kings.
Indeed, there does not seem to be enough evidence to support the claim that 1
Timothy 2:1-4 proclaims the reauthorization of secular governments, especially in
light of the sole authority of Christ affirmed in verse 5 and 6. The second difficulty
with O'Donovan's reading is his assumption that a prayer for peace is, in reality, a
utilitarian call by the early church for violence (albeit violence that ensures peace).
There is no sense in the passage that blessing the nations will convince them to
provide the church with peace, rather the passage seems to reflect Paul's confession
to Timothy in chapter 2, verses 12-15, that Paul, a "man of violence," received
overabundant mercy and grace, making him a disciple of the "King of the ages"
(2:17). As such, everyone, including the kings, and all who are in high positions,
should be prayed for in the hope that in them will be fostered a "knowledge of the
truth" and a "desire...to be saved" by the "one mediator...Christ Jesus...who gave
himself a ransom for all" (2:3-6). The mark of their salvation will be repentance and
a turning away from their sins, including heresy, persecution and violence (2:13).
It is in the hope of justifying his account of the reauthorization of secular governance
that O'Donovan turns to his second proof-text, which he labels as the "most disputed
discussion of political authority in the New Testament": Romans 13:1-7. In Romans
13, versus 1 through 7, St Paul writes:
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Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no
authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been
instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a
terror to good conduct, but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the
authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval; for it is
God's servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong you should be
afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of
God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be subject, not
only because of wrath but also because of conscience. For the same reason
you also pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, busy with this very
thing. Pay to all what is due them—taxes to whom revenue is due, respect to
whom respect is due, honor to whom honor is due (Romans 13:1-7).
According to O'Donovan, Romans 13 has as its aim "the definition of the ruler's
right," that is to say, it provides a description of "the authority which remains to
secular government in the aftermath of Christ's triumph."195
The key to understanding Romans 13, according to O'Donovan, is reading this
passage in the same context in which Paul originally set it, i.e., "his claim for the
continued significance of Israel as a social entity in God's plans for final
redemption."196 Thus for O'Donovan, Paul's response to the "authorities" arises
naturally from his commitment to Israel. The victory promised to Israel over the
nations is that victory which is fulfilled in Christ: "the victory of a God-filled and
humanized social order over bestial and God-denying empires."197 The role assigned
to the "chastened and reduced" authorities, which have been brought to the
obedience of Israel and her God, is the same, says O'Donovan, as the functions once
assigned to Israel's judges. Following Paul, O'Donovan observes government to be
"an avenger" whose purpose is "visiting wrath on the wrong doer."198 It adjudicates
disputes between two parties, not by encouraging reconciliation, but through "praise"
on the one hand and "discipline" on the other.
195 Ibid. p. 152




O'Donovan continues, "No respect can be paid to the role of government, then, as a
focus of collective identity" for it is Christ who is "the true Israelite and the true
representative of the human race."199 Rather, the sole role of government identified
by St Paul is judgment. It is the judgment of the governing authorities that must be
respected, for it is their judgment, the wrath of God, which allows a space to be
created and preserved in which the Gospel can be spread. O'Donovan notes that
while Christians are subject to the wrath "ministered" by secular government, they
should have no fear as long as the works they do are good. Thus, the subjection
expected of the church "is not the subjection of fear (diet ten orgen) but the cordial
recognition of the judicial function based on respect for its place in God's purposes, a
respect born of 'conviction' (dia ten suneidesin)." 00 O'Donovan notes that the
respect for the judgment of secular governance explains in part St Paul's dismay at
litigation between Christians (1 Corinthians 6: Iff). If the church is to be governed by
Christ alone, then allowing secular governance into the brotherhood, in order to
receive their judgment, belies a diminishment ofChrist's authority.201
There are several unasked and unanswered questions in O'Donovan's account: On
what ground is the judgment of government based? How does the government come
to know that ground, i.e., where does the knowledge of will and wrath of God come
199 Ibid. p. 148
200 Ibid.
201 IfO'Donovan is right there seems to be an excessive amount of judgment going on for Christians.
If he is correct, then it is the government's role to judge all wrongdoers, including Christians. If one
Christian wrongs another, O'Donovan suggests (along with St Paul) that the assembly should handle
the matter. But what if the government hears of this? Is the church to speak up and demand, citing the
primacy of Christ's authority, their right (and obligation) to handle the matter within the church?
Perhaps Paul's dismay is that the two Christians brought the case before a governing authority rather
than to a bishop, yet I find it hard to believe that Paul would suggest that the church hide their
wrongdoers from the world. There seems to be a bit of a dilemma when it comes to who has authority
over Christians. Surely it is Christ, but to whom has Christ given authority to judge Christians on
earth? Is it to the governing authorities or to the bishops? And if, as O'Donovan argues, the church
court is merely for the discerning of God's "right" rather than to separate the guilty from the innocent,
is Paul wrong to be dismayed if two Christians go before the authorities over a "criminal" dispute?
While it is clear that this was one of the big questions addressed for the whole of Christendom, the
answers seems less clear where we are now, in a post-Christendom era. And while this is definitely a
digression, I think that it must be dealt with (if not here) precisely because of the implications an
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Sin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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from? And is the epistemic source for Christian knowledge about God's wrath
located in the government? Judgment requires reason, and reason requires
knowledge. If the government makes just judgments consistently, it is unlikely that
this is accidental. If this knowledge is revealed by God then the government must
acknowledge Christ precisely because, for O'Donovan, Christ is the progenitor of all
revelation. On the other hand, if consistent just judgment on the part of government
is not accidental, and is not based upon knowledge of Christ, then it must be the case
that God directly intercedes. If this is the case, then God's will in the world can be
known by closely monitoring international affairs. While this is a tried and true
practice among some forms of American evangelicalism, God's will has a tendency
to suddenly become murky when governments disagree. Finally, it cannot be the case
that the church's knowledge about justice is located in the activity of the
government. If this was the case then Hitler's Germany, and Pinochet's Chile, could
never be condemned by the church. The only option left on the table is, as we will
see in later chapters, that offered by Yoder: a vision of secular authorities whom are
no longer mediators of God's rule, but merely his judgment.202 It is this judgment
that, as Yoder would put it, polices203 society and opens up a space for the church to
be the church. As O'Donovan notes, "The power that they exercise in defeating their
enemies, the national possessions they safeguard, these are now rendered irrelevant
by Christ's triumph...[n]o government has a right to exist, no nation has a right to
defend itself;" these claims are overwhelmed by the immediacy of Christ's
Kingdom.204 There is one kingdom and one ruler, but the political authority of the
202 It is unclear if the authorities were mediators of God's rule after the Fall.
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Strangely, O'Donovan criticizes Yoder at this point for seeing Romans 13 not as referring to war
and the death penalty, but to the "police function" of the State. It seems to me that there is not at all
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ruler has been given partially into the hands of men—in part to the governing
authorities, but only so that they might make space for the church and her mission.
O'Donovan begins his discussion of the church, and the authority that has been given
it, with a definition of the political society called church:
Describing the church as a political society means to say that it is brought
into being and held in being, not by a special function it has to fulfill, but by a
government that it obeys in everything. It is ruled and authorised by the
ascended Christ alone and supremely; it therefore has its own authority; and
205is not answerable to any other authority that may attempt to subsume it.
In O'Donovan's analysis therefore, the church is like a "household staff who cannot
be held answerable to one domestic regime because they...belong to another."206
Indeed, the nature of the dual authority under which the church finds itself has two
forms, according to O'Donovan: exilic and post-exilic.207 The exilic form articulates
two peoples living side by side until the parousia2m The post-exilic form is that
which identifies one's rulers as alien (and usually illegitimate).209 Indeed, the only
real difference between the exilic and post-exilic forms of dual authority is that the
exilic form is more accommodationist and complicit with authorities who are shown
to be false in the post-exilic world view. For now we will look in more detail at the
church side of the church-world divide as found in O'Donovan.
this way, war would be a swift punishment for those authorities that reject the judgment of the
international community.
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To speak of the independent political authority of the church is to speak of its
authorization at Pentecost.210 Yet according to O'Donovan, it is important that
Pentecost not be seen as a late addition to the Christ-event, the fifth in the series of
Advent, Passion, Restoration and Exaltation. The authorization of the church at
Pentecost occurs by the uniting of the church with the authorization of Christ. It is
through the descending of the Spirit at Pentecost that the apostles are opened up to,
and allowed to participate in, the Exaltation. "But," notes O'Donovan, "since that
moment is not isolated, but sums up the whole of the Christ event, so Pentecost
unites the church not only with the works of power and public display that attest his
211
triumph but with the service, sacrifice, and suffering of Christ, too." Thus it is
through the Pentecost that the church is able to participate in the fullness of the
Christ-event. It is through Jesus that the church is represented in the Exaltation, and
through the Spirit that the church can participate in it. In short, it is via this two-fold
conference of representation and participation to the church, by Christ and the Holy
Spirit respectively, that the church both represents and participates in the authority of
Christ. In the words of O'Donovan: "Represented, it is authorised to represent Israel,
the people of the Kingdom, possessed of the identity promised to the patriarchs.
Participating, it is authorised to be the gathering nations, finding the new world order
in the rule of Israel's God."212
Perhaps O'Donovan's best insight concerning ecclesiology is his identification of
four characteristics of the church that mirror the four moments of the Christ event: in
response to the advent, the church is a gathering community; in response to the
passion, the church is a suffering community; in response to the resurrection, the
church is glad, celebrating the vindicated creation order; in response to the
213
exaltation, the church speaks prophecy, the words of God. Thus the hidden
authority of the church becomes tangible by its speech; in the same manner as Christ,
210
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the church establishes God's kingdom through God's word. Particularly, O'Donovan
states, the tangibility of God's church arises from its sacraments, the manifestation of
its speech in praise of God. As the church recapitulates the saving acts of Christ
through the performance of a series of "formed acts and observances," the church is
granted order and becomes visible. Thus it is through the sacraments that the world
can know where the church is, and be gathered to it.214 Moreover, it is through the
authorized church that the gathered are bound to the community; a church which then
calls upon those bound to defy all other communities who make rival claims on their
allegiance, ruling out all who do not make the apostolic confession.215 In chapters 5
and 6, these images, and particularly the notion of the church as a gathering
community, will be central to repairing the work of Yoder, Hauerwas, and by default,
O'Donovan.
William Cavanaugh has rightly observed that, "If the history of salvation did not
simply begin a long detour in the fourth century, we must be able to account for the
continuity of the church before and after Constantine."216 This is, arguably, the task
to which Desire is aimed, for surely if a political theology cannot adequately explain
the Christendom era then it is useless to those living post-Christendom. "Fourth-
century Christians did not", says Cavanaugh, "simply become drunk with power and
move the church off its foundations."217 Rather, according to Cavanaugh, a shift in
Christian thinking and practice occurred as to the way in which the Kingdom of God
ought to be made manifest in the world.
O'Donovan identifies Christendom as the idea of a "professedly Christian secular
political order" and "the history of that idea in practice."218 Stating that we are post-
Christendom, inhabiting the era named modernity, O'Donovan argues that the only
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way to understand the current modern separation of politics and theology is to first
understand the Christendom background upon which it is set.
O'Donovan begins Chapter 6 of Desire by identifying two "frontiers" of the Gentile
mission: society, and the rulers of society - pointing out, that it was the grand
success of the mission toward society that gave the church its triumphal confidence
in confronting its rulers. The distinction between the two is based upon their
differing destinies. Whereas society is destined for transformation, rulers are
designed to wither away, renouncing their own authority. Thus the church's mission
was originally concerned with gathering the masses and only later worrying about
government, but the Edict ofMilan in 313 caused a contextual volte-face. The church
was instantly transformed from minority cult to Imperial religion. Yet as O'Donovan
continues, this was the logical conclusion of their confidence in mission.219 "The
kings of the earth," they proclaimed, "had come to bow before the throne of Christ,
and the empire they had served had lost its most powerful agents."220 Thus, claims
O'Donovan, the description of Christendom is a story of witness in response to the
church's mission, and a sign that God has blessed it.221 Yet the government is not the
church; the church rather, is a distinctive witness holding the government to account
and standing as a constant reminder of its temporary nature. "As ruler, the ruler is
meant to judge," says Cavanaugh, "as member of the church, the ruler is meant to
judge with clemency; and the church is there to signal the inherent tension between
the two obligations."222
It is upon this notion of Christendom that the modern separation of politics and
theology is perpetuated—which is in part why O'Donovan considers Christendom to
be the "most significant practical instance of the conviction that theology is
219 Ibid. p. 194
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politics." By turning to the theological politics of Stanley Hauerwas in the
following section, the triumphant assurance of Christendom as Christian victory will
be called into question. While Christendom is seen as the magnum opus of Christian
missions in the work of O'Donovan, it is for Hauerwas, a mark that the church has
forgotten its peculiarity. The next section will describe this peculiar church, called
for by Hauerwas.
Hauerwas: Temperance, a Contrary Cross, and Church as the Polis of Resident
Aliens
To say that the eschatology of Stanley Hauerwas is reticent is to say that it is reticent
in relation to something else. Namely, it is reticent when compared to the dominating
eschatological enterprise—the story of God's triumphant reign—undertaken by
O'Donovan. Yet in their joint article "Remaining in Babylon: Oliver O'Donovan's
Defense of Christendom," Stanley Hauerwas and James Fodor begin their critique of
O'Donovan with the disclaimer: "there are more things on which we agree with
O'Donovan that on which we disagree."224 In the first section of their essay, Fodor
and Hauerwas limn the way in which O'Donovan should be read (an attempt to
prevent "politically conservative readers" from misconstruing O'Donovan's program
as an endorsement of "conventional political agenda[s]"225). According to Fodor and
Hauerwas, Desire should be understood as a "bold, courageous, and compelling
account of the challenges facing Christianity in a time when the church is on the
brink of extinction in modern Western cultures." Indeed, O'Donovan's
"plumbing" of "the depths and richness of the biblical texts" is to be commended.227
While taking Scripture seriously is itself a rare quality among theologians, it is even
more surprising, to Fodor and Hauerwas, that O'Donovan's use of Scripture avoids
223
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"the sequestering of the theological into the transcendental" which is the offer of
"modern political arrangements."228 According to Fodor and Hauerwas, their
departure from O'Donovan's enterprise (this is where the reticence begins) is to "the
extent that... [O'Donovan] thinks resurrection and ascension make it possible for
Christians to be more than God's wandering people."229 For Hauerwas and Fodor,
the Scripturally unapologetic nature of O'Donovan's hermeneutic is refreshing, yet
in its attempt to create an architectonic, or master-narrative (upon which "the
unifying hermeneutic principle,"230 unmasks "the authority structure"231 of God's
reign), it insinuates that more can be known "about how the story comes out" 232 than
either believe is justified. The difficulty with O'Donovan's architectonic is that it is
conceived of in primarily theoretical terms; that is, it only articulates the "structure"
and "design" of political theology.233 O'Donovan's method for the construction of
this complex "exegetical framework" is thus summarized by Fodor and Hauerwas:
Borrowing three common Hebrew words, salvation, judgment, and
possession, O'Donovan constructs an interpretative matrix, which he will
later develop and extend through a rather elaborate declension, qualifying and
relating these terms to various (six) "theorems" and (four) "moments".234
The difficulty for Fodor and Hauerwas is delineating where exactly O'Donovan
separates theory from the exegetical framework (or even whether a distinction
between the two concepts is appropriate). Despite O'Donovan's repeated claim that
his exegetical framework merely has heuristic value, he nonetheless wishes "to
'stretch' beyond the insights thereby gained and use them to make strong theoretical
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claims." While O'Donovan occasionally contends that his interpretive framework
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is a "purely exegetical schema" having "no theoretical function,"236 at other times he
conflates the two, speaking of an "exegetical and theoretical outline."237 "It is not
clear," say Fodor and Hauerwas, "in what way(s) his hermeneutical theory actually
guides his reading of and commentary on biblical texts. Nor is it readily apparent
how his exegesis informs his theoretical claims...his hermeneutical architectonic."238
It is O'Donovan's Milbankian239 attempt to create an architectonic in the first place,
which belies a desire to "rule morally." For Fodor and Hauerwas, the systematic
ambition of such a venture leaves the door wide open to temptation. They describe
such temptation as "the sinful proclivities of the human imagination and of the
seeming ineradicable human pride that reserves for political life its most virulent
manifestations."240 Accordingly the goal must be temperance, moderating theological
ambition by an ecclesiology focused more on "the eschatological 'not yet' than...the
eschatological 'already'."241
Yet the difficulties with O'Donovan's construction of an architectonic are not merely
formal, but material as well; along with the structural infelicities and contradictions,
Hauerwas and Fodor maintain some material concerns. It is important, however, to
see that O'Donovan's hermeneutic method shapes the possibilities of his material
narration. His tendency to see Scripture as a "unifying conceptual structure," when
contrasted with Fodor's and Hauerwas' belief that "Scripture is best read as an aid
for the church to 'muddle through',"242 helps clarify why the eschatological
metaphors used by O'Donovan and Hauerwas are so disparate. "Whereas
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O'Donovan seeks correlation with Israel," say Fodor and Hauerwas, "we look for
analogies."243 The material image of God's rule rises directly from O'Donovan's
formal monolithic method. It is because O'Donovan's architectonic assumes that "an
analysis and development of an account of the reign of God is the appropriate point
of departure [from Scripture],"244 that God's kingship is the only analogy used to
"push back the horizon of commonplace politics and open it up to the activity of
God."245 Interestingly, if it wasn't for the conflation of "theory" and "exegetical
framework" in his formal structure, there might indeed have been a greater hesitation
in O'Donovan's material narration when it came to marking out the Scriptural
hermeneutic (rather than solely focusing on recovering an account of the reign of
God). While O'Donovan recognizes theology's manifold witness, he deems that
political theology needs a full political conceptuality rather than scattered political
images, requiring theology to have "a unified object on which it concentrates its
witness,"246 namely, the reign of God.247 According to Fodor and Hauerwas,
however, they prefer to
[rjemain open to the possibility that there may be other images of God's care
of and love for creation that might also be just as crucial as "kingship" and
"rule"—such horticultural images and descriptions as gardening and vine
dressing, not to mention the profoundly central pastoral image of shepherding
(or that of householder or the servants who tend the estate of the absentee
landlord).248
While both Fodor and Hauerwas recognize that the rule of God is a fundamental
category in any political theology, they argue that this should not dominate and
exclude all other Scriptural metaphors that describe the relationship between God
and the world. There are other ways of knowing; as noted by Fodor and Hauerwas,
"the anointed one (Jesus) is, after all, both servant and messiah, victim and priest,
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid. p. 212
245
O'Donovan, Desire ofthe Nations, p. 2
246 Ibid. p. 21
247
Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, p. 213
248 Ibid. p. 212
92
sufferer and liberator, afflicted and physician."249 When the metaphor of God's
kingship is addressed, it is not just "the manner or mode of that rule" but also the
"peculiarity and uniqueness" of its "subject and relations" that must be attended
250
to. In short, according to Fodor and Flauerwas, O'Donovan either offers the church
"more than we should want,"251 or not quite enough. In fact, it is his exclusive use of
the "rule of God" metaphor that removes O'Donovan's ability to temper the
"already" with the "not yet."
For Hauerwas, like Yoder, Jesus is the norm for Christian ethics; that is to say, if the
character of God is revealed in Jesus, and the ethics of the church arise from an
imitation of the character of God, then the church must imitate Jesus if it is to behave
faithfully. Interestingly, however, being formed as a disciple of Christ, according to
Hauerwas, occurs prior to knowing the truth; that is to say, in order to become
truthful people, we must first submit to discipleship. Hauerwas notes,
Jesus told those who believed in him: "If you continue in my word, you are
truly my disciples; and you will know the truth and the truth will set you free"
(John 8:31-32). He also said to them, "I am the way the truth, and the life"
(John 14:6)...Note... [tjruth is not a set of propositions about the world;
rather, truth is Jesus Christ. We know truth by coming to know this person
and we know this person by learning to pray as he taught us.252
For Hauerwas, therefore, the habit of praying the "Our Father," will, over time,
provide the church with the necessary skills for performing the story of Christ, i.e.,
for being the church. Moreover, it is only in the embodiment ofHis story - through
loving as he loved - that the church recognizes the truthfulness of his story. Indeed, it
is when the church faithfully follows the revealed character of God, in Jesus, that it
proclaims Jesus as the sovereign kyrios of all things. This is the reader's first hint
that the notion of kyrios itselfmust be based upon something other than kingship as
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found amidst the nations. Thus, Hauerwas recognizes the absolute subjugation of all
the rulers of the world, resulting from the establishment of God's new kingdom in
Christ. (Despite the similarities to Yoder here, it is important to note that in
Hauerwas' early work he almost never uses the language of principalities and powers
central to Yoder's ontology). Yet rather than announcing (as does O'Donovan)
God's reauthorization of the "governing authorities," with the conferred vocation that
they open up spaces for the church's mission, Hauerwas announces their
deauthorization.
For Hauerwas, the church is God's politics in the world. The politics of the God-
who-is-love cannot but be peaceable. Indeed, peace rather than violence is the
defining characteristic of the new Kingdom. Any politics not constituted by and with
the love ofGod is a poor imitation, and should be judged as both Fallen and sinful:
Christians believe that the world is deeply bent by sin, most poignantly
manifest in the distrust that characterizes all relations between people.
Violence and coercion are not accidental to such a world but are integral to its
nature. For example,...people are not racist because they are ignorant, but
racism is a manifestation of fear, fuelled by the corrupt and prideful
assumption that the only way to get out of this life alive is by taking control
of our existence....The Christian and the Jew believe that they have been
given a special mission in such a world. Namely, they have been called to
form communities that manifest the trust and love possible between people
when they recognize the sovereignty of God over all life. To be sure, they are
often unfaithful to the task, but even their unfaithfulness points to the kind of
life that should be possible between people.253
Thus, one of Hauerwas' central convictions is that the imitation of Christ begins and
ends with love - with peace - with the refusal to violently separate from, or
coercively incorporate, the friend, stranger or enemy. The Christ-event does not
signify a transfer of authority from the secular authority to Jesus. Rather, the Christ-
event is a transformation of sovereignty itself. For Hauerwas this transformation is a
radical shift in the way that sovereign power is conceived and experienced—a shift
rooted in the cross and resurrection. Here Hauerwas is following the lead of a
different Anglican, Bishop N.T. Wright. According to Wright:
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As everyone in the Roman world knew well, the cross already had a clear
symbolic meaning; it meant that Caesar ruled the world, with cruel death as
his ultimate, and regular, weapon. For Paul... [i]t is the means whereby the
powers are defeated and overthrown (1 Cor. 2:6-8; Col. 2:13-15). The
resurrection demonstrates that the true God has a power utterly superior to
that of Caesar. The cross is thus to be seen, with deep and rich paradox, as the
secret power of this true God, the power of self-giving love which (as Jesus
said it would) subverts the power of the tyrant (Mk. 10:35-45).254
Because Christ is the sole authority, that is, because no power has been given back to
the governing authorities, those authorities do not have the power they once had.
Christ has turned the world and its power structures upside-down. Thus following
Yoder, Hauerwas believes that "when the Christian whom God has disarmed lays
aside carnal weapons, it is not in the last analysis, because they are too dangerous,
but because they are too weak."255 The imitation of Christ requires, therefore, that the
church live into the new order established by the Christ-event, an order in which
politics is a way of being together, not because the dissidents have been walled-away
or exterminated, but because the God-who-is-love gives himself to the world.
Redeemed by Christ, the world is God's good creation, even when it refuses to
acknowledge the fact. As such, it is the purpose of the church, "the people capable of
remembering and telling the story of God we find in Jesus," to "show the world what
it is meant to be."256 Hauerwas' claim is two-fold: (1) soteriological, proclaiming
God's salvation and victory over evil as the result of non-resistant love; and (2)
eschatological, proclaiming that the slain lamb will sit glorious upon the throne.257
In After Christendom, Hauerwas employs Michel de Certeau's distinction between
strategies and tactics in order to describe the distance between the ecclesiological
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program found in Christendom and that found post-Christendom. According to
Certeau, a strategy is:
[any] calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes
possible as soon as a subject that will empower (a business, an army, a city, a
scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be
delimited as its own and serves as the base from which relations with an
exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies,
the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research etc.) can
be managed. As in management, every 'strategic rationalization seeks first of
all to distinguish its 'own place', that is, the place of its own power and will,
from an 'environment'. A Cartesian attitude, if you wish: it is an effort to
delimit one's own place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the
Other. It is also the typical attitude of modern science, politics, and military
strategy.258
For Hauerwas, these type of strategies provide "a triumph of place over time insofar
as" they allow one to "acquire advantages, to prepare for future expansions, and in
general to create an independence against contingency."259 The strategic method is
characteristic of the church post-313, which adopted the self-image of an imperial
stronghold from which any number of missional forays into the world could be led.
Yet if Hauerwas is to be believed, the church is simply not the church if it is
constituted by violent power, and strategic location always presumes violent power,
because it is (to borrow from Weber) a power over those inside that location. Even
at the height of Christendom the church was never complete, never homogenous and
totalizing. It was always incomplete and heterogeneous, a fact knowable precisely
because there were still those requiring evangelization (time had not yet run out).
Accordingly, church ecclesiology must distinguish between strategic-space and
tactical-time. In Certeau's analysis, a tactic is:
[a] calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No
delineation of exteriority, then, provides it with the conditions necessary for
autonomy. The space of a tactic is the space of the other, thus it must play on
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and with the terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign
power.260
Tactics require no general strategies, but afford only ad hoc engagements. While a
tactical politics has spatial mobility, this is only true because that politics takes
advantage of opportunities in its surroundings at appropriate moments.261 As noted
by Wells, such a church is "always on the hoof—at best a resident alien."262 If the
transformation of power in the Christ-event is, as Hauerwas claims, an authorization
ofweakness, service, poverty, and peace, and if Certeau is right in that tactics are the
art of the weak, then the church must adopt a tactical ecclesiology. For Hauerwas
there can be no faithful pursuit of Scriptural metaphors that teach the church to see
itself as a bounded country, with borders, armies, and territories; it is rather the
imagination of a tactical church in, and with, the God-of-love, that provides the
moments needed in order to birth a transformed politic-of-weakness.
Yet there are two possibilities of meaning when describing the nature of strategies
and tactics, and that distinction can be made clear by questioning whether or not they
are different ways of playing the same game. It is not necessary to discover whether
Certeau identifies tactics with weakness in the sense that weak is other to power, or
if on the contrary, he is merely acknowledging weakness as a mode (or species) of
power. The real question is whether or not Hauerwas is making an ontological
difference between the two. If for Hauerwas tactical weakness is not merely a low-
status species of power (while high-status modes involve strategic coercion and
violence), but is itself something else entirely, then Hauerwas is making an
ontological move more akin to that of Milbank than either Yoder, O'Donovan, or
263Wells. Such a move would be in good company amidst his call for the re-
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Indeed, following Sam Wells and J. Denny Weaver, practices of the kingdom like making friends
or turning the other cheek belie a kind of weakness that is resistance and revolution—a subversion of
Imperial order. An alternative description of the politics and practices of weakness, as the ontological
alternative to the politics of violence, could claim no efficacy for ensuring peace among the nations,
nor in undermining their structures of coercion, nor in replacing those structures with new and better
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contextualization ofpolitical language in terms of a church who is constituted by and
in the God-who-is-love. Indeed, a similar onto/ogical distinction needs to be made
between the politics of love - tactics, weakness, and practices of peaceableness - and
the anti-politics of violence - strategies of force, power, strength, coercion, and
status games. Weakness is not a means to an end. The existence of martyrs and the
victims are not tactical attempts to wrest coercive power from the world; rather
weakness becomes a way of being possible only through the God whose own being
is weakness.264 As noted by Romand Coles:
Witness to Jesus as Lord must not be read as a solicitation to strive for a
singular and direct knockout victory over outsiders. Instead it calls for
multiple particular vulnerable encounters in which the strengths of the church
body are little by little brought to light and perhaps themselves radically
reformed and renewed.265
This notion of the weakness of the church as vulnerability will be looked at closely in
chapters 3 and 4. For now it is enough to begin asking the question in light of the
flavor of Hauerwas' postliberal political eschatology: What is it exactly that
Hauerwas means by his use of words like "tactic" and "weakness?" This is perhaps
made clearer in the "Introduction" to the First Edition ofAgainst the Nations, when,
directly following his reading of Certeau, he offers the following lengthy vision from
Milbank:
Instead of Jove, the stayer of proceeding battle, Christians worship the one
true God who originates all finite reality in the act of peaceful donation,
willing a new fellowship with himself and amongst the beings he has created.
structures. Rather, a politics of weakness in this sense must be, first and foremost, nothing other than
the result of answering the call of Jesus. To participate in the politics of weakness involves being
discipled within the community of disciples, to the person of Christ. The reason for going the extra
mile is not to embarrass the Empire through the overacceptance of suffering, but rather to serve all,
even those who would crucify the Servant. Finally, the reason for service can be nothing else except
the imitation ofChrist, and the embrace of the politics of the newpolls which is Christ's body.
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the Weak: Everyday Forms ofPeasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.) as well as
theologians (see Weaver, D. J. 2001. The Nonviolent Atonement. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.).
There is a difference between practices of resistance and the Sermon on the Mount (cf. Chapters 5 and
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In the "Heavenly City," beyond the possibility of alteration, the angels and
saints abide in such fellowship; their virtue is not the virtue of resistance and
domination, but simply of remaining in a state of self-forgetting conviviality.
Here there is nothing but "provision of peace," a condition that originally
pertained also to the temporal creation, before the sinful assertion of pride
and domination introduced a pervasive presence of conflict leading to death
in both society and nature. But God and the heavenly Jerusalem—our "true
Mother"—reached down in compassion for the salvation of the world.
Salvation from sin must mean "liberation" from political, economic, and
psychic dominium, and therefore from all structures belonging to the
saeculum, that temporal interval between the fall and final return of Christ.
This salvation takes the form of a different inauguration of a different kind of
community. Whereas the civitas terrena inherits its power from the conqueror
of a fraternal rival, the City of God on pilgrimage through this world founds
itselfnot in succession ofpower, but on the memory of the murdered brother,
Abel slayed by Cain. The City of God is in fact a paradox, "a nomad city" for
it does not have a site, or walls, or gates. It is not like Rome, an asylum
constituted by the protection offered by the dominating class over a
dominated, in the face of an external enemy. This former refuge is, in fact,
but a dim archetype of the real refuge provide by the church, which is the
forgiveness of sins. Instead of a peace "achieved through the abandonment
of the losers, a subordination ofpotential rivals and resistance to enemies,
the church provides a genuine peace by its memory of all the victims, its
equal concern for all of its citizens and its self-exposed offering of
reconciliation to enemies.266
In many ways, the above passage shows an inherent contradiction of vision within
Milbank's own project (between theoria and praxis), yet for Hauerwas, this vision of
a peace which is no longer resistance, domination, or plays for power, is instead the
self-forgetting made possible by the refuge of the church—which is the site and
moment in which the God-who-is-love becomes material and temporal—a
description of the church's weakness that cannot help but turn victims into martyrs.
In the words of Hauerwas:
There is no more powerful witness to.. .understanding.. .salvation as enacted
narrative that martyrdom. For it was through martyrdom that the church
triumphed over Rome. Rome could kill Christians but they could not
victimize them. The martyrs could go to their death confident that the story to
which their killers were trying to subject them—that is the story of
victimization—was not the true story of their death...For the martyrs their
266 from Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 391-392, quoted in Hauerwas, After Christendom, p.
22. Italics mine for emphasis.
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dying was part of a story that Rome could not acknowledge and remain in
power as Rome.267
In Hauerwas' early work, the alternative story told by the church (as politics) is the
story of a rule that is not based on violence and power, but upon the love of God,
J /'O
which is constituted in submission to crosses. Moreover, when the nations
acknowledge the alternative re-storying of the universe in Christ, they can no longer
help but cease to be the nations and begin to be the church.
For Hauerwas the most critical ecclesiological metaphor to the church's
understanding of itself as God's politics is the description of love as paoikoi (resident
alien). To be Christ-like in the world is to be other than world. The strangeness of the
God-who-is-love, and His relationships (to Himself and His Creation), is a
strangeness embodied in the church and her relationships. Thus the God whose own
being is relationship (Trinity) is the ground that makes intelligible the relationships
that constitute the politics-called-church. Politics is the name for the church's day-to¬
day existence; it is the name for loving relationships within local parishes and the
wider catholic church, and for the charity of the church toward the withering
authorities of the world. The church is politics, and so her relationships, according to
Hauerwas, must always be founded on a commitment to the embodiment of God's
peaceable kingdom. Hauerwas' difficulties with American holidays such as Mother's
Day, reflect an unease with relationships founded on anything other than the
kingdom of God—a dis-ease that Hauerwas sees himself sharing with Jesus (Mt.
12:36-50, Mt. 19:29-30). Thus all relationships, including familial relationships,
must be re-imagined by the love of God or else they will become a danger to the
community (by encouraging the church to forget her identity and so cease being
church). According to Hauerwas
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[w]hat it means to be Christian, therefore, is that we are a people who affirm
that we have come to find our true destiny only by locating our lives within
the story of God. The church is the lively argument, extended over centuries
and occasioned by the stories of God's calling of Israel and of the life and
death of Jesus Christ, to which we are invited to contribute by learning to live
faithful to those stories. It is the astounding claim of Christians that through
this particular man's story, we discover our true selves and thus are made
part of God's very life. We become part of God's story by finding our lives
within that story.269
Indeed, the eschatological memory of that community provides the assurance of the
church's continuous existence in several ways - what Hauerwas names "the marks of
the church."270 These marks, according to Rasmusson, are a description of the
"means that God has given the messianic pilgrim people for sustaining its life as
'resident aliens.'"271 There are four marks mentioned by Hauerwas: (1) baptism, (2)
eucharist, (3) preaching, and (4) the holy life. Whereas baptism is the initiation of
members into the body of Christ (a transfer of citizenship from one dominion to
another), the eucharist is "the eschatological meal of God's continuing presence that
makes possible a peaceable people."272 As Rasmusson notes, it is in baptism and
eucharist that the Christian story is enacted; they stand as political rituals, forming
the identity of the church and witnessing to the in-breaking of the kingdom in the
273world. Preaching forms the church and challenges it to be faithful to the story—
admonishing outsiders to participate in God's good work. Finally, the holy life calls
the church to be "a people who are capable of maintaining the life of charity,
hospitality, and justice," so that the church is ultimately known "by the character of
the people who constitute it" - the people who are God's love in and for the world.
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Yet Hauerwas notes that "if we lack that character, the world rightly draws the
conclusion that the God we worship is in fact a false God."274
For Hauerwas these marks reconstitute, in the midst of the church, the presence of
the God-who-is-love. In the Preface to Resident Aliens, Hauerwas seeks to remind us
of Paul's words to the Philippians: "God is at work in you, both to will and to work
for his good pleasure" (2:13), for "[o]ur commonwealth is in heaven" (3:20). As
noted by Hauerwas, "in the space of a few lines, Paul has called the Philippians to be
part of a quite spectacular journey—namely, to live and to die like Christ, to model
their lives so closely upon Christ that they bear within themselves the very mind of
Christ."275
In short, the eschatological analogy of the church given by Hauerwas is one of aliens
living in a strange land, scraping out a living on someone else's turf. For Hauerwas,
the witness of the church to God's peaceable kingdom requires tactics rather than
strategies, and colonies rather than castles. The eschatological hope of the church is
the patient anticipation of the Eschaton; faithful witness requires both memory and
foresight, that is, the skill to wait with humility. We should not get ahead of
ourselves, says Hauerwas, for it is only through humiliation that the church can
receive humility. For Hauerwas it is because the kingdom of God has already come
in Christ that the church can hopefully constitute the love of God in and for the
world, between the times.
Conclusion: A Peculiarly Postliberal Politics
After Christendom is possibly Stanley Hauerwas' least popular, and yet most
important, book. I say it is least popular because in the preface to the Second Edition
01f\
Hauerwas describes the book as has having fallen "stillborn' from the press." After
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Christendom is arguably his most important book for a number of reasons, not least
ofwhich is that it provides the theological framework, foundation, and starting point,
albeit tentatively, for almost every essay Hauerwas has ever written. That is to say, it
provides the modus operandi for Hauerwas' entire theological project, first by
claiming, with Yoder, that the confession, "Jesus is Lord" is primary to every
theological task; second it forces those who would make that claim to acknowledge
their liberal, cultural, ethnic, national, modern economic context; third it requires
those who recognize their context to examine the language of everyday life in an
attempt to disentangle the conflicting allegiances within the most basic words used:
such as "we," "city," "politics," "good," etc; finally, it encourages those outside the
messianic community to learn, with those already gathered, a new way of speaking.
As Hauerwas puts it:
The book requires the reader to submit to a discipline.. .not unlike the
discipline required to learn to lay bricks or to worship God. Just as learning to
speak a new language is necessary to learn to lay brick so we must learn
again how to speak as Christians. One of the great problems, of course, is that
many of the words used in Christian speech have become common. As a
result, too often we have lost the oddness of Christian speech because we
assume we are adequate speakers because such language is so familiar. The
challenge is to rediscover how what we say as Christians forces a
reconfiguration of our lives in order that we might see the world as God's
777
good creation.
Of the words that Hauerwas encourages the reader to reclaim, particular attention is
given to "politics," "justice," and "sex," all of which are set within the broader
attempt to recover the oddness of what Christ has begun in the church. Rather than
politics being "the means necessary to secure cooperation between people who share
nothing in common other than their desire to survive," politics becomes "the ongoing
conversation necessary for the discovery of goods in common,"278 a definition
applauded by both Yoder and Maclntyre. Differences between Hauerwas and
O'Donovan arise most clearly when each begins to clarify what is meant by
"conversation," "goods," and exactly who is being referred to as being "in common."
277 Ibid. p. 6
278 Ibid. p. 29
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This is due in part to Hauerwas' larger claim that politics is always already the
church.
The title of the first chapter in After Christendom is "The Politics of Salvation: Why
There Is No Salvation Outside the Church," the general thrust of which carries
through the rest of the book, namely that politics, justice, and sex are activities which
only become intelligible inside the church. According to Hauerwas, the church is
God's salvation, such that there is no soteriological political conceptually not
informed by the Lordship of Christ. For Hauerwas, politics outside the church can
never be anything but the search for lesser goods, which stands as a clear point of
departure with both Yoder and O'Donovan. While liberalism can be rejected by all o
them because of its impoverished definition of what politics actually is, i.e., a means
of contractual survival, O'Donovan, and to a certain extent Yoder (as we will see in
Chapter 4), are able to identify in secular political structures (at minimum) a certain
usefulness. Yet to embrace the usefulness of secular politics (politics not constituted
by the God-who-is-love), while at the same time rejecting the definition of politics
given by liberalism, is still liberalism. O'Donovan and Yoder both identify a better
vision of politics, which is that embodied in the church; yet their identification of the
usefulness of political systems (liberal or not), as violent mechanisms that ensure a
survival space for the church, is in fact the precise definition of politics offered by
liberalism in the first place. This is exactly the concession that Milbank is making to
liberalism when he identifies the need for a temporary and contractual peace.279
Hauerwas at least realizes that a rejection of political liberalism must include not
only the rejection of liberal theory but liberal practice. Thus even non-liberal and
pre-liberal political visions must be rejected because they are forced to found the
basis for "goods" and "in common" either arbitrarily, or upon foundations other than
the God who gives Himself. In the words ofHauerwas:
It was the presumption of those [pre-Constantinian] Christians that they were
participants in a grand drama of God's salvation of all creation. Salvation was
cosmic, as in Christ's resurrection the very universe was storied by God's
279
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purposes. The church did not have an incidental part in God's story but was
necessary for the salvation wrought in Christ. The church was not and is not a
people gathered together in order to remember an impressive but dead
founder. Rather the church is those gathered from the nations to testify to the
resurrected Lord. Without the church the world literally has no hope of
salvation since the church is necessary for the world to know it is part of a
story that it cannot know without the church.280
For Hauerwas, the testimony of the church to the nations cannot help but be the
activity of a politics that is the continuing work of God in the world. Moreover, the
church cannot disperse itself among the nations, precisely because it is already
gathered in their midst; and for the gathered, the peculiarity of the church cannot help
but be a peculiarity of knowledge as well as action.
In the next chapter, I will look at Jeffrey Stout's criticisms of the philosophy of
Alasdair Maclntyre, which deconstructs half of the Hauerwasian synthesis. I note
that Stout's critique leads Hauerwas to make several partial concessions to Stout, and
more robust concessions to the radical democrats because of their philosophical
appropriation of the other half of the synthesis: Yoder. The result, I argue, is the
deconstruction of the Christology at the heart of Hauerwas' description of politics.
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Chapter 3
From Postliberal Politics to Radical Democracy?
Hauerwas in Dialogue with Stout, Wolin and Coles
This purpose of this chapter is to look at the recent dialogue between Stanley
Hauerwas, Jeffrey Stout, and the radical democrat Romand Coles in order to try and
make sense of several inconsistencies in Hauerwas' writings. There is indeed a
peculiar discontinuity between Hauerwas' brand of nearly sectarian postliberal
theological politics (as described in the last chapter), and his recent sympathy for
language of radical democracy—the adoption of which allows him to develop an
account of non-confessionally predicated engagements between church and world.
This chapter begins by looking at Stout's critique of Maclntyre and the new
traditionalists. It goes on to address Hauerwas' response to Stout in terms of
suggestions made by Coles and Wolin regarding the possibilities of democracy post-
liberalism. This chapter ends by looking at Mark Noll's account of the American
Civil War as a theological crisis in which democratic/republican values, when
combined with the reading of Scripture, made dialogical conversation between
opposing views of Scripture impossible—leading to an explosive and violent
adjudication in which the victors claim right thanks to God's providential protection.
Stout's Critique
In his book Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout's principal tasks are to critique
the "new traditionalist" (he includes in this list: Maclntyre, Hauerwas, and Milbank)
dichotomy between liberal democracy and sectarian moral communities, and to
encourage political philosophers to begin thinking about democracy as a tradition,
with a rich account of virtues and practices socially embodied, rather than in terms of
abstract liberal philosophy, a la Rawls. The key to Stout's position involves
distancing the practical characteristics of modern democracy from the assertions of
liberal philosophers (Locke and Rawls) who are committed to certain intellectual
ideals of liberalism not present among, on Stout's analysis, the actual constituents
(citizens) of modern democracy—particularly as it is manifested in America. These
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assertions include: (1) "a theory of the modern nation-state as ideally neutral with
respect to comprehensive conceptions of the good;" and (2) the attempt to "establish
political deliberation on a common basis of free public reason, independent of
reliance on tradition."281 Rawlsian liberalism conceives of a society in which
individual liberty is properly basic, and whose telos is the preservation of shared
rights and duties. As Wolterstorff puts it:
individuals offer each other general rules of engagement and agree to follow
these rules, provided others do so as well. Then, as good liberal democrats we
debate and decide matters of common concern by appealing to those general
rules. Nothing here about tradition.282
The absence of tradition is not accidental; for Rawls, tradition represents historical
prejudice and as such is antithetical to a universal account of social justice - it is
precisely tradition which individuals have been liberated from. Thus Stout's project
is the attempt to repair, or at the very least make secondary, these kinds of
intellectualized philosophies of liberalism, while positing democracy as something
other than (or perhaps more than) the embodiment of that philosophy. While Stout is
critical of liberal philosophy, he does not believe that critiques of liberal philosophy
as such can necessarily be extended to the practical embodiment of democracy.
Furthermore, Stout not only rejects the primacy of Rawlsian social contract
liberalism, he also affirms the importance of tradition; in fact, Stout's analysis of
democracy as tradition is founded on the traditionalists' description of political
activity. According to Stout: "ethical and political reasoning are creatures of tradition
and crucially depend on the acquisition of such virtues as practical wisdom and
justice."283 For Stout, this is precisely the political activity manifested (locally) in
modern democracy:
Democracy...A a tradition. It inculcates certain habits of reasoning, certain
attitudes toward deference and authority in political discussion, and love for
certain goods and virtues, as well as a disposition to respond to certain types
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of actions, events or persons with admiration, pity, or horror. This tradition is
anything but empty. Its ethical substance, however, is more a matter of
enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of conduct than it is a
matter of agreement on a conception of justice in Rawls's sense. The notion
of state neutrality and the reason-tradition dichotomy should not be seen as its
defining marks. Rawlsian liberalism should not be seen as its official
284
mouthpiece.
On the other hand, says Stout, the new traditionalists, in their reaction to Rawlsian
modes of liberal philosophy, have become excessive in their calls for sectarian
withdrawal from the democratic project—thanks in large part to the conflation of
secularism (as the chief characteristic of liberalism) and democracy. That is to say,
they refuse to see democracy as a virtue creating/sustaining political activity.
According to Stout,
Traditionalists claim that democracy undermines itself by destroying the
traditional vehicles needed for transmitting the virtues from one generation to
another. Because traditionalists see democracy as an essentially negative,
leveling force—as the opposite of culture—they tend to underestimate the
democratic practices to sustain themselves over time...
...They declare the civic nation or modernity itself innately vicious,
and then, having no place else to go, identify strictly with communities
distinct from democratic society as a whole.285
For Stout, there is a third way between Rawls' over-zealous liberal philosophy, and
Maclntyre, Hauerwas, and Milbank's call to Christian sectarianism, both of which
are "strategies of rhetorical [or conceptual] excess... [that] have outlived their
usefulness."286 This third way involves the identification of democracy as a tradition
socially embodied in America, complete with a shared account of the good life and
of the virtues and practices not only worth pursuing, but which make life intelligible.
Thus Stout's brand of liberalism ought not be identified as liberalism at all, but as a
narrative; a narrative that, according to Stout, provides support for the tradition of
American democracy and is embodied in the writings of Dewey, Emerson, Whitman,
and Thoreau.
284 Ibid. p.3
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Stout does not believe that what is required is a re-conceiving of liberalism therefore,
but a refusal to use the language of liberalism. This is the point at which Hauerwas
begins moving away from the use of the term postliberal, agreeing with Stout that
"[w]e should do so because, like the description 'modernity,' liberalism turns out to
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be too various to be given any singular identity." This shift away from the
designation postliberal signifies the loss of "Maclntyre" in the Maclntyre/Yoder
synthesis that was Hauerwas' theological politics.
In what follows it will be useful to look at critiques of Stout's position that one
would expect to arise from Hauerwas' account of postliberalism, before turning to
look at the surprising, and seemingly contradictory, response actually offered by
Hauerwas. It will be shown that perhaps the most important insight made by
Hauerwas in his various responses to Stout is that "Stout's argumentative strategy
against Milbank and Maclntyre is to change the subject. Stout simply denies that the
kind of democracy he is willing to defend reflects Milbank's or Maclntyre's
understanding or criticisms of modernity and secularism."288 It is the viability of the
kind of democracy that Stout is willing to defend, when read against Hauerwas'
postliberalism, that will be the focus of the next section.
A Few Hauerwasian Questions
If Stout is correct in his assertion that democracy is in fact a tradition, separate from
ad hoc liberal philosophical axioms, then there are serious problems with at least
Maclntyre's account of the moral fragmentation resulting from the apotheosis of
Enlightenment, i.e., liberalism. Whether or not these issues ought to affect
Hauerwas' description of the church as politics, and the pseudo-sectarianism such a
description implies, will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. Before looking at
Hauerwas' responses to Stout's position, I will pose a few questions to Stout's
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project arising from a juxtaposition ofDemocracy and Tradition with Iris Murdoch's
289
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals.
The similarity between Murdoch and Stout's descriptions of the relationship between
morality and politics is most visible in their shared distaste for attempts to found the
practical manifestations of liberally-shaped political communities on liberal
philosophical axioms. Murdoch notes, "it is difficult for a moral philosopher to say
anything of the slightest interest and be 'neutral'."290 Murdoch talks about the
rhetorical and conceptual excesses of liberal philosophy in terms of axioms:
Axioms...are sui generic, unsystematic, may involve acknowledged
'fictions', as when it is argued that in liberal politics the most important
picture of man is that offered by Hobbes, the self contained private being
who, within external limitations, does what he pleases, and, because he is
291
fundamental, is valuable.
Thus for Murdoch, over-zealous axioms of liberal philosophy, like "[references to
'reason' as...a single and unified authority... [are] usually rhetorical and otiose and
should be victims of Occam's razor."292 What deserves analysis for Murdoch (like
Stout), is the viability of modern political arrangements in terms of their ability to
sustain shared social descriptions of the moral, despite increased plurality among the
populace, particularly regarding the way in which individually intuitive moral
judgments can inform and contribute to the moral dialogue of political communities
as a whole. For Murdoch, democracy in particular operates via "a general consensus
about what things are right and proper, [in such a way that] different views can
contend in a reasonable manner."293 Thus for Murdoch, "a good (decent) state" is
full of active citizens with a vast variety of views and interests, [this state]
must preserve a central arena of discussion and reflection wherein differences
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and individuality are taken for granted. (For instance, religious differences.)
Here there are no authoritarian final arbiters, certainly not God, Reason or
History. Here general good will, consent, maintains a kind of justice which is
'intuitively' understood.294
The most important thing to note in all of this is that for Murdoch, there persists a
"distinction between morals and politics" that is ultimately an axiomatic dichotomy
between the moral duty of the individual and a shared account of moral rights in
society as a whole. For Murdoch, "Rights are simpler, and cruder, than duties."
Expanding on this description Murdoch notes that "moral rules are tasks set to
individuals, whereas axiomatic statements about rights (etc.) are public banners
flown for complex reasons which may be partly, even grossly, pragmatic."295 The
only difference between Stout and Murdoch on this point would be that for Stout,
moral intuition is not limited to the individual, but to embedded communities within
the larger narrative embodiment of the democratic tradition. Christians (thanks to the
theology of the Barth, Frei, Lindbeck, Yoder, and Hauerwas) may no longer be
interested in the individual choices of Christians alienated from the moral
community, but for Stout the activity of individual communities (sub-cultures or sub-
traditions) is always already under the purview of democracy, and their operation is
reflected (on a larger scale and with more consensus and argument involved) in the
same way as the intuitive moral individual in Murdoch's account. That is to say the
virtues of these communities are transmitted as values capable of informing the
shared virtues of plural democracy.296 In the words ofMurdoch:
294 Ibid. p. 366
295 Ibid. p. 386
296 On a side note, another characteristic of Murdoch's analysis that might prove useful to Stout lies in
her characterization of the demonic individual—particular as a manifestation of liberal philosophy. On
Maclntyre's ruling "barbarians" are not peculiarly tyrannical, but are the byproduct of the fragmented
culture of liberalism. Indeed, the very essence of modern man is barbarous—uncivilized, because
civilization is not possible for the self fragmented from communities of civil virtue. Murdoch
identifies the modern man of this view as the "demonic individual." About this demonic individual,
Murdoch states:
Perhaps the individual liberated or created by capitalism had a golden age of integral being
and virtuous idealism, reflected in the great art forms of the nineteenth century, but now, it is
said, has disintegrated and become unconfident and even corrupt. We see...his demonic
descendants in ruthless tyrannical regimes and persons, and in western democracies, in
egoistic materialistic 'go getters', in pursuit of money, fame, prestige and sex, who are now
our most conspicuous citizens (Murdoch, Metaphysics, p. 352-3).
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Political liberalism is pluralism, the cost must always be counted and there
are different ways of counting. Thinking about politics is in certain special
respects different from thinking about private morals. One may be ruthless
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with oneself but not with others.
For Murdoch, even ruthlessness within sub-cultural communities must remain
internal to those communities. But what if ruthlessness is a virtue mandated by the
self-identify of that sub-culture—that is, what if the "cost...to be counted" makes
unintelligible, as it does for Hauerwas, "the cost of discipleship?" For Murdoch, like
Stout, "the difference between political morality and private morals" is the "rough-
and-ready unavoidably clumsy and pragmatic nature of the former." While this,
for Stout, is the case in modern democracy, thanks exclusively to plurality of moral
insight amongst the masses, such a distinction axiomatically assumes a dichotomy
between private and public drawn from Rawls, Hobbes, and Locke. It will be useful
to look at Stout's description of the rise of secularism as the historical attempt to
negotiate a life in common against the backdrop of American pluralism. Of particular
interest will be whether or not moral historical pluralism by definition presupposes
the axiomatic public/private moral distinction—what William Connolly has dubbed
"the bias of pluralism."299
Stout's distinction between historically contingent liberalism and philosophical
liberalism is demonstrated throughout Democracy and Tradition, but I will limit the
scope of my analysis to the shape it takes in his critique of Radical Orthodoxy.
According to Stout, Milbank et al. are guilty of conflating modernity and
secularization. According to Stout,
Yet if the demonic man is a failed caricature of the citizen, as Stout would have us believe, and if the
tradition of liberal democracy in practices sustains civil virtue and intelligibility, then it would be
worth pursuing elsewhere what particular vision of human nature Stout's account is founded—and
where such a position fits in with a Christian account ofman, the fall, and the exaltation.
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One reason for doubting that the mythos or ideology of secularism is what
caused the secularization of public discourse is that its proponents have never
had the numbers or the clout to change the world...According to this theory,
modernity is a progressively secularizing force in the sense that it tends to
produce increasing levels of disbelief and disenchantment. The trouble is that
this theory now lies in shambles, having had nearly all of its predictions
falsified over the last four decades...
What drove the secularization of political discourse forward was the
increasing need to cope with religious plurality discursively on a daily basis
under circumstances where improved transportation and communication were
changing the political and economic landscape. Secularization of the kind I
have described did, however, give rise to desacralization of the political
sphere and to secularist ideology as an attempt to explain and justify it.300
For Stout, secularization ought not be referred to as an intellectual enterprise, but as
the historical byproduct of living together in pluralistic democracies. Yet even if
pluralism is a historical creator of practical secularism, the necessary distinction
between public and private exists precisely because independent moral communities
are embedded within the larger social embodiments of democratic tradition. What
Stout fails to understand is that for Radical Orthodoxy, secularization (in its practical
manifestation) is not the attempt to privatize or remove religion from the public
sphere in a pluralistic society, but is in fact the public-ation of it. In America, the
sacred became translatable without reference to mystery or revelation thanks in large
part to the construction of a higher-order common language, manifested in liberal
axioms, which denote an end to any notion of the incommensurability of the
Christian tradition. Whether or not the formulation of such axioms came before or
after the practical embodiment of them is beside the point. This is the case precisely
because secularization (both practical and axiomatic) was never the replacement of
sacred ontology or traditions with secular ones, but the embedding of the sacred into
a public non-sacred tradition. While pluralism was most likely the driving force
behind the well-intentioned translation of particular sacred traditions into the shared
common vernacular, it is wishful thinking to believe such a project to have failed.
Indeed, such a project is precisely that which Maclntyre, Hauerwas, Yoder, and
Radical Orthodoxy describe when talking about Enlightenment liberalism. Stout
then, denies the incommensurability of traditions, whereas Maclntyre, Hauerwas, and
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Milbank affirm it, albeit to different degrees. Just because democracy is a tradition
does not mean that it is not a tradition which refrains from dissolving, absorbing, or
fragmenting other traditions, and in doing so expunging the particularity of them.301
Hauerwas' description of postliberalism, as described up to this point, seems to
require a questioning of how to lovingly yet faithfully navigate the distance between
these two traditions—Christianity and American democracy; whereas for Stout, as
demonstrated above, they are not rival, rather one tradition is embedded in another
(Christianity is just another voice in the great conversation)—and this is precisely
why secularization, practical or not, requires a common language. While the tradition
of virtues in American democracy cannot help but be affected due to local proximity
with Christian neighbors, and vice versa, and while this itselfmay be a central virtue
of dialogue within the democratic tradition, that does not necessarily make it a virtue
for the church. For Hauerwas the vice versa part represents a serious problem, that is,
how to keep the church the church in the midst of the world. The impact of Christian
virtue on American democracy might be seen as the necessary result of the practice
of Christian charity (and evangelism) toward neighbors in the world.302 As such, the
replication of Christian virtues in American democracy may even be lauded by the
church as a good first step towards ceasing to be the world; yet for Hauerwas'
project, such a step ought never allow the church to forget that the world is the
world, or to legitimate American political arrangements as such. Under no
circumstances can the church, for evangelical purposes, give in to the temptation,
under the guise of "practical necessity," of translating Christian particularity into a
common language. Hauerwas' postliberalism, asks the question, of both Murdoch
301 Badiou's description of this attitude is extraordinarily helpful for understanding what exactly is the
problem within Stout's claim: "Itwill be claimed, for example, that a cultural or religious
particularity is bad if it does not include within itself respect for other particularities. But this is
obviously to stipulate that the formal universal already be included in the particularity. Ultimately, the
universality of respect for particularities is only the universality of universality. This definition is
fatally tautological. It is the necessary counterpart of a protocol - usually a violent one - that wants to
eradicate genuinely particular particularities (i.e., immanent particularities) because it freezes the
predicates of the latter into self-sufficient identitarian combinations." Badiou, A. and S. Zizek. 2009.
Philosophy in the Present. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 30.
302 There is something of this in Hunsinger's description of the confessing church in America. (See
Hunsinger, G. 2000. Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth. Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans. p. 89-113).
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and Stout: how can the particularity of Christian communal culture be sustained
when it is always already embedded within an overarching narrative of American
culture? Or conversely: how does one sustain a politics-of-love without the God-
who-is-love? The answer: only by removing Godself, the source of love (of being-in-
common) itself. This process is the justification of liberal philosophy in practice, if
not in name. Whether the generative cause of American democracy-as-incorporation
is liberal philosophy or cultural pluralism, the result is a politics constituted by a love
that is simultaneously God-less and polytheistic. The fictions of liberal philosophical
axioms, ad hoc or not, are necessary to make intelligible the operation of American
303
democracy. And as Murdoch says, "If a fiction is necessary enough, it is not a lie."
While Maclntyre may be wrong in his assessment of democracy qua liberalism as
something other than a narrative tradition, he still has the ability to critique it, on his
own terms, in light of liberal democracy's fictional character. In his discussion of the
narratives necessary for storying traditions, and the communities which embody
them, Maclntyre says:
It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand
our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of
narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are
lived before they are told—except in the case of fiction.304
Even if Stout is right in assuming that secularism, as embodied in liberal democracy,
is historically prior to the philosophical axioms that later attempted to explain it,
those axioms are, regardless, necessary fictions if citizens are to make intelligible
their lives. For a tradition to be a tradition the story is lived, and then told, but the
narrative of previous generations locates, and to a certain extent limits and qualifies,
the possibility of the stories being lived. Furthermore, Louis Mink has described the
inability of liberalism to provide an account for its own past, noting that:
The great controversies of rationalism and empiricism now appear to have
been complementary phases of the enterprise, extending over three centuries,
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to construct a comprehensive account of the relation between our direct
perception of the world and our inferential knowledge of that world through
the discoveries of natural science. In this epistemological enterprise there was
no room for either imaginative worlds or the inaccessible world of the past.
The latter, in particular, appeared significant only as something not
perceptible, not as something past. In the riot of epistemological theories... in
which the modern epoch of philosophy came to an end within recent memory,
not one took seriously the problem of how it is possible that the past should
be knowable, although each constructed a more or less embarrassed appendix
which restored some sort of cognitive status to history, some possibility of
1 Af
meaning to "statements about the past."
Thus the genealogy of democracy extends backward to the Enlightenment wherein,
for Maclntyre, a fictional story was created, embodied in philosophical liberal
axioms. These axioms represent the tradition's fictional starting point. Even if the
axioms were created in order to make sense of what was being lived "on the ground,"
they are, nevertheless, fictions.
Stout attempts his own description of necessary fictions, noting that in one sense,
they are really (metaphysically) true, and in one sense they are not. His reference in
this regard is not to liberal axioms qua universalism, but to the pragmatic
(democratic) making of a linguistic reality in which moral claims can be uttered true
(truth-talk) without worrying about the metaphysical complexities of representation
and correspondence (realism), or without reducing moral claims to descriptive
appearance, verificationism / justificationism, and ultimately relativism (classical
pragmatism). Stout identifies his position as "modest pragmatism,"306 what Mark
Johnston has described as "minimalism." According to Johnston, minimalism is the
view on which
ordinary practitioners may naturally be led to adopt metaphysical pictures as
a result of their practices and perhaps a little philosophical prompting, the
practices [however] are typically not dependent on the truth of the pictures.
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Practices that endure and spread are typically justifiable in nonmetaphysical
terms.307
Thus for Johnston, the correct understanding of communal practice is an
1AO
understanding which has "given no crucial hostages to metaphysical fortune." Of
course this position already assumes Foucault's objective Gaze. In other words,
Johnston's notion of justification assumes that one can observe a practice from the
outside (as other: without relation to the practice) and judge its utility, that is to say,
its "worthiness to survive on the testing ground of everyday life."309 The point,
according to Stout, is "that recent developments in the philosophy of language have
vindicated the plausibility of pursuing a nonmetaphysical approach to truth, an
approach that makes the notion of truth seem like an inappropriate focal point for
large-scale cultural angst."310 Moreover, Stout writes:
You can have the concept of moral truth and an ethos of fallibility and self-
criticism, it seems to me, without adopting a theory that makes moral facts or
"the moral law" capable of explaining what it is for true moral propositions to
be true.. .Citizens are better advised to keep their commitment to democracy
311free from the unresolved disputes of the metaphysicians.
For Stout then, necessary moral axioms (or moral claims) are neither fictional nor
true, rather, they are simply justified, the basis of which is utility. Yet for those who
hold metaphysical vision as more than just accidental to practices, and who find the
justification ofmoral belief to involve comparing "ought" with "is," Stout's position
cannot help but seem dangerous. The universal claims which arise from democratic
conversation (on the practices inherent to democracy) then are indisputably justified
as they are grounded on public utility—the metaphysical truth-fiction of majority
will. For Stout, the moral claims of the democratic polity seek to justify not the moral
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claims themselves, but the social polity which makes the claims. Revision of moral
claims is required, and indeed this is the process of democratic conversation, when
practice (among the majority) changes. When such change occurs, new moral
justifications (and a new metaphysics) are required in order to make sense of
changing practices of the polity. Such a position relegates moral language to rhetoric
and propaganda, and the moral majority within the polity to tyranny.
Hauerwas' Actual Response
Hauerwas' Performing the Faith is a strange and contrary book. In it Hauerwas
provides an interpretation of Bonhoeffer's description of the distinctive performance
of the church in the midst of the world, and in so doing buttresses much of what he
has argued about the practice of postliberal politics in his earlier writings. Yet the
book also contains a contradiction of his postliberalism as previously articulated, by
making concessions to the democratic pragmatism as envisioned partly in Stout, and
more fully in the radical democracy of Wolin and Coles. The reason for the
contrariety of Performing cannot help but be due in part to the publication of
Democracy and Tradition prior to its release, in which, as we have seen, much of
what Hauerwas had taken for granted in the critique of liberalism as provided in
Maclntyre was called into question. Thus, Performing works as a response to Stout
in the midst of his reading of Bonhoeffer. Indeed, the concluding postscript is
explicitly a response to Stout, and works to frame, and in some places contradict,
much of what comes before.
There are three areas in which Hauerwas makes concessions to Stout's project, the
first hints of which are present in Performing the Faith, but which are more fully
articulated in a follow up article entitled "Democratic Time."312 These include:
language and definitions, truth-telling, and Christological memory. In what follows I
will address the nature of each concession and the ways in which they contradict
Hauerwas' own best insights regarding the distinctively Christian character of
postliberal politics.
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In Resident Aliens, Hauerwas and Willimon assert that the political terms of
postliberal Christians can only be made intelligible if such terms are properly
Christological, noting that:
The church really does not know what these words mean apart from the life
and death of Jesus of Nazareth...It is Jesus' story that gives content to our
faith, and teaches us to be suspicious of any political slogan that does not
need God to make itself intelligible.313
For Hauerwas and Willimon, there is a significant danger involved in failing to
discern the content (and context) which informs every political utterance. The
influence of liberalism (and the desire to be efficiently evangelical) has given rise to
a tendency in the church to, as previously discussed, translate distinctly Christian
terms into a common worldly vernacular. As Hauerwas and Willimon say, "Big
words like 'peace' and 'justice,' slogans the church adopts under the presumption
that even if people do not know what 'Jesus Christ is Lord' means, they will know
what peace and justice mean, are words awaiting content."314 The problem with
liberal political definitions, for Hauerwas and Willimon, is that such an attempt on
the part of the church assumes the possibility of having an intelligible
context/content independent of the love ofGod.
Yet in Performing the Faith, Hauerwas limits his critique of competing contexts that
posit achristological imaginings ofjustice and truth, focusing particularly on the case
of democratic liberalism. Hauerwas' critique of liberalism's redefinition of political
terms reflects primarily the external/structural critique of liberalism in Maclntyre (as
opposed to the Christological critique from Yoder). Hauerwas states, "liberal
accounts of justice have tried to make justice an end in itself abstracted from the
constitutive goods named through the practices necessary for the achievement of
those goods," 315 moreover, "liberal social orders do not have the means to
313
Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens, p. 38
314 Ibid.
315
Hauerwas, Performing the Faith, p. 23 1
119
acknowledge goods in common. Such goods in liberal theory are at best confused
with common interest."316 Hauerwas' description here of the liberal project's failure,
in both theory and practice, fails to take into account Stout's response, namely that
democracy can and does in practice provide a common account of the good and the
virtuous. For Stout, the common good will often reflect common interest, but a
specific descriptive content is provided in democracy. Instead of falling back on
Maclntyre in order to provide an external critique of liberalism at this point,
Hauerwas would have more luck returning to his argument in Resident Aliens, that
any content for political terms not Christologically founded on the love of God
makes the use of such terms unintelligible to Christians—conversely, any
Christological basis for these terms will be necessarily unintelligible to the world. It
is not so much that Hauerwas ought to "resist those who... [think] that justice qua
justice...[is] more important than the justice God has shown us in the cross and
resurrection of Jesus,"317 rather he should be about the task of affirming that justice
is only justice because the God-who-is-love is justice. As Hauerwas notes elsewhere,
Bonhoeffer claims that "neither a static concept of peace... nor even a static concept
of truth.. .comprehends the Gospel concept of peace in its troubled relationship to the
concepts of truth and righteousness."318 Which is to say that: "No peace is peace but
that which comes through the forgiveness of sins. Only the peace of God preserves
truth and justice."319 The problem for Hauerwas is that he fails to respond to Stout in
such uncompromised terms, perhaps partly out of worry that he will once again be
called sectarian for what ought to be his necessary inability to compromise. This is
true in part due to what he says he learned from Yoder, namely that: "If you cannot
kill those with whom you may disagree, it becomes all the more important to learn to
listen to what they have to say. At times the commitment to nonviolence may mean
you can only listen from a distance, but you still have to listen."320 The trick for
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Hauerwas comes in finding an appropriate description of what such distance entails.
Geographical or local closeness to the democratic conversation in practice is a given;
the danger lies in the attempt to talk from within that tradition as opposed to that of
the church, or in assuming that the Christian tradition is, thanks to geography,
already embedded within the democratic one. IfHauerwas wishes to offer an external
critique it should be in terms of the incommensurability of rival traditions.
Truth-Telling
The problem becomes more explicit in Hauerwas' admission that he is "largely
sympathetic with Stout's account of 'common morality'."321 In Stout's account, the
construction, evolution, and maintenance of common morality in democracy arises
from pluralism in conversation. The danger of Hauerwas' sympathy stems from a
premise implicit in the notion of democratic common morality that Christians might
have something to say in such a conversation that does not appeal to Christ, or to the
political community inaugurated by him. For the Hauerwas of Resident Aliens, it is
simply the case that when the church uses the word "love," or "justice," or "peace"
its referent is the God-who-is-love, and so already a word that the world refuses to
hear. Stout's position on the other hand recapitulates the Murdochian dichotomy
between public and private defining "inspired speech" 322 as the contribution of
individual intuitions (ofmoral duty) to the common discourse on universal rights and
responsibilities in the social polity. This is a position that the Hauerwas of
Performing inexplicably furthers when he concedes that his own description of
"witness" in With the Grain of the Universe is "not dissimilar" to the "inspired
323
speech" in Stout's account of "democratic pragmatism."
The contrariety within Hauerwas' descriptive account of the task of Christian truth-
telling is perhaps best illustrated by his qualification of Rawls, whilst discussing
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Christian particularity in Barth and Bonhoeffer. In commenting on Rawls' claim that,
"The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public
reason that belongs with democratic citizenship,"324 Hauerwas says that "one should
at least ask Rawls whether, if politics cannot deal with the 'whole truth,' is it not the
case that 'smaller truths' might be important for any politics that would be an
alternative to naked power."325 Yet the attempt (to be distinguished from the
accident) to inspire democratic discussion via the incorporation of "smaller truths" is
antithetical to what Hauerwas claims326 to have learned from Barth and Bonhoeffer:
in the first case, "that it is the preaching of justification of the Kingdom of God,
which founds, here and now, the true system of law, the true State,"327 i.e., the
church; and in the second, that it is
[precisely because of our attitude to the state, the conversation here must be
completely honest for the sake of Jesus Christ...We must make it clear—
fearful as it is—that the time is very near when we shall have to decide
between National Socialism and Christianity. It may be fearfully hard and
difficult for us all, but we must get right to the root of things, with open
328Christian speaking and no diplomacy.
For Bonhoeffer, the prioritization of truthful speaking cannot be diluted or broken
down into "smaller truths," even in the best interests of diplomacy and discussion.
And for Bonhoeffer this "means protest against any form of the church with does not
honour the question of truth above all things."32
Once again the failure ofHauerwas is two-fold, both internal and external. Internally,
he sells the church short by implying the possibility of politics informed by the
transmission of "smaller" truths (God-less loves) that ultimately do not make claims
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of discipleship (calls to love) on the hearer. And externally, Hauerwas fails to assert
a doctrine of complete incommensurability between traditions, a point conceded by
his recognition of "common morality" as morality at all.
In his article, Democratic Time, Hauerwas finally challenges Stout's definition of
democracy, but for all the wrong reasons, arguing that Stout's distinction between
democracy and liberalism is problematic pr imarily due to his conflation of American
political life and democracy. According to Hauerwas, Stout would have better luck if
he ceased providing an apologetic for the American political tradition in particular,
and paid more attention to the local modes of democratic practice in the communities
of which he is a part. Hauerwas admits his perplexity saying, "What is not clear to
me is how Stout understands the democracy fostered in his neighborhood is
connected with, depends on, or is a manifestation of, what he takes to be the 'civic
nations.'"330 A better project, in Hauerwas' estimation, is that conceived in the work
of radical democrat Romand Coles, who draws on the work ofWolin and Yoder in
order to establish a working account of democracy as, in the words of Wolin,
"inherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and identified with revolution.. .This
democracy might be summed up as the idea and practice of rational
disorganization."331 Democracy thus envisioned "cannot be a complete political
system, but rather democracy can only succeed temporarily as a witness to a political
mode of existence that exists through memory." 332 Indeed, for Coles, this is precisely
what Yoder offers us through his ecclesiology, namely, "the local piecemeal
approach of reciprocal translation" that makes Christian virtuous practices, like
patience, intelligible to the world; this is demonstrated via the vision in Yoder's
writings
330
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of dialogical communities that that bring.. .forth very particular and powerful
practices of generous solidarity precisely through creative uses of conflict
and a vulnerable receptivity to the "least of these" within the church and to
those without it.334
Even this brief description of Coles' interpretation of Yoder as a radical democrat
should raise red flags, as such a position seems to contradict Hauerwas' insistence on
Christological unintelligibility (incommensurability) outside the community of
believers; a position which, as we have seen, Hauerwas' previous arguments have
attributed principally to Yoder. The next chapter will go on to address the aporias in
Yoder's writing, and the reasons for them, in an attempt to challenge, or at least
partly call into question, Coles' reading ofYoder. For now it will be useful to look at
the relationship forged between Wolin and Coles, and the dangerous way in which
Hauerwas responds to it.
The danger for Coles is that those of "us" within teleological traditions "will be deaf
and violent in our relations with others who resist the teleologies we embrace"335;
which explains to some extent, his preoccupation with a thinker like John Howard
Yoder—a member of a sect which has historically been killed by everyone, including
other Christians, and who is yet committed to the notion of the "church as a
community that engages otherness within and beyond its walls in a radically
dialogical fashion."336 Coles' description of Yoder's ecclesiology in these terms
filters Christian practice through the lens of radical democracy, which Coles argues
is the "constitutive tension between teleological and ateleological responsibilities."
Coles describes how the constitutive tension of democracy ought to be navigated,
writing:
We have teleological responsibilities to dialectically listen to and cultivate the
knowledge and practices we inherit in order to help orient further efforts to
334
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deepen democracy, for these contain—among other things—potent
sedimentations of other such judgments and struggles. We must search our
inheritance for the wisdom that might be found there and work it immanently
in an effort to discern as well the damages and dangers that also reside within
it—and within us. Such dialectical responsibilities are integral to the ethical
and political efforts of the finite historical beings we are. At the same time,
beyond the limits of our teleological efforts to critically extend the traditions
we inherit, the indeterminacies and finitude of our condition call us to
recognize how crucial are our ateleological receptive responsibilities to be
radically open to and opened by others and new events beyond "our
traditions." 38
The "double responsibility" of democracy, therefore, is to: (1) encourage citizens to
"cultivate dialectically" inherited teleological traditions, while at the same time
interrogating what is received from those traditions, a process of traditionmg; and
also (2) "cultivate radically ateleological receptivity."339 To put it another way, those
with inherited teleological commitments must listen to and dialogue with others,
from external, rival, or fragmented traditions—the outcasts, the marginalized, and the
prisoners. The importance of Yoder's ecclesiology for Coles' project is that Yoder's
understanding of radical reformation Christian practices reflects both of these
responsibilities: in the first case by proposing peaceable methods of discernment and
reconciliation when faced with conflict, and in the second case by offering
hospitality to strangers. 1 will address Coles' interpretation of each of these
characteristics as found in Yoder, as well as possible problems with his
interpretation, before moving on to look briefly at Coles' use of Wolin and
Hauerwas' response to the radical democratic project.
According to Coles, Yoder describes the Christian tradition in terms of traditionmg.
Traditioning, for Yoder, requires more than a blind acceptance of inherited wisdom,
but a critical engagement with the tradition of which one is a part; a dialogical
activity that leads each generation to cultivate the "expectation of newness."340
Yoder writes: "Far from being an ongoing growth like a tree (or a family tree) the
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wholesome growth of a tradition is like a vine: a story of constant interruption of
organic growth in favor of a pruning and a new chance for roots."341 Interruption
requires receptivity to "the need to be corrected,"342 and the willingness to engage in
a "midcourse correction."343 The recognition that such reform is needed requires a
"reaching back" to the canon (as discussed in terms of the didaskalos in Chapter 1).
Thus traditionmg is the "perennially unfinished process of critiquing the developed
tradition from the perspective of its own roots"344 in such a way that the church's
movement through history is as "a continuing series of new beginnings."345 As Coles
puts it:
Thus truth is always a finite historical incarnation. For Yoder what might
endure is a community of vulnerable dialogical practices responsive to Jesus
in their reaching back to Scripture for illumination; one that might allow truth
to manifest itself ever anew in the specificities of historical encounter and
discernment.346
In terms of radical democracy, the teleological responsibility of Yoder's ecclesiology
lies in a critical excavation of the roots, along with receptivity to the possibilities of
(re)newness.
Yet dialogical interruptions and opportunities for critical examination are not limited
to insiders. Indeed, when the church is incapable of seeing internal flaws in its own
makeup, it will often be the marginalized outsiders who are responsible for
challenging the insiders to reconceive their collective logic and activity. These
challenging engagements cannot help but require a looping back to the canon, thus
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the result of dialogical interaction can never be predicted, rather it opens the church
up to the possibility of newness. However, every dialogue has two speakers, and just
as the teleological community must be vulnerably receptive to ateleological
interruption from outside, so must the ateleological be open to challenge from the
teleological. According to Coles, Yoder's call for the church to be vulnerable (open)
to strangers (ateleological surprises), and engaged "for the nations," is manifested
in multiple ways, ranging from critical resistance, to community practices
embodying and proclaiming an alternative Gospel ethics, to the flexible
experimentation of a minority community in ways that often have broader
implications and uses, to selective tactical alliances and forms of cooperation
with other groups.347
Many of these engagements will be the chief focus of the following chapter; for now
it is enough to note that engagements between the teleological community called
church and ateleological outsiders are in a dialogical tension by which each
continuously calls the other to radically examine the practices, and accepted wisdom,
that inhabits the present instance of traditionmg newness that each manifests—a
process Coles calls radical democracy.
Yet it is important to note that Coles' account is explicitly "not confessional."348 As
Coles puts it, "I imagine that my own project is inflected less by Christianity and
more by a struggling faith in a traditio of discontinuous and discrepant insurgent
struggles of radical democracy."349 Yet as we have seen, in the attempt to uncover
the kind of practices necessary for sustaining the struggles of radical democracy,
Coles uses Yoder as an example of radical democracy in action. That Coles' interest
is solely on the sociological-pragmatic modes of radical democracy derivable from
Yoder's ecclesiology (and separable from his Christology) begins to become
apparent when Coles writes:
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There is no Christian ecclesiology that could forego the evangelical
proclamation to others that Jesus is Lord—that he calls us to peace, to
voluntarily radically dialogical communities, to a witnessing of the wild
heterogeneity of giftedness, to the cessation of coercive hierarchies, to
generous sharing of wealth in both production and consumption, and to
ifn
attention in every sense to the "least of these."
Indeed, at the beginning of the chapter "The Wild Patience of John Howard Yoder,"
Coles warns the reader that he is about the task of "translation," i.e., making Yoder's
project intelligible to radical democrats and vice versa. Rather than the herald being a
call to gather around Christ, it is a call to enter into "radically dialogical
communities" whose practices sound vaguely Christian in shape, but which could be
Buddhist, anarchist, Communist, etc.; a fact due entirely to the total removal of the
offensiveness of confessional language from the description of those practices.
Without such a removal Coles' translation (and the creation of a higher-level
language) would be impossible, and Yoder's Christologically-informed practices
would be of interest to radical democrats at best as unintelligible behavior and at
worst, sectarian.351 The practices themselves are intelligible to the church only by
virtue of remembering (looping-back) the source from which they come, and by the
way such activities have trained them to be people capable of remembering. Because
no Christian ecclesiology can forego that evangelical proclamation, "Jesus is Lord,"
Coles is forced to do it for them. It is worth quoting Coles at length in order to
observe his deft use of Yoder's own words in order to justify this move on Yoder's
own terms:
Crucial to this project is translating "our Word into their words," "one
particular community at a time" ("Meaning after Babble," 132). This is not a
call to trim the Gospel to whatever "public discourse" claims to be sovereign
in the surrounding world. Rather, faithful to their scriptural roots, Christians
should contest the discourses and powers that govern the world when those
powers contradict the politics of Jesus. But this means that, far from simply
bearing witness in their "own" idioms, they must also communicate in "terms
familiar to particular outsiders," as the messianic Jews did when they openly
"seized [the world's] categories, hammered them into other shapes" that often
350 Ibid. p. 124
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radically reformed or reversed their meaning (.Priestly Kingdom, 54). In so
doing they bore witness in such a way that the others who were invited to
respond could truly hear it. "Interworldly grammars" are often generated in
these encounters (56), but none should "renew the vain effort to find
assurance beyond the flux of unendingly meeting new worlds, or to create a
metalanguage above the clash" (60). The church's assurance and the other's
352
acceptance are the stuff of ever renewed challenges.
The question as to whether Yoder is actually guilty of conceding Christological
particularity by discarding confessional language as offensive will be addressed at
length in the next chapter. What is important to take as a given for now is that at the
least, evangelism (mission) and dialogue are, for Yoder, codependent activities.
Indeed an underlying question which this thesis attempts to provide an answer to is
whether the church has the capability of "entering] concretely into the other
community.. .long enough, deeply enough, vulnerably enough" or even at all, while
still maintaining its identity as "church." Hauerwas' description of the postliberal
politics called "church" by definition, refused even the possibility of that engagement
as one of "entering." Indeed, the church, for Hauerwas, was always already both
scattered and gathered within the midst of nations. The emphasis was on staying
faithfully the church, vulnerable and "the weakest of these," without taking up the
violent and greedy habits of liberalism and Constantinianism. For Hauerwas, honest
dialogue with the world almost always took the form of polemical argument—
vulnerable in the sense that, "you can kill us but at least we'll tell you the truth first."
But on Coles' reading of Yoder, even the church's ability to confess "Jesus is Lord,"
is called into question, or at least tempered by something prior, namely the virtue of
patience qua patience, rather than patience qua Jesus.
Christologically timeful patience must be a virtue of people awaiting parousia. But
as Coles notes—the way that such patience applies to the powers, a list of idolatries,
according to Coles, which includes self-aggrandizing "power, mammon, fame and
efficacy"—is never to the powers as such, but to the "other subject peoples" enslaved
by them.353 Yet how can eschatological patience ever be more than simply: waiting
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in hope, evangelical dialogue which names the enslaving powers, and the invitation
for outsiders to enter into a commonwealth of freemen? Moreover, eschatological
patience is a virtue, the memory of which is sustained by a "looping back" to the
canon within the canon, the practices ofwhich manifest caritas (the love of God) via
witness, a "receiving of others with radical vulnerability,"354 not merely in terms of
openness to the surprises (ateleological directions) they might wish to give, but a
willingness to see and share the suffering of those whose vulnerability has been
radically exploited by the powers—the weakest of these. Patience, no matter how
wild or radical, cannot be patience if it eschews the God-who-is-love and who makes
all love possible, nor if it rejects the judgment required to disciple the church to that
confession. Certain judgments—such as those which hold that Christ has triumphed
over powers that are still in rebellion—are necessary if Christians are to train
themselves, reflexively to be sure, to be people capable of understanding and
remembering what patience is. Judgments about truth do not preclude vulnerability
for the church; indeed they make it not only possible but necessary.
Yet in Coles' reading of Yoder, patience is nothing more than "radical
indeterminacy."355 Coles writes:
the meaning and relevance of "His [Christ's] victory" breaks off into
indeterminacy when faced with other subject peoples "for themselves." Those
within the church simply cannot know if their good news is the best news for
356other subject peoples.
To put it another way, the church's confession that "Jesus is Lord" is good for those
within the church, but the church cannot make truth-claims that result in judgments
about what is good for anyone else. What the church can offer to do is surprise the
world, by introducing new teleological or ateleological directions to those who find
themselves subjugated. The danger in making judgments then, involves falling into
354 Ibid. p. 111
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the trap of assuming that "exemplary relations are to be within the church."357 Coles
continues,
does "Jesus as head" structure relations with people outside it around a rigid
hierarchical privileging of Christian vision.. .In other words, might not "Jesus
as Lord" constitute a radical deafness to nonbelievers and a confinement of
prophesy to those within the church, so that the dialogic conditions of agape
within give way to monological practices toward others outside in a manner
likely to proliferate blindness and violence—certainly not the careful
discernment that might make vital giving and receiving possible?358
For Coles, confessional judgments only avoid the tendency toward deafness,
blindness, invulnerability and violence if such judgments are deemed truthful only
within the confines of a particular dialogical community, in this case the church.
Even then they will be open to revision, reform, or rejection, as each current social
embodiment of the traditio continually "loops back" in order to determine if such
judgments are worthwhile in light of internal dialogue with "members" and external
dialogue with "others." Coles' reading of Yoder in this regard makes clear his
Derridian commitments to postmodern notions of inter-subjectivity and alterity,
ultimately representing a response to the Enlightenment failure dubbed "relativism,"
as defined by Maclntyre.
Coles' excavation of radical democratic modes of practice from their Christological
roots in the writings of Yoder stands in a strange relationship to his simultaneous
privileging of the political vision of Sheldon Wolin.359 The contribution ofWolin to
critiques of liberalism in both theory (Rawls) and practice (radically exploitative
capitalism), arises from his telling of the history of political thought; a reading that
affirms the timeful (Christianity) and ridicules those who would deny contingency
(liberalism). Wolin names the politics of liberalism, the politics of speed. What must
be recovered at all costs, according to Wolin, is an honest politics of memory. The
strangeness in Coles' appreciation of Wolin should be readily apparent. What Coles
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receives from Yoder is a specific memory, which he then reconstitutes into a
memory available for everyone. In short, what is required in radical democracy is not
so much a memory, but a way of remembering and dialoguing with those who would
challenge that memory, that is not context specific; rather it is available to all
democrats qua the democracies they inhabit. It will be useful to look at the politics of
speed versus the politics ofmemory in Wolin, in an effort to come to grips with this
tension in Coles between particular memory and general modes of vulnerable
remembering.
Wolin argues that attempts to navigate the tension between the political and politics
was a dismal failure until the Christians interjected time into the equation. The
"political" in classical thought identified the form of government required in order to
rule, while "politics" was the "art" of dealing with "conflict and antagonism:" to
"offset them when necessary, to ease them where possible, and creatively, to redirect
and transmute them when the opportunity allows."360 Yet, according to Wolin, Plato
attempted to defeat the need for artful politics by defeating contingency, i.e., "the
361contraries of disorder" that "the political realm was inherently prone" to. Plato
attempted to solve this disorder by inaugurating a better form of the political; one
founded on "knowledge of the eternal pattern."362 The danger of his project, for
Wolin, is its tendency to remove the contingent and replace it with unassailability.
Removing the contingent removes time. As Wolin puts it, "the concluding note of
Plato's political science is not of an unlimited arrogance that man can fashion a
polity untouched by time, but of a heroism chastened by the foreknowledge of
eventual defeat. It is, in Shelley's words, 'Eternity warning Time'"363—or perhaps
more appropriately, eternity warring time. The salvation of politics came from a
most unlikely source, says Wolin, in a time when the polis was being subsumed into
360 Ibid. pp. 40-1
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Empire; a time when bureaucracy and self interest replaced "a sense of common
involvement" with "a common reverence for power personified."364 Wolin writes:
Christianity succeeded where the Hellenistic and late classical philosophies
had failed, because it put forward a new and powerful ideal of community
which recalled men to a life ofmeaningful participation. Although the nature
of this community contrasted sharply with classical ideals, although its
ultimate purpose lay beyond historical time and space, it contained,
nevertheless, ideals of solidarity and membership that were to leave a lasting
imprint, and not always for the good, on the Western tradition of political
thought.365
Christians were able in Wolin's analysis, to doubt existing political arrangements
366
because, as Hauerwas puts it, "they were members of an alternative politics."
Often times the church "mistakenly equated politics with power" in the attempt to
attribute "a more positive form" of political life based upon that politics, as was the
case in Christendom. Where Christianity falls back into the classical trap of
conflating power and politics, or politics and the political, the church should be
rightly chastened, yet "Christianity," thanks in large part to Augustine, saw that any
politics "which began in hope and ended in despair, seemed a mockery of both God
and man."367 Augustine's contribution then was to insert the notion of time into
history: "It was a unity pointing towards consummation at the end of time."368 Wolin
writes:
Christianity broke the closed circle, substituting a conception of time as a
series of irreversible movements extending along a line of progressive
development. History was thus transformed into a drama of deliverance,
enacted under the shadow of an apocalypse that would end historical time,
and for the elect, bring a halt to suffering.369
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It is against this background that Hauerwas, via Coles, comes to see liberalism in
Wolin's terms as a return to Plato. Indeed, the attempt to establish an ahistorical
perfect form of rule in terms of a contractual veil of ignorance is no different from
the benevolent philosopher-king's Republic. Both remove conflict and contingency
by attempting to create an unassailable position from which one can say "the way
things are seem to be the only way things can be."37 For Wolin, Plato, Rawls and
Empire all threaten to end the art of politics by removing time from the context of the
political life, replacing it with invulnerable, static, eternal truth.
Politics without memory cannot help but be a politics of exploitative excess, for there
is no "birthright"371 (teleological tradition) with which to temper (by looping back)
conflicts (ateleological surprises) which inevitably arise. Conflicts arise because the
political arrangements in which such politics operate can never be free of
ateleological surprises; no matter how violent the political systems' attempts to
repress the other may be, there will always be barbarians who want Rome to burn.
Indeed, the attempt to suppress otherness inside the empire by creating a poverty of
language and category (what some might call orthodoxy) seeks to abolish difference,
but in fact encourages it. The historical proof of this is that movements like
postmodernism and postliberalism actually exist (as those "irrational" elements once
repressed but which have come bursting through the surface of the encyclopedic and
organizing logic of the "rationality" imposed on them). What is necessary, for Wolin,
is the critical rejection of liberalism's induced Alzheimer's, and a return to a politics
of memory. As Hauerwas puts it, in Wolin's analysis, "Birthright politics, historical
politics is composed of ambiguous historical moments, deep ambiguities, that require
interpretative modes of understanding that make us able to reconnect past and
present experience and in the process reconstitute our politics." Furthermore,
"birthright politics" should be cultivated in local communities rather than states, for
"state-centeredness" results in "a politics in which at one extreme are the experts
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struggling to be scientific and rational while at the other is a politics of mass
irrationality, of manipulated images, controlled information, single-issue fanaticism
and pervasive fear."373
A politics of memory is ultimately, for Wolin, the politics of democracy, which "is
inherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and identified with revolution...the
idea and practice of rational disorganization." In this sense, democracy is not a
political system, bat a politics of time, the chief attributes of which, are contingency,
interruption, and conflict resolution. This point is crucial for understanding the
seeming contradiction between Wolin's affirmation ofmemory, on the one hand, and
Coles' translation of Yoder's Christological particularity into general democratic
terms on the other. Namely, Yoder's church is the religiously informed political
system, while the politics operating within that system is radically democratic. It
should be noted however that Coles' analysis in these terms forces a separation
between agent and agency, actor, and act, that neither Coles nor Wolin should be
comfortable with. What Coles ought to learn from Wolin is the opposite; indeed the
politics of the church can in no way be identifiable as radical democracy because the
politics (act) is inseparable from the political system (actor) which birthed it. In the
case of the church the political system is constituted by a continuous re-membering
of the birthright—the inexplicable recapitulation of the God-who-is-love in the midst
of time. The politics of the church is, because of that birthright, radical discipleship
as radical love - not radical democracy. Indeed, Hauerwas notes that in Wolin's
account the church represents the kind of radical democratic interruption that Rome
needed in order to preserve and reacquaint itself with the notion of politics, yet he
fails to point out that once accommodated to the power of Empire the church was
guilty, not of ceasing to be radically democratic (in favor of imperial efficacy) but of
ceasing to radically disciple itself (to the God-who-is-love).
That Hauerwas is sympathetic to the account of democratic politics offered by Coles
and Wolin cannot be denied. Hauerwas notes that
373 cf.n371
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Wolin does not believe our situation is at all hopeless. Indeed he thinks we
have time to draw on our ability to tend to one another when we are sick or
when the garden needs weeding. To so tend requires the development of
skills through which our tending is tempered by "a concern for objects whose
nature requires that they be treated as historical and biographical beings. The
beings are such as to need regular attention from someone who is concerned
about their well-being and sensitive to their needs." [Wolin, Presence of the
Past, p. 89] Such tending politically should direct our attention to practices
constituted by habits of competence and skill that are routinely required if
things that matter to us are to be taken care of.374
Yet Hauerwas here is not merely approving of pagans, who, not knowing quite what
they are about, do what is just or good by accident, or circumstance. Rather
Hauerwas asserts, "If that is "radical democracy," then I think I can claim to be a
radical democrat."375 For Hauerwas there is something positive at work in radical
democracy. In reflecting on the mentally handicapped, Hauerwas notes, "A
community that has the time and can take the time, the patience, to be constituted by
practices represented by those "slower" than most of us, is a community that may
provide an alternative to the politics of speed that currently shape our lives."376 The
question is whether what "we" need is an alternative, or more to the point, any
alternative, to liberalism. If anything will do, then surely Jesus dying for the sins of
the world seems a bit excessive. The problem here is that Hauerwas never calls into
question how "we" know that the politics of speed is bad, while the politics of
memory is good. "We" know because "we" refers to the people of God, not to those
enslaved by liberal forgetfulness. The people of God know because "we" are
gathered around the person of Christ, the Light of the World, who makes visible, if
"we" will only look, "our" own vulnerability, weakness, and contingency. To be
gathered into the body of Christ requires habits and practices that "we" call
discipleship. When the world names such practices radical democracy, "we" can only
reply that "our" stories and practices, when told and performed rightly, bear witness
to the way the cosmos is really ordered, i.e., the grain of the universe; moreover,
"our" confession that "Jesus is Lord," offensive as it may be, is necessary for
remembering how to engage in those practices—a proclamation heralded to the
374




world in the hopes that "they" will remember to help "us" remember how to be a
people ofweakness and vulnerability (for this reminder we should indeed thank Rom
Coles). What Hauerwas must not do when faced with an ateleological surprise like
Romand Coles, is forget to loop back to the canon, tempering Coles' interruptions
with the (offensive) memory of the cross. Anything less continues the mistake of
O'Donovan, giving primacy to politics sui generis, rather than to the politics of the
peculiar God-who-is-love.
Civil War as Democratic Theological Crisis
In keeping with Hauerwas' desire to ground the church's self understanding in lives
practically lived, through examples like that provided by the Dunkards in chapter 1,1
will close by looking at the particular examples of the theological crises surrounding
the American Civil War, the relationship those crises bore to democracy, and what
the church ought to have learned from them. This critical looping back is entirely
necessary if the church is to embrace its vulnerability, in Christological terms, as the
necessary cost of discipleship. The following argument is meant to directly
challenge, explicitly in Coles, and latently in Stout, the notion that the church has a
stake in identifying its ecclesiological practices as fundamentally democratic. For
Coles:
Democracy is democratization. And when it has been brought to life
historically (by abolitionists, feminists, antiwar activists, Native American
rights activists, grassroots community activists, and so on), it has always
hinged upon those who sensed, in their myriad insurgent, inventive, and
receptive capacities, that democracy was, is, and will be significantly beyond
democracy as "we" "know" it in its dominant forms: beyond the arbitrary
exclusions, subjugations, and dangers that accompany every democratic "we"
and their "knowing" and disclose complacency toward present practices as a
sham. Democratization has always depended upon those who embark beyond
democracy's dominant forms to invent greater equality, freedom and
377
receptive generosity toward others.
Democratization as described by Coles ought to be rightly attractive to Christian
sensibilities, particularly in terms of its continuous self-critical reflexivity, but it is
377
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not at all clear how democracy so envisioned, nor the practices it entails, are different
in any way from the necessary ecclesiological practices of weakness, generosity,
caritas, and self-critical reflexivity, which are inseparable and unintelligible (for
Christians) from the confession that "Christ is Lord." In his book, The Civil War as a
Theological Crisis, Mark Noll analyzes the historically deaf, blind, and violent
internal debate on the legitimacy of the American practice of slavery on both sides of
the theological crisis that founded the American Civil War. Indeed, it will be shown
that in Noll's account it was the very democratic virtues of "equality" and
"freedom," as non-Christologically founded, that, when introduced to everyday
readings of Scripture, could not help but result in the liberal, "invulnerable
privileging of one's own church and community...[a church, which] finally and in
T-yo
spite of themselves, slid.. .toward postures at war." While the churches could not
see their apostasy because they had exiled the necessity of confessional language
from descriptions of discipleship in practices, that is to say, they had removed the
content (the person of Christ) that made such language intelligible, they were unable
to temper their democratic, independent notions of justice, equality, and freedom
with the (at one moment critical, at one moment receptive) generosity (caritas)
toward others that is required by those who have had their sins forgiven.
According to Noll, "The most important first step toward understanding the Civil
War as a theological event is to recognize how reasoning about the war reflected
long-standing habits ofmind."379 Noll writes:
For more than a century before 1860, American theologians had been uniting
historical Christian perspectives with specific aspects of American
intellectual experience. The ubiquitous Christian reflection on the war
followed trails blazed in the late eighteenth century and then set firmly in
place by a confluence of intellectual forces during the early years of the
Republic. A culturally powerful combination of intellectual ingredients gave
American theologians their categories for apprehending sectional controversy
and the war itself. For the most numerous and most public American religious
groups, biblical Protestantism of a primarily evangelical cast provided the
378 Ibid. p. 112
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religious content of the synthesis. Despite tumultuous conflicts with each
other, these Protestants shared a number of fundamental convictions that
grew directly out of their American experience.380
The "time-tested ideology" of these Protestants381 included: an exaltation of the Bible
as the sole authority, instead of tradition or clerical hierarchy; a skepticism toward
received religious authority; an emphasis on grace in their lives and lives graciously
lived; pietism; a worldview in which Catholicism was not a branch of the church
(denomination) but a "perverse" heresy, not solely in terms of "true Christianity" but
also "treasured political values"; and finally, the utilization of American cultural
institutions and ideas to effectively further the cause of the Gospel.382 Indeed, it is
due to the adaptability of the brand of American Protestantism "that dominated
public life at mid-century" that it was able to "gain its place" by "successfully"
clothing "the Christian faith in the preeminent ideological dress of the new
Republic."383 Yet not only did the relationship between American Protestantism and
the Republic's democratic values lead to an increase in the credibility of the church,
but the church "vivified, ennobled, and lent transcendent value to republican political
assumptions, democratic convictions about social organization, scientific reasoning
pitched to common sense, and belief in the unique, providential destiny of the United
States."384
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According to Noll, nowhere was this "marriage" between American Protestantism,
republican values, democratic practices, and Enlightenment reason "more clearly
illustrated than in the pervasive belief that understanding things was simple,"385 This
reason by common-sense approach bestowed not only great "self-confidence" to
those employing it, but also the ability to vilify intellectual opponents as willful
perverters of "sacred truth and natural reason."386 Furthermore, American Protestants
saw the Enlightenment as directly responsible for liberating "liberty," and other
republican values, from the stifling traditions of their European forbearers. Once
"distracting traditions had been set aside," "perceiving the causes and effects of
political developments was a simple matter" because "human beings of the right sort
possessed a nearly infallible ability to perceive clear-cut connections between moral
causes and public effects."387 The intellectual synthesis between biblical faith and
Enlightenment certainty birthed, therefore, a set of republican and democratic values
that were at the same time both reasonable and authorized by God. In the words of
Noll:
By 1860 a substantial majority of articulate Americans had come to hold a
number of corollary beliefs about the Bible—specifically, that besides its
religious uses, it also promoted republican political theory, that it was
accessible to every sentient person, that it define the glories of liberty, that it
opposed the tyranny of inherited religious authority, that it forecast the
providential destiny of the United States, and that it was best interpreted by
388the common sense of ordinary people.
The Protestant churches that prospered during this time were the churches that
gloried in the disestablishment of complex forms of reasoning and Scriptural
exegesis. Yet even the more traditionally minded Protestants, like the Episcopalians
and Lutherans, were pulled along in the wake ofChristian democratic republicanism.
Thus in 1860, when disagreements over "what the Bible had to say about slavery"
385
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occurred, there was no way to adjudicate between individual interpretations without
impeding upon personal liberty or referring (looping back) to tradition.
Both sides in the debate retained unassailable intellectual positions, and as a result
the only possible response to the escalating conflict was violence. By eschewing the
possibility of dialogical conversation, the only way to prove who was right was by
seeing who won the military conflict—a demonstration of God's providence. Yet
does Noll's account of American republican/democratic values in the 1860's really
have anything to say about radical democracy? For Coles, radical democracy
requires a generous receptivity in order to avoid the kind of monologically violent
posturing exhibited on both sides of the slavery debate. Indeed, Coles rejects the
invulnerability of Enlightenment modes of thinking which repress ateleological, or
competing teleological, traditions. Yet the democratic values of liberty, justice, and
equality qua democracy occur in only two contexts: liberalism and the church. In the
church such practices are the activities of discipleship and are indistinguishable from
the exclusive Christian commitment to the God-who-is-love—"the god who is above
all gods;" yet as I have argued, claiming to know the truth does not endanger the
vulnerability of the church, because the truth was incarnated in the One who would
rather die than claim power. In liberalism, prior categories exist—an activity can be
just or good, liberty and equality can be human rights, generosity and vulnerability
can be exemplary skills—that is, as long as they are founded upon liberal Averroism.
In short, there is no way to judge the practices of radical democracy as good without
replacing the goodness of Christ with a position - a moral standard that is
ontologically prior to the God-who-is-good. Indeed, in the debate over slavery there
was a third way, which incurred the wrath on both sides, those pro-slavery as well as
abolitionists. Henry Van Dyke, a pulpit minister in Brooklyn, responded to those
who would replace Scripture, due to its indeterminacies, with abolitionism. Van
Dyke argues that
Abolitionism leads, in multitudes of cases, and by a logical process to utter
infidelity...One of its avowed principles is, that it does not try slavery by the
Bible; but...it tries the Bible by the principles of freedom.. .This assumption,
that men are capable ofjudging beforehand what is to be expected in a Divine
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revelation, is the cockatrice's egg, from which, in all ages, heresies have been
hatched.389
Dyke is right insofar as abolitionism is not in any way more primal than the authority
of Christ. A more interesting question to ask of Coles, is whether or not
"abolitionist" is a good term for describing a Christian who is anti-slavery. If
abolition implies a position rather than an activity of Christ (freeing us from the
powers), which must also be embodied by His body in the midst of the world, then
Dyke would probably want his readers to indict Coles on similar grounds. Abolition,
like pacifism, is only virtuous if it proceeds from a commitment to Jesus—abolition
qua the abolition of the messianic community. In that sense "abolitionist" is only
intelligible to Christians as a description of one facet of faithful discipleship. What
the account provided by Noll serves to show is that (1) republican/democratic
values/practices are always already committed to the ontological axioms of
liberalism, and (2) it is extremely dangerous for the church to clothe itself in the
independent, i.e., non-Christological, democratic language in the hopes of
transmitting goodness to the world. Even when such transmission is well intentioned
(as opposed to the American Protestant grabs for secular power), the results can be
disastrous.
Conclusion: Acts by Different Agents
In the final analysis, while the practices espoused by radical democracy may be good
ones, it is not at all clear how radical democrats judge them to be so. That is to say,
how can anything other than the forgiveness of sins by the God-who-is-love make
possible generous receptivity—hospitality, the hope of new friendship, and love of
the enemy—or make such practices in any way intelligible? What is more likely is
that American democracy is in practice a tradition, and the memory of that tradition
(common sense) articulates, through constant dialogue, shared common interest
(non-Christologically founded goods in common); this is possible insofar as just
enough of the church's best insights have rubbed off to make it seem so. That is not
to say that the church is incapable of learning how to be the church from the world.
389 Ibid. p. 32
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Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth, as such learning forces the proper
reevaluation and reconception of what constitutes right Christian practices. Hauerwas
notes that for Yoder, even "agents of the Enlightenment have taught and continue to
teach the church crucial lessons about religious liberty."390 These crucial lessons are
of course things that should have been learned from Jesus and Paul, particularly in
terms of "radical subordination," yet the church should be thankful for the reminder.
As Yoder puts it, the
Hermeneutical role of the community is...primordial; i.e., we have to talk
about it first. It is however by no means an exclusive possession.. .When the
empirical community becomes disobedient, other people can hear the Bible's
witness too. It is after all a public document. Loners and outsiders can hear it
speaking especially if the insiders have ceased to listen. It was thanks to the
loner Tolstoy and the outsider Gandhi that the churchman Martin Luther
King, Jr.,...was able to bring Jesus' word on violence back into the churches.
It was partly the outsider Marx who enabled liberation theologians to restate
what the Law and the Prophets had been saying for centuries, largely
unheard, about God's partisanship for the poor.391
That such has happened historically there is no doubt, but what must really be called
into question is whether same acts (by different agents) constitute same practices?
In Performing the Faith, Hauerwas extends this line of enquiry a step further,
nothing that he is "not sure"392 he agrees with Stout that "all moralities" are "about
roughly the same topics." Hauerwas writes:
If description is everything, and if act and agency are constitutive of one
another, then it is not at all clear to me that we can be confident about "same
topics." I am not denying some commonalities may be found, but you have to
look. I would press this same set of issues in relation to Stout's thought
experiment concerning the atheist who does the same act in two possible
worlds with the only difference being that in one of the worlds God exists. I
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am not at all convinced that in such worlds we can be confident it would be
i 394
the same act.
Practices, as we have learned from Maclntyre, are more than the sum of their parts. If
the difference between acts and practices is that practices have goods internal to their
activity and standards of excellence attached to that activity, then it makes sense to
judge practices as unique to the socially embodied contexts in which they are
pleonastically performed (and which via the process of looping back, non-identically
perform those social contexts). The move that Hauerwas rightly makes here is from
the pragmatic to the ontological. No longer is "a difference between agents" merely
descriptive, rather it names ontologically separate moral entities (this position
coupled with Yoder's ontology of the powers, may give Hauerwas the ability to
resist, as I will argue in the next chapter, the accommodations he is inclined to make
to Coles and Stout). To put it another way, Hauerwas moves from a
psychological/anthropological description of the relationship between agency and
act, to a tacit ontological account of the church, which by doing right acts (loving)
participates in the continuing work ofChrist (God's love)—that is, His agency.
The next chapter, through a close reading of Yoder, argues that there exists an innate
schizophrenia in his writings. Because of its occasional quality, and Yoder's
eschewal of attempts to systematize his writings, the ontological implications of
Yoder's account of the powers—as precisely the ontological difference between
moral agents—is ignored when he articulates the proper Christian response to
democracy and civic nations. Moreover, in his debates with Stout and the radical
democrats Hauerwas lost, in different ways, the firm footing upon which he had been
standing in the form of Maclntyre and Yoder. The task of the next chapter then is to
identify the problem and possibilities in Yoder, in the hopes of finding the grounds
upon which Hauerwas might tactically reestablish the kind of postliberal theological
politics he espoused for most of his writing career.
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Powers Ontology versus a Christian Witness to the State
The purpose of this chapter is to address inconsistencies in Yoder's own account, and
in so doing begin to understand the possibilities of repair that might be open to
Hauerwas if he were to read Yoder differently. In this chapter I argue that the major
failure of Yoder's account can be attributed to the occasional nature of his work, and
his refusal to systematize his thought. This has led him to speak ontologically about
the Fallenness of the powers in some places, while in others he speaks of the
church/world distinction as a difference between agents. The refusal to remember,
particularly in his writings on democracy, that the church/world distinction is
ontological has led him to affirm the translation of Christian peculiarity into worldly
terms, giving a liberal tint to those writings.
I begin by outlining Yoder's cosmology of the powers, as found in Tbe Politics of
Jesus and The Christian Witness to the State. As we will see, for Yoder the powers
are those physical and spiritual entities that since the Fall have stolen authority from
Christ and have gathered/enslaved His creation to their own benefit. These powers
are disarmed in the resurrection and ascension such that the eschatological promise
of the Kingdom of God is the subordination of those powers (once again) to the
Lordship of Christ.
One of the powers that Yoder's cosmology identifies is the state, which, according to
Yoder, has also been disarmed in the resurrection and ascension. Yet as I illustrate in
the second part of this chapter, the state in almost every way attempts to deny the
Lordship of Christ, claiming for itself authority over all those it has gathered—who
live within a particular set of imagined geographical boundaries. Drawing on the
work of Oscar Cullman, Yoder argues that all such attempts are futile however, as
Jesus Christ has mastered history—this occurs in such a way that even the defeated
powers work toward the good of the church despite their continued attempts at
rebellion. As we will see in the final part of this chapter, for Yoder, the church must
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be a witness for the nations in such a way that the nations become better, less violent
servants of God's will.
The difficulty that I will address in this chapter is Yoder's inconsistency in
maintaining an account of the peaceful politics of the Kingdom of God (arguably the
whole point of The Politics ofJesus), while at the same time generally affirming the
politics of the world and of democracy in particular. Drawing on the work of Oscar
Cullman, Yoder describes the role of the state as that of a police force. For Yoder,
throughout history states have maintained a certain order (albeit Fallen), which is
required in order for the church to be the church. According to Yoder, this describes
the way in which Jesus can be Lord of all while some powers still resist his Lordship;
namely that Jesus uses the violence-on-violence mechanism of the Fallen powers to
make the continuation of the church's mission in the world possible. It will be the
point of this chapter to begin raising suspicions about Yoder's account of God's
utilitarianism—God's use of violence to maintain a community of peace. This
position is one that I believe contradicts all of Yoder's (and Hauerwas') own best
insights.
Yoder's Ontology of the Powers
Yoder's work on the powers is most thoroughly discussed in the eighth chapter of
(1972) The Politics of Jesus entitled, "Christ and Power." The second chapter of
(1964) The Christian Witness to the State further analyzes Christ's Lordship over the
powers as a foundation for talking about "The Ground for the Witness to the State."
What follows is an account of Yoder on the powers taken primarily from these two
sources. It is important to say at this point, that in the Second Edition of The Politics
of Jesus (1994), Yoder's purpose is not to "spell out at length samples of the
relevance of this kind of approach for concrete social and ethical thought."395 Rather
he points to Jacques Ellul, who through his plethora of writings "probably.. .thinks
the most consistently within the framework for this approach, though often without
393
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direct allusion to the Pauline vocabulary."396 Indeed, Yoder allows for Ellul's
systematization of thought on the powers precisely because, for the most part, Ellul's
work on the powers is inseparable from an account of Jesus' victory over them, and
it is precisely that victory which allows for a critique of mechanisms which govern
the secular world. Those who would attempt to derive a priori or natural principles
of economy, manipulation, force, technological progress, etc., from Ellul's writings
would therefore be doing the unintelligible, as the powers of enslavement are only
nameable thanks to the alternative freedom provided by Christ. Thus the lens through
which Ellul views the world must always be identified as both Pauline and
Christological if it is to be useful.
Yoder begins his account of the powers in the The Politics ofJesus, by stating that
the powers originate in Creation; that is to say, the powers are a creature of God,
397made with a specific purpose and function. The purpose of the powers is to
establish "the reign of order among creatures, order which in its original invention is
a divine gift."398 Yoder continues, "[t]he universe is not sustained arbitrarily,
immediately, and erratically by an unbroken succession of new divine interventions.
It was made in an ordered form and it was good."399
Yoder finds it helpful to make an analogy between the New Testament concept of the
"principalities and Powers"400 and the contemporary use of the word "structure." For
Yoder, the regularity, systemization, and ordering of the universe, provided by God
at the Creation in the form of the powers, is responsible for the possibility of society,
history, and nature. The powers are mediators; God's means of regulating Creation.
396 Ibid. For a thorough description of the Powers in the work of Ellul see Dawn, M. J. 1992. The
Concept of 'The Principalities and Powers' in the Works of Jacques Ellul. Ph.D. Thesis, The
University ofNotre Dame. Unpublished. Available, Ann Arbor : University Microfilms #9220014
397
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400 It is interesting that Yoder almost always capitalizes the word powers, which serves to give them
proper names, making them ontological entities in their own right.
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Yoder argues that there could be no humanity without the existence of "religious,
intellectual, moral and social structures;"401 there could be no nature without the laws
of science; there could be no history without the passage of time.402 Noting the wide
variety of ambiguous language surrounding the powers in Scripture, and particularly
considering the complex uses of the term "power" in modernity, Yoder argues that it
is helpful to see the dilemma, as to right use of language involving the powers and
the word "power," as analogous to modern and ambiguous uses of the word
"structure."403 For Yoder, the modern hierarchical power structures that surround us
on a day-to-day basis are "structurally analogous to the Powers."404 Indeed it is upon
making the analogy between powers and "structures" that Yoder avoids discussion
about the ontological make-up of the powers, as guardians of the natural order of
Creation and towards political/historical accounts of the powers structuring
humanity.
Yoder's focus on the political/historical aspects of the powers is evidenced when in
Politics he provides a list of some of the structural powers that govern Creation,
including: (1) primitive sociological religious foundations; (2) intellectual "'ologies
and 'isms"; (3) moral "codes and customs"; and (4) political structures like "the
tyrant, the market, the school, the courts, race, and nation."405 Yet there does exist an
explicitly ontological account of the powers as more than "ideas" in Yoder's work,
which can be found in the first footnote of The Christian Witness to the State; there
Yoder provides an extended list that importantly includes powers at work in the
natural order. Yoder says:
401
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402 The powers that regulate history and time are a function of both humanity and nature brought
together. In terms of nature we have the possibility of space-time and with humanity we have the
possibility of history within that space-time.
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we could add 'doms and 'hoods. Such words as causality, fatality, necessity,
humanism, respectability, Christendom, nationhood do not point to specific
people, things or events but neither are they mere ideas.406
Yet Yoder's account of the powers is not limited only to the material, physical, and
structural. Marva J. Dawn, a student of both Yoder and Ellul, argues in her book
Powers, Weakness, and the Tabernacling of God, that over the last fifty years
scholars have broadly fell into two categories whilst describing the powers.407 Dawn
dubs the first category the Demythologizers and includes Rudolf Bultmann, Amos
Wilder, G.H.C. MacGregor, and Ernst Kasemann.408 (Dawn tentatively includes
Walter Wink in this list). According to Dawn, the Demythologizers argue that the
powers are identifiable only with human structures; the powers are visible and
physical structures that exert authority over humanity and do not exist as spirits or
angelic/demonic beings. Yoder makes a reference to demythologizing scholars,
saying that like the Protestant fathers of the Reformation, the Demythologizers found
themselves living in an
age which no longer believed in spooks or in Santa Claus, there was
something embarrassing about the way in which the Bible—and especially
the Apostle Paul—spoke of the "Powers," that is, of some sort of undefinable
superterrestrial beings, not only as if they existed but in fact as if they
mattered and were somehow involved in the work of Christ.409
While Yoder clearly does not place himselfwithin the Demythologizer camp, neither
does he fit with the alternative. According to Dawn, the scholars which fell into the
second category can be called Personalizers. The Personalizers, the most notable of
which was John Stott, argued that the Scriptural powers referred only to angelic and
spiritual creatures. Dawn describes their interpretation as an almost fundamentalist
reaction to that account of the powers provided by the Demythologizers. For Stott,
406
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the description of the powers provided by Bultmann and the others was both
reductionist and inadequate.410 Robert Webber, also a Personalizer, later modified
Stott's position to say that the spiritual powers employed human structures.411 Dawn
argues that the median between these two categorical extremes is walked, albeit in
vastly different ways, by the likes of Hendrik Berkhof, John H. Yoder, William
Stringfellow, Oscar Cullman, and Karl Barth. If Dawn is right in arguing that Yoder
takes the middle path between the Demythologizers and the Personalizers, his
account requires a description of the powers which is both
material/historical/physical and also spiritual and invisible.
I have already addressed Yoder's description of the creaturely origination of the
powers, their governance of both humanity and the natural order, as well as their
physical and structural characteristics, yet it is also important to mention that Yoder's
analysis of the powers includes a spiritual side (which necessarily gives them
ontological status). While the spiritual dimension of the powers in the thought of
Yoder is not often discussed, it is perhaps best described when Yoder argues that the
powers are "not and never have been a mere sum total of the individuals composing
them... [t]he whole is more than the sum of its parts. And this 'more' is an invisible
Power, even though we may not be used to speaking of it in personal or angelic
terms."412 That is to say, the structures of humanity give us a background on which to
paint our existence and ought not be reduced to the material or psychological.
Indeed, there is a spiritual reality above them, which in some cases is entirely
separate from the physical. That to which the powers point are "not mere ideas" but:
410 See Stott, J. 1979. God's New Society: The Message of Ephesians. Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press.
411 See Webber, P.. E. 1986. The Church in the World: Opposition, Tension, or Transformation. Grand
Rapids : Zondervan Academic Books. Today many Pentecostal, charismatic, and even evangelical
churches offer classes and seminars on "Spiritual Warfare," which almost always refers to the
individual Christian's battle with specific demonic entities. These accounts, while spurred on by
authors of Christian fiction like Frank E. Peretti, are historically based in the "Personalizer" traditions
of scholars like Heinrich Schlier, F. F. Bruce, and D. E. H. Whiteley.
412
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realities, of a suprapersonal kind, which lend coherence to life, exercising a
real power over human decision. Their impingement upon concrete events
may be quite crudely visible (Fascism, sorcery) or quite imprecise and
indirect (humanism, moral law).413
Indeed, "these powers are seen as invisibly determining human events."414
Unfortunately, continues Yoder, we no longer have access to the good Creation of
God. As alluded to above, the human creature, the world, and the powers, are all
Fallen. Following St. Paul (Romans 8: 18-22), Yoder notes that humanity, creation,
and the powers (as mediators of God's creation) are subjected to futility and death
after the Fall. Moreover, in the words of Yoder, the powers
...are no longer active only as mediators of the saving creative purpose of
God; now we find them seeking to separate us from the love of God (Rom.
8:38); we find them ruling over the lives of those who live far from the love
of God (Eph. 2:2); we find them holding us in servitude to their rules (Col.
2:20); we find them holding us under their tutelage (Gal. 4:3).415
In the Fall, the powers become the systems and structures of sin, i.e., those orderings
of reality that are lesser goods than the Good that God established for his creation. In
the Fall, the powers, rejecting their creaturehood and the modesty and service
required of them, glorified themselves, seeking to replace Very God with themselves,
a multitude (legion) of authorities.416 Indeed the hopelessness of the situation is most
clearly revealed, according to Yoder, in that while humanity cannot live under the
authority of the powers, neither can humanity exist without those structures that
order its existence.
According to Yoder, despite this seemingly hopeless situation God has preserved his
creation. The powers, while immersing humanity in the slavery of sin, at the very
least order its existence as a protection from chaos—all of creation, including
413
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humanity is preserved to await the redeeming work of God.417 Yoder continues,
pointing out that, "If...God is going to save his creatures in their humanity, the
Powers cannot simply be destroyed or set aside or ignored."418 Rather, their authority
and "sovereignty" as lesser gods/goods "must be broken."419
For Yoder, this is exactly what Christ does in the cross and resurrection. As Yoder
notes in The Christian Witness to the State: "The triumphant affirmation of the New
Testament is that Jesus Christ by His cross, resurrection, ascension, and the pouring
out of His Spirit, has triumphed over the powers."420 Indeed Jesus submitted himself
to the powers but refused "to support them in their self glorification" for which the
powers killed him:421
417 Ibid. p. 143
418 Ibid. p. 144
419 Ibid.
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It is important to point out that Jesus no longer had a choice but to submit. The only other option
was to wield the same violence used by the powers, and this was unacceptable to him. It is not that
Jesus was trying to undermine the powers ontology of self-glorification, but that he chose to die
instead of fight his way free. His submission, suffering, death, and resurrection do undermine powers
ontology. Indeed, many readers of Yoder are predisposed to view any mention of ontology as
transcendental and metaphysical, and as such exerts some kind of top-down, systematic, violent
control over theology proper. This is due in large part to the bad reputation ontology has gained from
those involved in Radical Orthodoxy, particularly the writings of John Milbank. For Milbank et al.
Christian ontology is a better, stronger, more persuasive vision of the cosmos than that provided by
the nihilism of modernity (and postmodernity). It is no wonder that Milbank's project has thrown up
red flags to readers of Yoder. Indeed, any attempt to present an ontology of strength from the
Christian tradition seems very reminiscent of the Christendom hubris which bathed the Anabaptist
Fathers in their own blood.
The question that must be asked by the reader of Yoder (and at which Hauerwas more than hints in his
exchange with Milbank in Must Christianity be Violent? (Chase, K. and Jacobs, A. [eds.]. 2003. Must
Christianity be Violent? Reflections on History, Practice and Theology. Grand Rapids, MI. Brazos
Press.) is: in what way must an ontology of peace be primarily an ontology of weakness as opposed to
an ontological of strength? Any attempt to recover and extend an ontology of peace that is rooted in
strength will inevitably lead to Pax Romana, while the Pax Christi by its very nature denies the self-
glorification of its ideology. The peace of Christ is not better than the peace of empire; rather it is the
only peace that is actually peace by virtue of the Christ-Act. Christ did not attempt to establish a better
ontology; he redeemed God's creation from the violently self-absolutizing powers by re-ordering the
cosmos in the church. It is the job of the church therefore to witness to the vision ofCreation (which is
also eschatology) in Jesus, not by fighting our way free of the privative ontology (nihilism) of the
world but by pointing out that God's ordering of the world is the only ontology possible. We are not
competing with the world; the world's ontology is a self-positing, self-absolutizing, and ultimately the
self-glorification of the powers, the mediators of the world, who are fallen. In the same way that
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Preaching and incorporating a greater righteousness than that of the
Pharisees, and a vision of an order of social human relations more universal
than the Pax Romana, he permitted the Jews to profane a holy day (refuting
thereby their own moral pretensions) and permitted the Romans to deny their
vaunted respect for law as they proceeded illegally against him. This they did
in order to avoid the threat to their dominion represented by the very fact that
he existed in their midst so morally independent of their pretensions. He did
not fear even death. Therefore his cross is a victory, the confirmation that he
was free from the rebellious pretensions of the creaturely condition. Differing
from Adam, Lucifer, and all the Powers, Jesus did "not consider equal with
God as a thing to be seized" (Phil 2:6). His very obedience unto death is in
itself not only the sign but also the firstfruits of an authentic restored
humanity.422
For Yoder, the powers were an attempt by God's creatures to become gods
themselves, a temptation which Jesus denied even unto death on a cross. Through
death on the cross and resurrection to new life, Jesus "disarmed the principalities and
powers and made a public example of them, triumphing over them." (Col. 2:13-15).
In short, Jesus broke the sovereignty of the powers concretely and historically.423 It is
upon this cosmological foundation that Yoder develops an account of the church as
"revolutionary subordination," that is to say, the church is the body of God's people
who serve (love) the world (rather than dominate it) by their visible re-ordering in
Christ.424 The church's discipleship in Christ therefore, is a rejection of any attempt
to grasp equality with God by embracing the powers as ends in and of themselves;
rather, the church acknowledges that Christ has given us a new way of being
humanity (gathering), and a new way of living in the natural order (environmental
Milbank rejects the positive substance of evil in favor of privation he should similarly reject the
ontological positive substance of nihilism and violence as merely privative. Moreover, any attempt to
compete or fight with privative ontology is to submit to that lesser ontology by situating our own
vision within the same violent struggle for dominance i.e., Christianity is just another version or
possibility, but better because it is more beautiful. The point for Yoder, and Hauerwas, is: Christ has
died, risen, and will come again; the world has been re-ordered in the Church; the grain of the
universe has been revealed; and it is not our job to fight the powers. Christ through his embrace of
weakness, suffering and death has disarmed them and reigns as the Prince of Peace. It is our job to
embrace the reign of the King of Peace rather than engage in battles with the death throes of the
Imperial powers. When we attempt to engage the powers we enslave ourselves to them.
422
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care and sustainability), and this way is not a way of violent domination but an
acceptance of creaturely weakness (contingency).
In the next few sections I provide a close reading of the way in which Yoder, in other
writings (but also including Witness) and particular in those toward the end of his
career, separates himself from this ontology, positing the church/world distinction
not as one between ontological antitheses but as a difference of response between
moral agents. It will become clear as this chapter progresses that Yoder's position is
extremely sympathetic not only with the radical democracy of Coles and Wolin, but
also the liberal democratic pragmatism (even in its civic national form) of Stout.
These sympathies are unfortunate and illuminate serious contradictions in Yoder's
overall body of work, occasionalist as it is. It is difficult to believe that the Yoder of
The Politics ofJesus is the same as the Yoder ofFor the Nations.
There are serious inconsistencies between Yoder's ontology of the powers in terms
of the legitimacy of those powers under the Lordship of Christ, and Yoder's
optimism toward the work of the state. Throughout his writings, and particularly in
The Politics of Jesus, Yoder exhorts the church to reject the violence and force
employed by the powers in favor of submission and weakness, which is ultimately
discipleship to the Prince of Peace. In this age, according to Yoder, all of humanity is
obsessed with progress and the direction of history, such that "part if not all of social
concern has to do with looking for the right 'handle' by which one can 'get a hold
on' the course of history and move it in the right direction."425 Forcing history in a
certain direction not only rejects the notion that history has already come out right in
Christ, but identifies a new telos, which humanity must fight for and for which
everything ought to be sacrificed. Unfortunately as we will see, in some of Yoder's
other writings, particularly in the The Christian Witness to the State, The Priestly
Kingdom, and For the Nations, it seems to be the case that post-ascension, the Lamb
of God is master of history and as such has become a utilitarian—using the violence
of the nations to constrain the violence of the world, giving the church room to be the
church.
425 Ibid. p. 228
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Yoder's reliance on Cullman in his description of the Lordship of Christ and the two
ages (two perfections, two responses), his Augustinian description of the Christian
witness to the state, his development of a Christian case for democracy and its basis
as a low status power play, as well as his reliance on the survival of the church via
the violent hand of either God or the just warriors, will all be analyzed in what
follows.
Yoder and Cullman
The importance of Cullman to Yoder's enterprise cannot be overstated. Cullman, a
protestant theologian and pioneer of the ecumenical movement, was Yoder's
professor ofNew Testament at the University of Basil. Unfortunately, in most Yoder
scholarship the importance of Cullman to Yoder's enterprise has been given but
passing mention, while much more time and energy has been put into illuminating
the connections between Yoder and Barth, or Yoder and the Yale School. An
example of this would be Craig Carter's previously mentioned book, The Politics of
the Cross. Against Carter, I argue below that it is Cullman's account of time and
history, rather than Barth's, which Yoder adopts wholeheartedly as his "ground for
the witness to the state".426
Cullman points out that questions as to the nature of the relationship between the
church and the state are not "contemporary problems," rather such questions "are
actually posed and solved by the New Testament."427 It is because the Gospel
identifies the church as the politeuma, "the community of the coming age, [that] it
must accordingly see as its most intrinsic concern its disposition toward the present
'polis,' the secular State."428 The difficulty then, according to Cullman, is finding a
middle ground between "denial" and "affirmation" of the world, whilst reflecting the
426
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primitive Christian conviction that, "on the one hand, in Christ the end is already
fulfilled; and that nonetheless the consummation is still in the future, since the
framework of the present world still endures."429 While Cullman is right in that the
New Testament poses the question of church and state, there is still a decided lack of
clarity as to the answer, evidenced by the very fact that Cullman wrote a book titled,
The State in the New Testament. While the New Testament provides a variety of
clues for how the church should name, serve, and witness to the world, conclusions
are missing because, as Stanley Hauerwas puts it, "the Gospel is only the Gospel
when it is received."430 That is to say, the Gospel cannot be good news if it is not
embodied and performed within a community that is always already rooted in
Christ. 31 Indeed Cullman admits that the question of church and state "is so closely
bound up with the Gospel itself that they emerge together."432 In the same way that
the Gospel is the Gospel when it is received, Hauerwas argues that the church/state
relationship cannot be discussed separately from a community of Christ. It is the
church which makes the world the world; that is to say, it is only in the midst of the
church, the Kingdom of God, that the state can be named world. This is something
that Hauerwas credits learning directly from Yoder.433 Yet as we will see below,
while Cullman's task begins by interpreting the world through the church, by
providing a primitive Christians lens by which history can initially be viewed,
Cullman's eschatology finds at its end the justification of the church via the world;
which is to say that the church is just a stepping stone on the way to the universal
429 Ibid. For Cullman's work on primitive Christian eschatology see: Cullman, Christ and Time.
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redemption of humanity, and if one is not careful it is that universalism which then
constitutes the church, not the God-who-is-love.
In his book, Christ and Time, Cullman rightly argues that the Christ-event is at the
center of all history. According to Cullman, the primitive Christian conception of
redemptive time can be visibly represented in that "[i]t takes its start from the
broadest conceivable basis and narrows steadily until it reaches that center from
which it again broadens out: Creation - mankind - Israel - the remnant - the One -
the apostles - the Church - mankind - the new creation." 34 While Cullman's
account of time is correctly centered on the redeeming work of Christ, the
description of the redemption process involves a universal and progressive expansion
of the community of Christ to the nations (and all of creation)—a primitive Christian
universalism—which we will see is a major point of contention in this thesis.435 For
Cullman, this universalism is not an extension of the church per se, but a
dissemination of the recognition of the Lordship of Christ to the ends of the earth.
Thus, according to Cullman, not only does time center upon the redemptive work of
Christ, but Christ's place at the center of history is an unmistakable sign of his
immutable Lordship. While the knowledge of the Lordship of Christ over all creation
is present at both ends of the historical timeline, it is the story of salvation which
spans the historical distance between the two.
Rejecting the "de-mythologizing" efforts of Bultmann,436 Cullman dedicates a hefty
chapter of Christ and Time to developing an account of exousia as entities both
material/structural as well as spiritual/angelic.437 Summarizing his overall cosmology
at the beginning of Christ and Time, Cullman notes:
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There is in the New Testament an invisible heaven and a visible earth;
invisible powers and authorities are at work, while man observes only the
visible deeds executed by the earthly agents of those powers. But this
invisible course of events is itself completely subjected to the progress of
time. The essential thing is not the spatial contrast, but the distinction which
438faith makes between the times.
Thus it is in following the paradoxical character of 1 Corinthians 15:20-28, that
Cullman is able to announce the Lordship and reign of Christ over all things, whilst
acknowledging that many of the powers of the world still refuse to subordinate
themselves to Christ's reign. The way that Cullman navigates the contrary
descriptions of the lordship of Christ in the New Testament is two fold: (1) an
eschatological account of two ages, and (2) a soteriological account of the
relationship between those two ages which includes the universal redemption of
both.
Cullman's Eschatology
The central thrust of Cullman's argument involves the illumination of a Biblical
conception of time divided into three distinct units: the time before Creation, the time
between Creation and parousia, and the time after parousia,439 Subsumed within the
"Biblical conception of the time" however, there are two vastly different
perspectives: that of Judaism and that of Christianity. The vastness of the difference
between the two is noted by Cullman as occurring thanks to a second two-fold
division present in each timeline between "this [age] and the coming age."440 This
two-fold division designates a midpoint in the overall timelines of Judaism and
Christianity, the difference between the two being the location of the midpoint on the
timeline. For Christianity the midpoint of the timeline is the Christ-event, while for
Judaism the midpoint is coterminous with the already existing separation twixt the
age that is "between Creation and Parousia" and the age "after Parousia."441 What
438
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this means is that for Judaism the midpoint on the timeline is in the future, whereas
for Christians it is in the past. The difficulty for Christianity therefore, lies in coming
to grips with the notion that while the initial timeline remains, i.e., that the parousia
is in the future, the church finds itself already belonging to the new age.442 Cullman
puts it such that
Expectation continues to exist just as in Judaism. What the Jews expected for
the future is still expected of the future; but the future event is no longer the
center of the redemptive history; rather, the center lies now in a historical
event. The center has been reached but the end is still to come.443
For Cullman this is analogous to the deciding battle happening during the early
stages of a war, yet the war continues on till "Victory Day." Cullman rightly
describes the powers as defeated by the Christ-event, and yet they still rule over the
world, in the present, awaiting the fullness of the parousia.
It is precisely this method of navigation of the "already" but "not yet" character of
the Lordship of Christ which Yoder adopts throughout his writings. Following his
description of the creation, fall, and dominion of the powers in The Christian Witness
to the State, Yoder acknowledges the "triumphant affirmation of the New
Testament.. .that Jesus Christ by His cross, resurrection, ascension, and the pouring
out of His Spirit, has triumphed over the powers."444 Following Augustine and
Cullman, Yoder identifies the present historical period (after Pentecost and prior to
parousia) as being marked by the coexistence of two overlapping ages, one old and
one new. The old age is passing away and is centered upon the sin of man, the
rejection of God, and the dominion of the powers. The new age, which is already
beginning to supersede the old, is the "redemptive reality" characterized by the
Lordship of Christ and "God's will being done."445 For Yoder, "the present
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paradoxical state of the world is well expressed in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28. Christ is
now reigning, He is now Lord, yet not all His enemies have subjected to Him."446
This is the point at which Yoder adopts Cullman. Yoder uses the example provided
by Cullman (as described above) of the time between the end of a war and the final
surrender of the defeated enemy. Citing the "merit" of Cullman's work as having
"most clearly" worked out the "double character of Christ's reign," Yoder identifies
two separate anticipations of the kingdom, "both of them valid foretastes of the final
triumph but in different ways."447 Yoder describes these two anticipations as follows:
The church points forward as the social manifestation of the ultimately
triumphant redemptive work of God; the world, however, even though still
rebellious, is brought into subjection to the kingship of Christ or the kingdom
of the Son. The kingdom of the Son is thus to be distinguished, insofar as we
may be permitted to speak systematically, from the kingdom of God.448
It is upon this foundation that Yoder builds his argument for the "scaffolding"
service that violence provides to the redemptive process. For Yoder the purpose of
the "vengeance-upon-vengeance mechanism.. .is to maintain peace so that all men
can come to the knowledge of the truth."449 Thus it is Cullman's work that makes
this seeming inconsistency (a kingdom of peace maintained by violence) in Yoder's
work possible. If I am to argue that Yoder is wrong regarding God's utilization of
violence to master history however, I must first make my case against Cullman.
Cullman's Soteriology
According to Cullman, the soteriological process that primitive Christian eschatology
identifies as occurring in history can be dubbed a "double movement of the
redemptive line," which is "the principle of representation," i.e., "the election of a
446 Ibid.
447 Ibid. p. 9-10
448 Ibid. p. 10
449 Ibid. p. 11
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minority for the redemption of the whole."450 In the first case, man is representative
for the fall and redemption of the whole creation; the curse of man in the fall is the
curse of all Creation. Moreover in the midst of the sinfulness of all humanity God
chose one community of people, Israel, to be the agents of salvation for the whole
creation.451 As the process of redemption continues, it follows a path described by
Cullman as a "progressive reduction." In the prophets, when Israel does not fulfill
her role in God's plan of salvation, the whole of Israel is replaced by a faithful
remnant. Finally the remnant is further reduced to one man "who alone can assume
Israel's role," Jesus Christ, the "Suffering Servant of God" and "Danielic Son of
Man."452 As Christ is the midpoint on the line, the overall movement of redemptive
history changes. No longer does redemption move from the many to the One, but
'
from the One, in progressive advance, to the many."455 For Cullman this is the
separation between the Old Covenant and the New Covenant; in the first the many
are represented by one and in the New Covenant the many will ultimately represent
the one 454 Thus the New Covenant/Old Covenant divide signals a double movement
on the redemptive timeline with the Christ-event at the center. The second movement
on the redemptive line, from the One to the many, begins with the apostles (the
remnant), leads to the church (Israel), advances to the universal redemption of all
humanity, and finally of the whole creation—a new heaven and a new earth.
Cullman's soteriological universalism is equally problematic for Yoder's enterprise.
According to Cullman,
[sjince the time of Abraham there has been occurring a course of events
which, to be sure, develops outside of the real redemptive history, but which
430
Cullman, Christ and Time, p. 115
451 Ibid. p. 116
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453 Ibid. p. 117
454 What Cullman refers to here is the unity of the people of God in Jesus. The question is whether or
not that unity is available outside the church, or perhaps in a time that is post-church.
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nevertheless has proceeded from it and will again enter into it; indeed since
Christ's death and resurrection it already has begun to enter into it again 455
The gentiles, and all the nations of the world, have been continuing to exist
(subjugated to the powers) outside the redemptive timeline since the inauguration of
Israel as representative of all humanity. Yet post-Christ, redemption is once again
spreading universally to the whole world. Perhaps Cullman's best (and saving)
insight in his description of "Christian universalism," which he acknowledges as
paradoxical, is that the general history must enter into the redemptive history, not
vice versa. The danger comes from describing the eschatological relationship
between the timelines as a merging. In the case of a merging, the general timeline is
not subordinated to the redemptive timeline; that is to say, the world need not
necessarily pass through the church in order for it to participate in the redemptive
history.
There is a reflection of this kind of soteriological thinking in the work of A. James
Reimer, particularly when he encourages theologians like Yoder to temper their
"ought" with a contextual "is." According to Reimer, a more proper relationship
between the two, rather than an over-focus on "ought," as is found in Yoder, or an
over-focus on "is," as found in the Niebuhrs, is required. For example, Reimer
believes it would be prudent to temper the "Anabaptist ideal" against the "Mennonite
reality."456 Should this tempering fail to happen, a scenario is created in which a
theological discussion of
how God governs the world "outside the perfection" of Christ remains largely
unaddressed, the focus being primarily, if not exclusively, on what it means
to be faithful "inside the perfection" of Christ, with little analysis on what
positive role human institutions of family, tribe, ethnicity, nationality, law
and government play in the divine economy of the world at large and the
cosmos as a whole 457
433
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As will become obvious in what follows, the conclusion of this chapter does not find
Yoder guilty of overemphasizing theology "inside the perfection" at the expense of
theology "outside the perfection," although it would probably be better for Yoder if
he were. Reimer's main concern is that the "true theological significance of 'God
ordained' institutions through human history, which God preserves the world from
4co
total chaos and disintegration, is not adequately understood or acknowledged." Yet
it is precisely a theology of "God ordained" powers (most of which, according to
Yoder, are systems and institutions) that Yoder is developing when he draws on
Cullman's eschatological account of the two ages and his soteriological description
of the Lordship of Christ.
Reimer's soteriology, insofar as it reflects that of Cullman, is summarized in the
following three part movement: "God has created the world good, God has redeemed
the world in Christ, and God is reconciling the world to himself through the Holy
Spirit."459 The statement as such seems rightly orthodox. Until, that is, Reimer
clarifies the third movement of his summa, noting that:
If, for example, Christians believe that God is doing something reconciliatory
in the world through the Holy Spirit both inside and outside the church, then
there is insight to be gained from looking empirically at what is happening in
cosmic and human history—past, present, future."460
Nowhere in Reimer's three part summa does he mention that the reconciliatory and
redemptive work of Christ occurs within the church. Indeed, it seems for Reimer that
the work of the Spirit replaces the work of the church as opposed to grounding it. To
put it another way, for Reimer it is the Spirit which works both inside and outside the
church, because, on Reimer's analysis, rather than Yoder's, the church is designated
"inside." For Reimer, the job of the church seems to be being the church, whose
evangelical witness to the world is showing what the perfection of Christ looks like.
This sounds similar to Hauerwas' claim that the first task of the church is to be the
458 Ibid. p. 248
459 Ibid. p. 249
460 Ibid.
163
church, except for one caveat. It is not necessarily the church who serves the world,
or even attempts to perfect the world by evangelizing it—rather, that is the work of
the Holy Spirit. It is unclear how Reimer then avoids the charge of deriving an
"ought" from an "is." On his analysis, human institutions are the way they are, the
Holy Spirit perfects institutions outside of Christ, therefore, current institutions are as
perfect as they can be (or are getting there through the grace of the Holy Spirit)
outside of Christ.461 (Here he leaves himself open to critique from both Yoder and
Ellul by assuming the possibility ofHegelian progress); even if this is but a parody of
where Reimer wishes his position to take him, it remains unclear how anything can
be perfect, or perfected, "outside the perfection of Christ," which Reimer takes to be
present only in the church, that is, unless Reimer were to make an ontological
distinction between the perfection of Christ and the perfection of the Holy Spirit.462
Reimer's position is similar to Cullman's insofar as Cullman says that the general
time line is forced to enter into the redemptive time line, and the way this occurs can
be articulated as the world entering into redemptive history at a time perhaps best
described as post-church. In short, God's salvation of the nations occurs separately
from the gathering of the nations into the church. The alternative then would involve
seeing the crossover between the general time and redemptive time as always taking
place in the church. Unfortunately the error made by Reimer, Cullman, and Yoder is
that too often a dichotomy is presumed between perfection "inside" and "outside" as
if there really were two perfections, one for each age. Redemption of the old age is
marked by making it as good as possible, but ultimately assuming that the gathering
of the nations will occur in the parousia. For now a few citizens here and there may
461 It also stands to reason that an account of the perfecting of the world outside of Christ through the
Holy Spirit would make the notion ofperfection synonymous with progress. Either, history has
already come out right in Christ, and therefore the nations are as perfect as they can be outside of
Christ, or, the Holy Spirit is progressing history in the right direction, toward the perfection of the
nations outside of Christ.
462 A second criticism could be made of Reimer regarding his reading at this point of the church as
collection of individuals rather than as a community unified by the Holy Spirit. Reimer notes: "The
Church is of course, for Christians, the primary community of allegiance—the community within
which our ultimate values and commitments are shaped. However, the church is not the only venue of
our faithful activity. Good and godly things happen outside the church and church-related ministries.
In fact, there are occasions when individuals are called on in concrete times and concrete places to
give provisional priority to working outside the standard institutions of the church as a form of
Christian faithfulness". (Ibid. p. 248). Reimer is making a distinction here between the individual
Christian and the context in which their faithful activity occurs.
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decide to switch their allegiance, but the church must be satisfied with the perfection
of the nations to only a certain extent, because, of course, the violence of the nations
is required.
The compartmentalization of the "perfection of Christ" within the church is made
particularly evident in Cullman's description of the crossover between the two time
lines, which is based upon his account of the New Testament concepts "the sovereign
Lordship of Christ" and the "Church."463 Citing a number of passages in the New
Testament (Matt. 28:18, Phil. 2:9-10, Col. 1:18-20, Col. 2:10, Eph. 1:10) that
proclaim Christ as head of both the church and head over all things, Cullman argues
that while Christ is head over all things, including the church, the body of Christ is
represented by the church alone, because "[t]he Church as Christ's body continues
his work on earth."464 The church, for Cullman, is the heart and center of the
Lordship of Christ. According to Cullman it is not the case that the church and the
world are
two circular surfaces that lie beside one another...or perhaps only touch or
intersect...[or are] identical. We must rather conceive two concentric circles
whose common center is Christ. The entire circular surface is the reign of
Christ, the inner circle is the Church, the...[outer] is the world.465
Indeed, while both circles are full of sinners the inner circle knows it has been
redeemed while the outer circle stands "unconsciously under the Lordship of
Christ."466 It is the work of the church then to make the world aware that it stands
already under the Lordship of Christ. It should be said here that I find this analogy
useful as long as the world is called to recognize the Lordship of Christ not where
they are, or as what they are, namely "world," but are called to come enter in to the
community of Christ, the "church."
463
Cullman, Christ and Time, p. 185
464 Ibid. p. 187
465 Ibid. p. 187-188
466 Ibid. 188
165
It is at this point in Christ and Time that Cullman begins to develop his own
particular account of the powers as those entities that have been placed under the
Lordship of Christ yet do not quite realize it, including the way in which Christ's
mastery of the powers is the ability to use the powers, despite their rejection of his
Lordship, in order to benefit the process of redemption. Cullman explains this benefit
such that the powers work on behalf of Christ "not, to be sure, as mediators, but
rather as executive instruments of the reign of Christ."467 (The worrisome connection
between Yoder and Cullman at this point becomes readily apparent). Establishing the
"late Jewish belief that all peoples are ruled through angels" based upon Daniel,
Wisdom, Sirach, Enoch, the Talmud, and Midrash, Cullman identifies Christ's
mastery of the powers as the subjection of Fallen angels. Cullman then leaves room
for the violence and sinfulness of the state, by observing the presence of a "certain
freedom...left to the angelic powers within their subjective position;" this explains
why, "in the present stage of redemptive history, it still is not possible for the Church
to take without qualification or criticism the view that the State is divine."468
Looking specifically at Rom. 13:1, Cullman argues that the state can never be viewed
as an end in and of itself, rather it merely serves a purpose within the divine order, a
purpose that is to be both respected and questioned (as the state is prone to demonic
flare-ups).469
Cullman's overall emphasis on the respectability of the state in the divine order, as
based on Rom. 13:1 must be addressed. According to Cullman, the New Testament
"simply confirms the fact that the State (the Roman State), in its judgment
concerning good and evil, agrees with the Christian judgment."470 Yet this is clearly
not the case for either Yoder or Hauerwas. Everything in the Gospel rejects the
Roman Imperial order, particularly their view of good and evil, and replaces it with
something completely different: no longer are the rich blessed, rather it is the poor.
467 Ibid. p. 192
468 Ibid. p. 198
469 Ibid. p. 202
470 Ibid. p. 204
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Indeed, Cullman himself sounds slightly confused when he notes that the nature of
the agreement between the church and state, as to what is good, cannot be
explained.471 The question is: why does Cullman even think that a theory of state
legitimacy is necessary in order to describe the intersection of the redemptive time
line and the general time line? Why is it necessary to see the state as having a place
within the divine order that does not require transformation and incorporation within
the redeemed community, the church? It is not as if, upon Christ's ascension into
heaven, the Roman Empire, or the angelic powers which led it, immediately altered
their conceptions of goodness and justice. Yet Christ was still Lord, regardless. The
point is that if general history is to be incorporated into redemptive history, then the
general history must acknowledge the Lordship of Christ by gathering to Him, into
the community called church—a position explicated in detail in the next chapter.
Upon Cullman's eschatology and ecclesiology, as described thus far, Yoder
extrapolates a vision of the mastery of God over history that identifies the Lordship
of Christ as using the mechanism of violence-on-violence to police the unruly
nations, thereby making it possible for the church to be the church in relative peace.
But surely, as I have noted above, it cannot be the case that the maintenance of the
church is made possible by a utilitarian Prince of Peace who uses violence to
establish the peaceful Kingdom of God. Such a vision enslaves the peace of Christ
(the love of God) to the Pax Romana, a peace (love) on the other side of violence.
This Deific utilitarianism stands in stark contrast to his account of the powers as
metaphysical entities that stand in rebellion against God. As I will argue in the next
chapter, what Yoder and Hauerwas require is a theology of gathering that proclaims
the Lordship of Christ, yet requires those who would answer the call, including the
powers, to disciple themselves within the community of love. Negatively, to identify
the redemptive process as a gathering into the body of Christ, rather than a diaspora
of salvation to the world, a merging of redemptive history into the world history,
Yoder will be able to avoid falling into the trap of universalism, and founding the
Lordship of Christ on an ontological violence. Positively, Yoder, and through him
Hauerwas, have the intellectual tools to discern the powers as ontological realities, as
471 Ibid. p. 203
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opposed to merely moral agents (who make bad choices), if they would only use
them.
Bettering the State
Besides the Lordship of Christ, Yoder identified a second foundation for the
Christian witness to the state, namely, the translatability of Christianity into the
language of the World. This translatability is manifested by J. H. Oldham's notion of
"middle axioms," which acknowledges the ability of the church to speak to the world
in a neutral language. The use of middle axioms in Yoder's work, to attend the
interrelationship between secular peace and justice groups, the state, and the church,
begins in The Christian Witness to the State (1964), but as I argue below, continues,
though often not so named, throughout his career finding its apotheosis in his (1992)
Body Politics: Five Practices of the Christian Community Before the Watching
World. Through the use of middle axioms, Yoder encouraged the church to engage
with, and witness to, the nations. This involved replacing the language of the church
with the language of the state, in the hopes of calling the state to live up to the state's
own best moral insights. Such methods of public engagement might for example
involve the translation of agape into "pagan terms" such as "liberty, equality,
fraternity, education, democracy, human rights."472 Yet it is important to remember
that for Yoder, middle axioms are only tools whose utility is the illumination of
Christ to those unable to hear and comprehend the Christian language. As Alain Epp
Weaver puts it, "[n]o metaphysical value is ascribed to the middle axioms outside of
Christ."473 Still the question as to whether or not Yoder embraced the translation
possibilities provided by "middle axioms" for the duration of his career has been at
least briefly contested. Michael Cartwright observes that Yoder drops the middle
axiom terminology later in his career, though never repudiates the notion per se.474
472
Yoder, Christian Witness, p. 73
473
Weaver, A. E. "After Politics: John Howard Yoder, Body Politics, and the Witnessing Church." in
The Review ofPolitics. 16:4. (1999). pp. 637-73. p. 663. Weaver is the Mennonite Central
Committee's representative for Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq, and is directly responsible for offering
alternatives to the conflicts in these regions. Indeed, his job is that of using middle axioms to establish
and maintain peace.
168
Craig Hovey disagrees, acknowledging that while Yoder drops the language of
middle axioms, the notion itself is retained, and most likely transformed.475 It will be
my purpose in this final section to identify the continuity, as implied by Hovey,
between Yoder's vision of the interrelationship between the church and world in his
early writings, and that found in his later works in order to make clear any
inconsistencies between Yoder's description of the church within the context of the
Kingdom, and the church within the context of the world.
The Christian Witness to the State
In his essay, "The Christian Witness in the Earthly City," Gerald Schlabach draws
remarkable comparisons between the form and function of Yoder's The Christian
Witness to the State and St. Augustine's The City ofGod. 476 It will be useful to look
closely at Schlabach's reading of Yoder through the Augustinian lens precisely
because it is a reading which avoids the particulars of middle axiom language whilst
illuminating the eschatology of translation that underpins each. Schlabach argues for
six ways in which Yoder's Christian witness to the state "corresponds with
Augustine's attitudes toward the earthly city:"477 (1) eschatological context; (2) the
co-mixture/coexistence of two societies; (3) the obscurity of purpose and meaning
within history or society alone; (4) critiques of imperial self-glorification; (5) an
exhortation of the earthly polis to its own betterment; and (6) the making of effort to
establish and maintain the peace of the earthly city. It will be useful to look briefly at
each of these below.
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Schlabach's analysis begins by noting the eschatological context in both Augustine
and Yoder is that of God's people struggling to come to terms with the "already" but
"not yet" character of the kingdom. Augustine's contrast between the earthly city and
478the heavenly city is an analogy reflected in the "two ages or aeons" of Yoder, both
ofwhich identify a
pilgrim people [who] live in tension, as resident aliens, not only because they
are away from home but because the current world is a contested zone, in
which the angelic citizenry of each city (the faithful and rebellious angels) vie
to direct our loves and loyalties to opposing ends.479
Schlabach goes on to note that the opposition between the two cities is not merely a
question of time, but of space as well. While both cities represent opposing ages, it is
also the case that the citizens of both cities are intermixed within the same space. It is
the practices of citizenship, therefore, that distinguish the members of one city from
the other. As such the solution to the conflict between the two cities can never be a
question of time alone or space alone. It stands to reason therefore, that the church
cannot simply trust that given enough time the chaff will separate itself from the
mystically unified wheat. Neither can the church begin the task of separation by
walling itself inside suitably Christian ghettos. Rather, citizens of the heavenly city
must locally embody the full catholicity of the paronsia in the midst of the earthly
cities. Moreover, it is the evangelical nature of the church (witness and conversion),
which allows the heavenly city to avoid charges of sectarianism. Thus the timeful
and eschatological response of the church to the earthly city must always be witness
and an invitation to conversion, whereas the space into which earthly citizens are
invited is the local embodiment of the universal city of heaven—for it is the very
practices of the local community which make both responses possible.480
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The danger for both Yoder and Augustine occurs when the nature of witness
becomes the effort to effect change in the practice of the earthly city by bettering its
practices. The reason to better the practices of the earthly city involves an over-
preoccupation with the notion of shared space. Both Augustine and Yoder
acknowledge the Fallen character of the earthly city and the practices of its citizenry.
For Augustine, it was not the might of Rome or her gods but the "one God who was
ruling for purposes that were ultimately inscrutable but surely included such ends as
establishing that partial earthly peace of which believers were to make use but not
trust."481 For Yoder the state is always only the "scaffolding" service by which the
church can more effectively evangelize the world. In both cases, the effectiveness of
the mechanisms of the earthly city is too good a medium for the church to pass up.
As just one example, when it came to sending out missionaries, the roads of Rome,
and the peace from banditry, were to be lauded. Similarly for Yoder the Anabaptist, a
state free of religious persecution is preferable to one that is not. Of course, the
earthly city and the practices of her citizens must never be seen as ends in and of
themselves, but in some cases such activities might just be the means by which the
will of God could most effectively be done. At this point a brief aside will help make
clear the nature of what Yoder and Augustine are doing when they make this kind of
move.
In his book, Improvisation: The Drama ofChristian Ethics, Sam Wells advocates the
appropriation of categories found amidst the activities of improvisational theater in
the hopes that such categories will help Christian re-imagine their moral contexts.
Among the categories listed in Improvisation is a description of the different roles
playable by actors, particularly in regards to those who are high status as opposed to
those that are low status. According to Wells, high status roles command attention,
demand space, and refuse to yield, while low status roles work in the margins,
getting things done with subtlety rather than force.482 According to Wells, the
variation in status relationships is similar to the variation found in Michel de
481
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Certeau's distinction between a "strategy" and a "tactic."4 3 For Certeau, as described
in Chapter 2, a tactic is an act of resistance (what Wells would call blocking) which
occurs when those who would resist are homeless, whilst a strategy begins as an
excursion from citadel to countryside—after either victory or defeat the army can
retreat back to the citadel. Yet there is a striking difference between Wells and
Certeau involving the place of the "other." For Certeau, a tactic is the resistance of
the other to the domination of hegemony, whilst for Wells both high and low status
describe the interrelationship of power within that hegemony. To put it another way,
those who are low status are not weak, nor are they victims, rather, adopting the
means of the low status player is but a strategy for the manipulation of power. At a
recent conference Wells told the slightly humorous story of a friend who catches a
young boy breaking into the ground floor of his flat. Rushing outside, his friend
(high status) catches the boy and holds him. Yet as the friend prepares to call the
police, the boy (of low status, and seemingly powerless) shouts out to those at a
nearby bus stop: "This man is trying to touch my willy!" This, according to Wells, is
a form of role reversal in which the low status thief uses his lower status to make a
high status player vulnerable. This occurs because the low status player, the high
status player, and those at the bus stop, are all set within a deeper context involving
pedophilia and abuse that saturates society as a whole. Thus both low and high status
players are playing the same power games, only in different ways. There is no
"other" involved in Wells' analysis at this point, which could quite possibly be a
criticism of Well's categories, or at least the ambiguity in his employment of them.
At times Wells wishes to encourage the Christian to creative and shrewd acts of
resistance, and in his another book describes Jesus washing the feet of the disciples
as an status reversal (high to low).484 It would be extremely helpful then if Wells
were to spend some time making distinctions between non-exploitive acts of
weakness, vulnerability, service, and victimization which do not attempt to
manipulate power in the manner of the low status player. Whether or not de
483 Wells cited the similarities between his own work and that of Certeau at The Ekklesia Project
Conference in 2006.
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Certeau's tacticians are as other to the strategist as he claims is a discussion for
another place.
What is important for this chapter is coming to see the moves toward efficacy made
by Augustine and Yoder, particularly regarding their affirmation of the usefulness of
the practices of the earthly city, as attempts to play the low status game. The attempt
to better the practices of the earthly city in the hopes of maintaining a longer lasting
Pax Romana (or Pax Americana), is a low status manipulation of power. Yoder and
Augustine attempt to increase the efficacy of the church by establishing a peace and
a justice rooted in violence rather than the God-who-is-love. Schlabach notes that for
both Augustine and Yoder, the call is for the statesmen to at least give their "second
best," that is, to adopt as policy the lesser of two evils—all the while the shared
motivation for their actions, is a Christ-founded concern for the welfare of one's
neighbors and friends. Overall, Schlabach argues, this is the eschatological
worldview on which Yoder founds his account of the translatability of Gospel
principles and ultimately his description of the usefulness of middle axioms.
Schlabach goes farther and notes that an account ofmiddle axioms might have saved
Augustine from accommodation to the Constantinian enterprise, by rejecting his need
to ascribe metaphysical ground to lesser truths.485 While Schlabach acknowledges
serious differences in Augustine and Yoder, particularly in Augustine's willingness
for Christians to engage in just war, the differences as presented in The City ofGod
and The Christian Witness to the State are ultimately differences in what concessions
are made in the name of effective utility. To put it more clearly, the differences
amount to different strategies by which the church ought to use its low status to
maintain a Kingdom which does not even have a stake in the game.
The Christian Case for Democracy
Yoder's article "The Christian Case for Democracy," was given to the Ethics Section
of the American Academy of Religion conference on October 29l , 1976. The article
485
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was republished with minor changes in 1984, in The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics
as Gospel, twenty years after the publication of The Christian Witness to the State. In
addition to the task presented in this section, of finding continuity in Yoder's writing
with regards to the nature of the church/state relationship, it will also be useful to
look at the ways in which this article affirms one form of secular government in
particular, namely, democracy, and does so precisely because democracy is the form
of government which is most useful to Christians who are attempting to better the
practices of the state.
Yoder begins by noting that there is no simple way to engage Scripture so that a
biblical vision of how the world political order ought to look like is swiftly
illuminated. Rather, "[w]e need to correct for our built-in habits of thought, to
recognize that prescriptive visions for how things ought to be, in the world beyond
the community of faith, did not come naturally to early Christians, or to early
AQf.
Israelites." The Maccabees and Zealots adopted a theocratic model based upon
their Messianic expectations, which "included an affirmative design for government
according to the will of God, but projected that hope only for the people of God, not
a better empire."487 While the apocalyptics and Zealots were frustrated with earthly
Empire, and their preoccupation with it revolved around its annihilation, or at least
it's fading away, the question was never asked, "What would be the best form of
government?" Alternatively, Yoder notes, the early Christians never asked whether
empire was the best form of government. Rather, this question could only be asked
by the church after Constantine, when those who asked had the power and leisure to
4oo
contemplate possible alternative worlds. In an attempt to explain the complexity of
Yoder's position, Hauerwas observes:
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Yoder's disavowal of the question of what form of government is best does
not mean that he thinks we live politically in a world in which all cats are
gray. Christians can and should distinguish between different societal and
governmental alternatives, but they must do so without assuming they need a
theory of legitimacy to discern the difference between political societies. That
Christians refuse to speculate about what form of government may be best
does not mean they must abandon all attempts to discern between better and
worse forms of societies.489
Yet whether or not Yoder actually disavows the question, is far from clear.
Following his recitation of the difficulties involved with the question, including the
Constantinian context from which the question is asked, Yoder develops two
accounts of translation: one negative and one positive. The negative case for
democracy is interested in a kind of translation which navigates between the facticity
of secular authority and the moral claims of secular authority, yet whose starting
point is the way of Christ. The positive case for democracy is the more familiar
notion of the Christian cultic commonwealth which trains, most likely through the
use of middle axioms (although this terminology is not used), the civil
commonwealth. Yoder begins with his discussion of the negative case for democracy
because it is, in practical terms, more basic and possibly more useful, though also
more accommodated.
Yoder begins his discussion of the negative case for democracy by talking about the
"facticity" of secular dominion as opposed to the "language of legitimation" (which
is the ad hoc justification of that facticity), referring to his claim in The Christian
Witness to the State, that "[t]he State does not need to be theoretically justified in
order to exist; it does exist."490 Indeed, according to Yoder, Jesus did not, and the
church should not, baptize the authority of the secular state as the divine right of
rulers. Despite the already character of state dominion, the state legitimizes itself by
identifying itself as a moral good. Yoder observes, "that even the pettiest Caribbean
dictator, like the most powerful in Peking or Moscow, makes claims to be
benefactor."491 In practical terms, the church need not criticize the ontological
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ground for the legitimacy of a government; rather the church need only call a
government to live up to its own moral claim of legitimacy—to be a benefactor to
those over whom they claim dominion. (The problem with this is that it already
begins to ignore Yoder's account of the ontological facticity of the powers).
Following Yoder, Hauerwas argues that Christians need not "ask governments to be
nonresistant, but they can ask those in power to be just, care for the orphans and
widows, and use the least violent means possible to secure order."492 Thus middle
axioms have been rejected in that no longer are such axioms taught to the nations as
principles derived from the Gospel; rather, the church is responsible for calling the
state to its own best insights. Moreover, none of this lies in contrast to the
"differentness of the disciples," who live in obedience to the Lordship of Christ in
the midst of the nations. It is when a ruler claims to be a benefactor "and he always
does...that [his] claim provides me as his subject with the language I can use to call
him to be more humane in his ways of governing me and my neighbors."493
Therefore, the negative case for democracy states that in democracies in particular, it
is not the case that the government is more humane494 or legitimate because it is a
government "by the people," rather it is merely the case that democracies are more
useful to Christians (who desire to call on the state to improve its care for the
governed), because in democracies representatives of the people have to take
seriously the wishes of the people if they wish to continue to legitimate themselves
as democratic qua democracy. Thus, Yoder can be opposed to Niebuhr's liberalism
whilst still being optimistic about the possibilities of democracy for the church.
Indeed, because the government attends to many services other than protection and
the acquisition of resources, it is possible for Yoder to claim that the government is
"by no means only the sword."495 This allows Christians to not only exhort the state
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to better practices, which is the Christian witness to the state, but also to participate
in government.496
Alternatively, Yoder's description of the positive case for democracy once again
encourages the church to think in terms of middle axioms, although Yoder never
actually uses the term, as such. In what Yoder calls the more hopeful case for
democracy, the Christian commonwealth is called to act as a model for the civil
commonwealth. The particulars of this relationship are never really expanded upon
except to note that two failed versions of such a program are reflected in the age of
Milton and Cromwell. The gist of Yoder's argument however, seems to be to train
the world so that honest dissent is possible on a range of issues, including those that
deal with human justice and nonviolent conflict resolution, all of which must be
founded on "the logic of servanthood rather than.. .coercive beneficence."497 The
oddity in Yoder's argument however, is that there does not appear to be a clear line
of separation between the civil commonwealth and the Christian commonwealth. If
the civil commonwealth is founded in Christ, why is this positive case for democracy
not called effective evangelism? At what point does the civil commonwealth cease to
become civil and become a part of the Christian commonwealth? At what point does
this new arrangement become Christendom all over again? The answer to these
questions has to be that Yoder is actually referring to a kind of education whereby
the church teaches the state a set of cruciform principles through the use of middle
axioms—the very activity of liberalism. Whether or not the principles of democracy
have a cruciform shape has already been called into question by Noll's reading of the
theological crises of the Civil War, but Noll's arguments aside, as readers of Yoder,
our suspicions are raised by the seeming inconsistencies between Yoder as radical
democrat and Yoder as the opponent of Niebuhr. At the very least it seems that
Yoder is providing an answer to the question: what is the best form of government?
He does this not only by acknowledging the efficacy of democracy for calling rulers
to account, but by implying, with Romand Coles, that the republicanism of the "town
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid. p. 167
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hall" is akin, on some level, to the diversity of the "congregation," by comparing
"free speech" and "parliament" to the "Christian hermeneutic of dialogue in the Holy
Spirit".498
Body Politics
In his book Body Politics, published in 1992, Yoder analyzes five practices of the
church, which "prefigure" God's will "for human socialness as a whole."499 Yoder
notes that these five practices are called sacraments by some, yet in them grace is
conferred not only to the church but to the world as well. This conference of grace is
not, according to Yoder, a metaphysical reality, but is rather, training in the ways of
discipleship for the church and a mediation of better alternative practices for those
living in secular communities. Thus Yoder describes the church/world distinction not
as "two compartments under separate legislation or two institutions with
contradictory assignments, but two levels of the pertinence of the same Lordship."50
Body Politics as a whole, therefore, further develops Yoder's positive account of the
church/state relationship as found in the above section. While the primary goal is to
discover the formative political character of the sacraments for the church, Yoder's
discussion of each practice ends with a description of the ways in which that
particular practice is capable of transforming political habits in the secular
community as well. Before moving on to look at Yoder's magnum opus on
church/state issues, it will be useful to look briefly at one of the sacraments, and the
way in which Yoder makes it viable to the secular community.
The first practice of early Christians, as described by Yoder, is Jesus' admonition of
binding and loosing. In the words of Jesus:
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If another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the fault
when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have
regained that one (Matt. 18: 15).
The process of binding and loosing is a doctrine of confession, discipline, and
reconciliation called by Paul501 "the law of Christ" (Gal. 6:1), and affirmed also by
the Epistle of James (5:19-20). In both Matthew and John 20:23—"If you forgive the
sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained."—
Jesus outlines, according to Yoder, a specific human activity (sacrament) in which
"God would at the same time be acting 'in, with and under'" the activity of the
disciples.502 (Yoder uses this definition of sacrament to apply to all five practices).
According to Yoder, the goal of "binding and loosing" is to name sin in the midst of
the community and then to seek both peaceable reconciliation and forgiveness, i.e.,
the remission of the offense. Yoder observes four central aspects of this activity,
which he points out are "significantly different" than historical understandings of this
practice:
a. The initiative is personal, not a clergy function. The one who is to address
the offender is the person who knows about the offense, not a clergy
person.
b. The intention is restorative, not punitive.
c. There is no distinction between major offenses and minor ones: Any
offense is forgivable, but none is trivial.
d. The intention is not to protect the church's reputation or to teach
onlookers the seriousness of sin, but only to serve the offender's own
well-being by restoring her or him to the community.503
Thus the church must first discern (confess) sin, and place upon the offending party
the obligation to confess its offense. Thus confession is, in both cases, a description
of sin and a call to (or affirmation of) a different way of living. Forgiveness and
absolution of the offender are not solely activities of the clergy, nor are they wiped
clean by an inward (mental) assertion of guilt and remorse within the sinner. Rather,
the offender can only be reconciled to the body through a person-to person process of
501 For a discussion of Yoder's contribution to Pauline studies see Harink, D. 2004. Paul Among the
Postliberals. Grand Rapids, Ml: Brazos Press.
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confession and forgiveness between offender and offended. Furthermore, the pastoral
nature of the call to peaceable reconciliation is only possible for Yoder because
membership in the community is voluntary. Yoder sums up his argument about the
practice of binding and loosing in the early church in the following way:
1. Believing men and women are empowered to act in God's name.
2. What the believers do, God is doing, in and through human action.
3. God will not normally do this without human action.
4. Ifwe receive forgiveness, we must give it.
5. This dialogical reconciling process must come first. Only then must we
turn to talk of the set of standards that this process enforces. Much
Christian debate about moral issues makes the mistake of concentrating
on what the standards ought to be rather than on how they are to be
discerned and implemented.504
It is at this point that, despite Yoder's oft-repeated rejections of the liberal attempt to
derive theological insights from Christian practices,505 he does exactly this by using
middle axiom terminology to make reconciliation viable to the secular community as
a whole.506 Here Yoder creates an eight-point model of peaceable and effective
reconciliation for any human community, based upon the principles of the practice of
binding and loosing.
a. The process begins at the point of concrete offense, with a real problem.
b. The intention is not punishment but resolution.
c. The frame of reference is a value communally posited as binding the
parties.
d. We should assume that the process is not a zero-sum game. The mediator
trusts that a solution is available whereby both parties will win; each party
affirms the other's rights.
e. The first efforts are made in ways that minimize publicity and threat, and
maximize flexibility without risk of shame.
f. The process makes use of a variety of roles and perspectives carried out
by competent, caring, yet objective interveners.
g. The skills and the credibility of interveners can be validated by
experience and accredited by colleagues and clients.
504 Ibid. p. 7
50:1 Ibid. p. vii
506 Ibid. p. 11-12
180
h. The ultimate sanction if negotiations fail is public disavowal of the party
refusing reconciliation; what is left is either to let the injustice stand or to
see the civil powers intervene in their ordinary way.
Yet a number of questions arise from Yoder's claim that such secular reconciliatory
activity is possible, such as how can peculiarly Christian concepts like confession,
forgiveness, and reconciliation be intelligible in communities not founded upon the
acclamation that Christ is Lord? What is the method for determining offenses from
correct behavior in secular communities? Would not these be framed in terms of
reason, nature, and law507 for which the claim "Christ is Lord" has no meaning?
What are the limits of secular discipline for the unrepentant? What are the terms of
the membership for those within the community? Is the community voluntary? What
if it is not? And in what way is reconciliation intelligible as a good, or even a "lesser
good," within communities not disciplined by the Lordship of Christ?
Beyond these most basic questions, concerns arise as to whether Yoder's description
of liberalism in the "Introduction" is any different from his own attempts to translate
sacramental practice into secular terms. According to Yoder:
There are ways to bridge the chasm between "church" and "politics" or
between "worship" and ordinary life, many people will say, but all agree that
a bridge is needed. Then they differ about what the right bridge is. From the
perspective called "liberal," the bridge between the two is thought to be a set
of insights concerning human nature and the world, such ideas as justice and
freedom and understandings of why and how we should behave. Worship is
then thought of as inculcating such insights and reinforcing devotion to them.
Worship helps you understand things in a particular way; then, in the light of
those understandings, you will be usefully active in public affairs. It will for
instance, help you think of the global ecology as something God created for a
purpose or of your neighbor's hunger as your responsibility. Those
understandings will guide you to act.508
The main difference between the liberal response to the chasm between church and
state, and Yoder's own, lies in the distinction between individual and community.
507 These are terms which are disavowed by Yoder (Ibid. p. vii) as attempts at "autonomy," i.e.,
autonomy from Christ. These terms claim to be known "otherwise than through revelation or
worship." (Ibid).
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Liberalism identifies Christians as those secular citizens with special insights,
whereas Yoder identifies the church, as does Stout, as a separate community whose
insights are available to world. The important thing to recognize is that this
availability of insight (into Christ) is not evangelism, nor does it require the world to
disciple itself to the Lordship of Christ, nor enter into the community of faith as a
citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven. Rather, a version of these insights is available to
the world as middle axioms—whether or not this is merely Christianity without
Christ remains to be seen. At the very least it is clear that Yoder is once again relying
on middle axioms to bridge the church/state divide, ultimately in the hopes of
bettering the state, ensuring a temporary peace, and relying on God to use the
violence of one nation to check the violence of another. But is this entirely fair to
Yoder? It seems that the whole point ofBody Politics is to expand on the notion that
the state is not, or need not be, entirely the Sword. By drawing on a variety of
services which might be provided by the state, and which offer an alternative to the
violent maintenance of peace, Yoder it seems may be hoping to avoid the dangers of
describing God as using the violence of the state to ensure the work of the peaceable
Kingdom. Whether or not Yoder can extricate God's use of the nations from the
violence of the nations remains to be seen as I end this chapter by looking briefly at
Yoder's most extensive study of the church-state relationship in For the Nations.
For the Nations
As Yoder notes in the "Introduction" to For the Nations, published in 1997, each of
the essays in the volume "argues, though each in a somewhat different key, that the
very shape of the people of God in the world is a public witness, or is "good news,"
for the world, rather than first of all rejection or withdrawal."509 In For the Nations,
therefore, Yoder's chief enterprise is to shuck the label "sectarian" and to provide an
alternative through the analogical "development of Yiddish."510 Yoder refers to the
development of Yiddish as the Jewish attempt to find a middle ground between, on
the one hand, the adoption of German language and custom in the interest of
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becoming "effective participants in the...culture,"511 and on the other hand, the
Jewish need to maintain their Hebrew identity by hanging onto the language of
519
"'back home'." Thus Yoder's goal is to encourage diaspora Christians to find a
median between engaging "fully... [with] the host culture" and maintaining the
peculiarity of habits cultivated by citizenship in the Kingdom of God. Indeed, it is
safe to say that there is no place among Yoder's later writings in which a call to
middle axioms is more fully realized. Yoder is not calling the church to merely find
single concepts or terms which can be translated from Christian commonwealth to
civil commonwealth, rather, he is encouraging the church to develop a pidgin, creole,
513
or contact language, by which both poleis might begin to understand one another."
According to Yoder, there is much at stake in the way we discern what he calls the
two most basic turnings in history, Jerimian and Constantinian, each of which
required a review and transformation of the relationship between God, power, and
the nations, in the theology of the people of God. Yoder's wish, in the light of the
still felt reverberations from the Constantinian turn, is to reconcile Christ and the
nations through a middle language which allows for participation in the world, while
allowing the church to maintain its identity and discipleship. Yoder is thus
advocating a similar low status strategy for the development of peace within the
nation, such that, through the new language of witness the church need not rely on
511 Ibid. p. 1
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the nations to maintain peace through the use of violence, but through a variety of
services that have less to do with the Sword.
The stated aim at the beginning of the last section was to discover any
inconsistencies between Yoder's description of the church within the context of the
Kingdom, and Yoder's description of the church within the context of the world. The
above reading of Yoder's work recounts the evolution of Yoder's thought, with its
genesis in Cullman, regarding the positive possibilities of temporary peace provided
by the nations, and more specifically, the use of that peace as a police action,
restraining the violence of the world, giving the church the space to do the work that
God has called it to. In light of his arguments, one is forced to wonder if the realist's
criticism of the pacifist has been right all along: "The only reason you can argue
about pacifism is because we (the soldiers and just warriors) fight for your right to
live in peace." In response to the realist's claim that Christian pacifism is not an
effective means to ensure peace and order in the world, Yoder responds by saying:
That Christian pacifism which has a theological basis in the character of God
and the work of Jesus Christ is one in which the calculating link between our
obedience and ultimate efficacy has been broken, since the triumph of God
comes through resurrection and not through effective sovereignty or assured
survival.514
When Yoder's account of Christian pacifism from The Politics of Jesus is coupled
with his vision of the policing possibilities of the nations, it stands to reason that
Yoder's account of Christian pacifism need not be effective (in ensuring the survival
of the church) precisely because the survival of the church is ensured by the violence
of the nations. As Yoder puts it, "[vjengeance itself, the most characteristic
manifestation of evil, instead of creating chaos as is its nature, is harnessed through
the state in such a way as to preserve order and give room for the growth of the
church."515 Yet when the survival of the faithful church is ensured by the violence of
the nations, a two-tiered ethic falls into place by which the church is called to true
discipleship under the Lordship of Christ (the perfection of Christ), while under that
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same Lordship the nations protect the true disciples, who in turn make the salvation
of the nations possible (those who are, as of yet, unready to respond appropriately). It
is unclear how this vision ofYoderian justpolicing is any different from Augustinian
just war, except in that Christendom is no longer confined to one nation but to all the
nations of the world. Moreover, if it is not the violent hand of the just warrior who
ensures the survival of the peaceable community of disciples it must be the violent
hand of God, who, because of the war-mongering of the nations, rather than despite
it, ensures the survival of His people.
While Yoder hopes for the church to draw on the Jerimian tradition of encouraging
the nations to better and more peaceful habits, it is still the case that the nations are
the nations. Their use of the Sword, no matter how restrained, can never be a
function of the God-who-is-love - of the Lordship of the Prince of Peace - precisely
because the community he has created stands not as a vindication of that order, but as
a transformation of it. If a language is developed in order to translate the Gospel to
the world then what is said in that language must always be a call to confession,
repentance, and discipleship. As I will argue in the next chapter, Christ ensures the
survival of the diaspora church, not through the violence of the nations that surround
them, but by gathering the scattered into the body of Christ, unified in Baptism, at
the Eucharistic common table, and through the grace of the Holy Spirit.
Conclusion: The Implications for Hauerwas
Throughout the course of this chapter it should have become clear that Hauerwas'
appropriation ofYoder's thought, as previously explicated, neglects to name many of
the contradictions in Yoder's writings, and it should not be a shock, therefore, when
conflicts arise in Hauerwas' own work. Without the rabid anti-liberalism of
Maclntyre's account in which democracy both creates and is sustained by moral
disarray, it is not surprising that Hauerwas should spend more time looking at
Yoder's own political commitments. Hauerwas' defense, when questioned as to why
he does not use powers terminology, or provide an account of the powers, is that
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Yoder already said it.516 Yet if Hauerwas spent more time looking at the ontological
commitments involved in Yoder's description of the powers, before and after the
Christ-act, he could not help but be more critical of Yoder's later political writings,
particularly in regards to Yoder's affirmation of democracy (both radical and
otherwise). An account of the powers would supplement his early and middle
critiques of liberalism that, up until Stout, were founded primarily on Maclntyre's
dismissal of the Enlightenment project and democracy. Moreover, a full account of
the powers would force Hauerwas to recognize that radical democratic imaginings of
political activity are nothing more than practices central to the church which have
been co-opted by the world. As such they are simulacra of the good practices to
which the church is called, which the church has historically had enough difficulty
embodying on its own—despite having access to the perfecting/correcting influence
of the Holy Spirit, Scripture, tradition, and the sacraments. On such an account, when
transmission occurs it ought always be accidental, the result of charity and
evangelism, to be lauded, but never seen as an end in its own right. In light of
Yoder's implicit ontology of the powers, radical democratic practices can only
finally be seen as the attempt to have Christians without Christianity, or Christianity
without Christ. Indeed, radical democratic practices cannot be intelligible as good
ideas without an account of the character of the God-who-is-love which they attempt
to imitate.
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Between Already and Not Yet
In the first two chapters of this thesis I mapped the geography of something new in
Christian political theology: an attempt to get beyond the organizing logics of
modernity as found in the unsystematic postliberal writings of Stanley Hauerwas. As
noted, the tentative nature of Hauerwas' writing can and should be seen as a
continued critique of the modern/liberal encyclopedic description of what can be
known. Yet, as I argue in chapter 3, the absence of a strong methodological
framework makes inconsistency between Hauerwas' scattered writings a reality.
Much of what Hauerwas hopes to gain by writing against and without an organizing
method is sabotaged by his turn toward radical democracy. Radical democracy posits
a secular politics that is neither informed by God's grace nor disciplined by God's
wisdom. Radical democracy posits a knowledge, wisdom, and grace separate from
God; it posits a new organizing logic, based on care and sharing which is not
founded in the relationship between God and Godself (Trinity), or God and God's
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creation, but rather a description of abundance (Deleuze) and lack (Lacan) that is
grounded in Cartesian (liberal/modem) descriptions of the ego and the (o/0)ther.
Hauerwas' postliberal hope, to reject the limitation of God and his activity by human
reason, is subverted and appropriated to work against that very hope. In chapter 4, I
worked to deconstruct and repair problems in Hauerwas' relationship to his source
material, particularly the writings of John Howard Yoder, which have left him open
to such a disastrous theological about-face.
While the first four chapters worked toward the critical and deconstmctive portion of
this title, the final two chapters do the work of the second half: the proposing of an
ecclesial politics of gathering. Yet the description of ecc/es/a-as-gathering-of-love
toward which this thesis is working cannot be separated from what the gathered are
gathered from: the multitude. And so the final chapter will take up the constructive
517 See: Tender, L. and L. Thomassen (cds.). 2006. Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance
and Lack. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
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and creative task of describing the phenomenality of the church's love for the world
as a thing-in-itself. While this chapter works to answer questions about the
knowledge, means, and shape of the gathering, the last chapter will attempt to sustain
the concept of gathering while exceeding it. The central question that both chapters
seek to answer, albeit in different ways, is that posed by Robert Jenson in his article
titled "Christian Civilization": "When the barbarians say, 'Teach us to sing,' can the
518church say 'No'?" In many ways, Jenson's question frames the tension in
Hauerwas' writings between public postliberal sectarianism and the desire to
evangelize, witness, serve, and care for a suffering world. Ought not the church help
if and where it can? Jenson (reflecting Coles' tension between faithful remembering
and radical, generous receptivity to the stranger) writes:
If the church shares her cultural treasures with a civilization, she shares them
with an entity that does not control her own use of them. The church takes the
risk that instead of despoiling the Egyptians, she is inviting Egyptian chaos to
despoil her: to make of her freedom, libertinism; of her art, blasphemy; of her
debunking ofmyth, nihilism.519
Indeed, as Foucault said, "everything is dangerous."520 But does sparing the church's
purity outweigh the cost of denying the world practical practices that could make the
lives of those enslaved peoples easier? Putting the question in these terms, even the
Hauerwas ofResident Aliens would say, emphatically: "No." The church cannot help
but teach the world about Jesus; evangelism is as Yoder describes it, a dialogue with
the other. Yet when teaching the world the ways of Jesus, the church must
continually remind the world that "generous receptivity" is not a transcendental, but
the very name of God. Indeed, the church is "a segment for this age of the single and
unitary city of God,"521 the mission of which is to minister and care for prisoners
(peoples enslaved to the powers); yet service and ministry are more than the attempt
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to "make things better," they are the call to be free—an invitation to take the King's
amnesty, to gather around His table.
In this chapter, I begin by developing a correct location for Christian epistemic
access (the church) and question whether and how such knowledge can be shared
with the world. It becomes clear quite early on that it is impossible to begin to know
in the right kinds ofways without being part of that gathered assembly called church.
Indeed, in this chapter, I explore the question of what it means to be gathered at all
and how such gatherings are made possible by certain practices called sacraments.
Toward the end of the chapter, I explore several challenges to gathering, both
practical and epistemological, that sacraments work tentatively to overcome. I finish
this chapter by inserting an ecclesial identity of gathering into the work of Hauerwas,
and recounting the challenges that he will face if he is allow such an identification to
shape his theological politics. In short, my work in this chapter is to describe
Christian eschatologically-informed practices of gathering and the way in which the
church and her theologians (particularly Hauerwas and Yoder) ought rightly
respond—simultaneously, generously, and confessionally—to a world enslaved by
the false gods. My task will be achieved by opening up new sources to Hauerwas,
beginning with the negative political theology ofBernd Wannenwetsch.
A Tale of Two Cities
Wannenwetsch begins his version of theological politics by drawing on the
eschatological vision ofRichard Bauckham, who states that
In the beginning God had planted a garden for humanity to live in (Gen 2:8).
In the end he will give them a city. In the New Jerusalem the blessings of
paradise will be restored, but the New Jerusalem is more than paradise
regained. As a city it fulfills humanity's desire to build out of nature a human
place of human culture and community.522
522
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Moreover, the old city is always and everywhere under the judgment of the new by
virtues of God's new city presently present. Wannenwetsch here is echoing Ellul's
sentiment that it is by virtue of "the fact that God chose the city to show forth there
the presence of final truths [that the New Jerusalem] removes man's sovereignty over
523his work." In order to understand the new city set over, against, and amidst the old,
Wannenwetsch extends Ellul's observation making a distinction between the
eschatological practices of "de-citifying" and "de-civilizing." The latter represents
wrongful ungenerosity, a lack of receptivity to other. For Wannenwetsch, the
civilizationwg of the world by the church is a positive response to the Jerimian
exhortation to the exilic community in Babylon, "Seek the welfare of the city where I
have sent you" (Jer. 29:7). That the church does not "leave the earthly city
unaffected" is to say that it offers "judgment and hope—not as a model, blueprint, or
actual 'betterment,' but neither as blunt annihilation nor disdain."524 Thus, the
Christian engagement with the world must be tempered by a commitment to remain
525
"genuinely Christian;" Wannenwetsch dubs this process, "de-citifying the city."
De-citifying is, says Wannenwetsch, "short-hand for the threefold need to defortify,
demythologize, and desacralize the earthly city by stripping it of exactly those traits
that represent its most profound self-understanding: its civic pride." Each of these
de-citifying practices will be discussed in what follows. First, it will be useful to look
at Wannenwetsch's description of the relationship between the two cities.
What Wannenwetsch means by 'the city' is not merely the structured governing
bodies that rule the world but the "ultimate expression of civilization and the icon of
human sociality."527 Rome was not merely the capital of an empire, but an "infinite
523
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stretching of the city walls that offered Pax Romana to those forced inside."528 This
is reflected in Scripture in the apocalyptic vision of John of Patmos, in which the
city, Rome/Babel, represents demonic imperial power while the "city that comes
down from heaven" (Rev. 21:2), the New Jerusalem, stands in direct opposition to it.
Wannenwetsch identifies three antitypes that illuminate the relationship between the
two cities:
The New City comes dressed as a "bride" (21:2), as opposed to the great
whore Babel, who is dressed in purple and scarlet and drunk with the blood of
the saints (17:4-6). Whereas Babel/Rome's empire was based on violence and
death—bringing death to others as well as bearing death for itself—the New
City will be marked by the absence of death and crying and pain (21:4).
While Rome's habit of "giving" was actually a means of sustained
oppression, in the New City the water of life will be given to the thirsty
"without cost" (v. 6).529
Moreover, the civitas caelestis, living between the times, is, in the words of
Augustine, "like a captive and stranger in the earthly city.. .though it makes no
scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city."530 Thus the heavenly city "'touches
down' rather than 'settles down';" "[i]t intersects rather than occupies;" "it can have
no stabilitas loci.''''531 Moreover, the touching down of the civitas dei in the midst of
the civitas terrena engenders opportunities for engagement qua change and
transformation among the nations—engagement qua de-citification. It is telling, says
Wannenwetsch, that the Hebrews writer (13:12-14) believes
that the one crucial event in the history of mankind, its actual turning point,
was meant to happen outside the city. And when it was accomplished the
concomitant signs of Jesus's death were the extinguishing of the lights that
illuminate the city's grandeur, the tearing of the temple curtain, and the
shaking of the city walls (Matt. 27:45-5 Iff).532
528 Ibid. p. 169
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Yet the Christ-event does not only darken (deconstruct) the earthly city, but
illuminates the "future promise" of the one that is coming, and, at the same time, is
already here in part. The eschatological vision of the civitas caelestis intersecting the
earthly city is not just spatial but temporal as well.
Arising from his reading of Revelation 21, Wannenwetsch describes three "moments
of political rule that are portrayed as being absent in the new City"533:
1. shut gates in the city wall (v. 25);
2. a need for lighting (sun andmoon) to reflect the grandeur of the city (v. 23);
3. a temple at/as the center of the city (v. 22).534
According to Wannenwetsch, each of these symbolizes the organization of "social
identity by virtue of the security that it bestows on its inhabitants."535 Protection is
offered the inhabitants: by their location behind a wall with closed gates, by their
temporal storying via a cosmological (sun and moon) myth of eternality, and by their
spatial anchoring via a temple in the middle of the city. The "presence" that fills the
new city is the Lord, and that presence illuminates the idolatrous security of the old
city as maintaining modes of protection which are at once aberrational simulacrum,
and unnecessary. The peace of the city of heaven is constituted by the "absence of
threat and fear and not from the employment of protective measures that operate on
the basis of separating an inside from an outside."536 Thus the heavenly city does not
operate on the basis of exclusion, but rather for those not inside, the "unclean" and
those who practice "abomination and falsehood" (v. 27), "it is simply...that they will
not enter."537 Secondly, the eternality of the new city does not struggle to create for
533 Ibid. p. 172
534 Ibid. p. 173
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itself permanence, but arrives from heaven, illuminated by the light of the presence
of God.538 Thirdly:
In the New City there will be veneration of divine majesty, but not as religion
or civil religion. The eschatological singing of God's praise will no longer be
intelligible in terms of.. .the binding of one's own fate and the fate of the city
to a deity whose presence must be visualized and localized, fixed in space
and domesticated for continuous service for the city. Rather than being a god
in a temple at the center of the city, God will be its temple. God's presence
will fill the whole of the city. Rather than himself being localized within the
city, God's presence will actually make the city a locus, a true place.539
For Wannenwetsch, the "presence of the absence" in the new city represents more
than just opportunities for judgment on the idolatrous ideologies of the old. Rather,
true peace and security makes it possible for the church to welcome strangers into its
midst.
Wannenwetsch illuminates three practices of vulnerable invitation to citizens of the
old city, though he does not explore them fully: asylum, mediation, and pilgrimage.
The offering of asylum to the weak and disposed is an invitation to the exiles and
marginalized of the old city to become citizens—to be baptized into the "celestial
politeuma,"540 The second invitation takes the form of providing the old city with an
outsider's perspective, that is, the church as the adjudicator of political disputes
which always speaks from "outside the city gate" (Hebrews 13:12). Finally, the
church invites those within the city to follow the liturgical procession. Nevertheless,
even if they do not join in, the church still moves toward the new city, in the midst of
the old, in the hopes that such movement will disrupt, and illuminate, the false
security and staticity of the old city.
If we learn anything from Wannenwetsch's account it is that "a genuine theological
engagement of politics should be precisely negative, representing what is absent
538 Ibid. p. 177
539 Ibid. p. 174
540 Ibid. p. 189
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rather than what is present."541 His call to judge the civitas terrena and de-citify it
whilst simultaneously inviting it to gather in the midst of a new city, the civitas dei,
provides an account of appropriate Christological engagement with the world. The
old city is not bettered, legitimated, or controlled by the church, but neither is it left
to its own devices. Indeed, judging "the presence" of characteristics in the earthly
city that are "absent" in the heavenly one, makes it possible for the church to offer
the world hope despite itself. As Ellul puts it, it is not what the New Jerusalem
says or does that expresses her true mission, but her simple presence in the
world of men, confronting the cities of men. She is like a catalyst: because
she is there, things change. She is like a road sign, changing the route of those
who observe her. But the most basic meaning of this mission is that by her
very presence she shows the world that there is a final judgement—and that
its presence may already be seen in her...She is subject to all the twists of
history and to the reverberations of what is happening in Chaldea and Egypt.
But throughout this history her only and never-ceasing purpose is to hold up
before men not the end of time, but the present reality of what constitutes the
end...witnessing to divine grace and condemnation is an integral part of her
eschatological function.542
The presence of the new city, presently awaiting Eschaton, by embodying judgment,
makes invitation possible. Thus Wannenwetsch not only navigates the tension in
Jenson's question, as to whether the church ought to teach barbarians to sing, but in
doing so provides an explicitly Christological description of generous receptivity to
other that is so central to Coles' account of radical democracy. The church need not
choose between withdrawal and accommodation (forming contracts for survival) to
the idolatrous powers (and their false gatherings), rather it embodies the hope of the
"already" in the midst of the "not yet," and invites those enslaved by the powers to
flee their enslavement and re-gather into the citizenship of the city which will not
fade away. As Bonhoeffer puts it, "God is one, and the whole world should be in
God's Realm."543
541 Ibid. p. 168n5
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It is precisely this notion of "gathering in the midst" that I will discuss in what
follows. This eschatological "already but not yet" gathering in the midst of the world
is not just a call to catholicity for the church, but an invitation to those who, as of yet,
are still straggling amidst the wolves. The call to "seek the welfare" of the city is
tempered by a call to exodus—an exodus which, as we will see in Lohfink, is always
a call to gather somewhere else: "Flee from the midst of Babylon and go out of the
land of the Chaldeans, and be as he-goats before the flock" (Jer. 50:8). In the words
ofEllul, this is not
the departure of individuals fleeing before a catastrophe, but the departure of
God's people [to be] gathered into a flock. What is astonishing is that in this
prophecy those who understand God's will are likened to he-goats, the
leaders of a flock. And so in this departure it seems not only that faithful
Christians separate themselves from the city, but that they are guides for still
others—men whom God has chosen in secret and who perhaps have never
confessed Jesus Christ or belonged to any confession, but who nevertheless
belong to God's people and prove it at the decisive moment by hearing the
word of judgement and salvation that the church is announcing to the
world.544
While those in the old city may reject the prophetic call to exodus—as it was with
Noah, Abraham and Lot—the church lives in hope, precisely because it has the
ability to remember Jonah's Nineveh. What Gerhard Lohfink teaches, through his
careful exposition of Scripture, is that the civilizationmg of the world is not a
scattering or diaspora, but a gathering together, which by its very activity constitutes
judgment and the invitation to true catholicity.
The Exodus and the Gathering around Sinai
Lohfink begins his description of exodus and gathering as practices that constitute
the creation of a new eschatological community. Following the crucifixion and burial
of Jesus, Lohfink notes that "Jesus' disciples left the capital city and were in the
process of being scattered to the four winds. But suddenly the movement turned back
on itself: they regathered, and not just anywhere, but in the very place that was most
344
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dangerous for them, the city of Jerusalem."545 Indeed, following the encounter with
the resurrected Jesus on the road to Emmaus, the two disciples, at "[t]hat same
hour...got up and returned to Jerusalem, and they found the eleven and their
companions gathered together" (Luke 24:33).546 The reassembling of the friends of
Jesus in the midst of the capital city and their subsequent preaching of the
resurrection with "great grace" (Acts 4:32-4), constitutes a witness to the Easter
event. Yet, in Acts 4, the emphasis is not on the grace with which the disciples
spoke, but on the witness born by the gathered, i.e., the life held in common:
Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and
no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they
owned was held in common. With great power the apostles gave their
testimony to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great grace was upon
them all. There was not a needy person among them...
Indeed, notes Lohfink, the disciples "needed no special eloquence, for they knew
whereof they spoke and their hearers could see it."547 The basileia had come fully in
Christ, and was still in the midst of the world, though not perfectly, as embodied in
the community He gather(s/ed), and which awaits its consummation in the fullness of
time. In what follows, I will first address Lohfink's description of baptism as an
invitation to exodus, and then the gathering to which those called out are invited.
For Lohfink the act of baptism is simultaneously an act of exodus. This is true in the
sense that people are called out of their previous communities, contexts and stories,
and invited to be part of something new—it is baptism that "creates the
cao
eschatological people of God and continually adds members to it." Moreover, the
making of the people of God, in Lohfink's account, is not a mystical (or internal)
union but a concrete community embodied within real history.549 This community is
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visible and bodily, made up of distinctive ways of living together that demonstrates
the profundity of Christ's love, caritas. As Paul says to the communities in Galatia:
in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. As many of you as
were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no
longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male
and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus. And if you belong to Christ,
then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise (Gal 3:26-
9).
The "novelty and revolutionary" character of this body is constituted, Lohfink notes,
by "the deep gulf between nations, classes, and genders."550 The offer of baptism is
manifested then in the invitation of all to walk away from the idols and practices of
idol worship that constitute the Falleness of the world. This occurs through the
incorporation of those on exodus into the "very real history of Jesus and thus into the
Church, his equally real body" in such a way that those belonging to the new
community "are placed on a new footing that makes it possible for them no longer to
live according to the models of pagan society."551 This is precisely where an account
of the ontological reality of the principalities and powers arises in Lohfink.
The powers, by Lohfink's account, are ultimately the power of sin that "has spread
through the world, that rules people like slaves and allows them no freedom at
552all." In the same way that the newly inaugurated community constitutes a gathered
body, namely the body of Christ, so too must the powers of sin, and the communities
which they sustain, be accounted in bodily terms, i.e., "the body of sin."553 Baptism
is a rescue from the power of sin that is enslavement to a false gathering. This
language of slavery is extremely important to Lohfink precisely because of the
crucial way in which the early church discussed Easter, as a remembrance of Exodus.
Lohfink writes,
550 Ibid.
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As Israel went out of Egypt, the land of slavery and unfreedom, and received
at Sinai, in the Torah, a new social order that made possible freedom and
equality, so the Church celebrated in the Easter night its exodus from the
rulership of sin and death, and its rescue and translation into the new life of
Christ.554
The use of passages from Exodus in the liturgical mass on Easter night along with
the baptism of catechumens provided the church with a constant re-storying that
ended in re-membering. This remembering does not end in eschatological
triumphalism but proceeds "cautiously and without false enthusiasm" in order to
preserve the tension between "already" and "not yet."555 Moreover, the act of
remembering is central to the constitution of the body of Christ precisely because
through memory the church continually is trained. The learned practices of idol
worship are rejected, along with the communities that made such activities
intelligible (and ends in and of themselves), in favor of new ways of living together
at worship before God. As Rudolf Pesch puts it, when the rural (Galilean) disciples
followed the call to exodus out of their homes and to the capital they could not help
but
live and work together out of necessity, especially in the hostile atmosphere
surrounding them, manage their affairs and finance their daily life and
mission from the sale of landed property (such as Barnabas's field)—in order
to be able to fulfill their eschatological task of building in Jerusalem the
messianic community in which there could be "not a needy person among
them" because otherwise "their testimony to the resurrection of the Lord
Jesus" would have been diminished.556
On Lohfink's account, exodus was not a withdrawal, despising, or renunciation of
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Moreover, there is particular significance in the name that the community, gathered
together by God in the midst of the nations, took for itself, that is, ekklesia. Lohfink
traces the genealogical import of this term within both Torah and Rome. In Greek,
ekklesia refers to the "assembly of the people," "the coming together of all those with
citizen rights in a given city."557 The adoption of this term from the civil life of the
polis made the "extraordinary claim" that the church was not "a group of like-minded
friends...joined together because of particular interests."558 Rather, they were a
public gathering, interested in all things, and instituted by God. Indeed, throughout
the history of the church, Lohfink notes
The Church deliberately avoided applying the manifold terminology of
ancient guilds and societies to itself. The Christian community was not a
thiasos or an eranos or a koinon or a collegium. It was not a segment or part
of a larger whole. Concretely it was not a group, or a faction or a club, nor
was it a sect. It was rather a "public assembly of the whole."559
The whole people of God participated in more than the Greek and Roman
understandings of polis; they also identified themselves as the "eschatological
fulfillment of the gathering at Sinai."560 Lohfink follows the account, in
Deuteronomy, of Israel's gathering around Mount Horeb, which was a gathering "out
of the fire, the cloud, and the thick darkness" (Deut 5:22)—a day that was ever
referred to by Israel as "the day of the assembly." The gathering at Sinai was the
consummation of the Hebrew exodus from Egyptian captivity, the moment wherein
God acted to unify the exiles, slaves, outcasts, wanderers and oppressed into one
people, one body, Israel. Moreover, "the Church did not regard itself as a new people
appearing in the stead of the old people of God, having dissolved and replaced it, but
as Israel, or more precisely as the beginning and center of growth for the
eschatological Israel."561 The church's appropriation of the term ekklesia therefore
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denotes a description not only as a polis, but also as the consummation of the
promise to Israel.
Finally, it should be noted that for Lohfink, the ekklesia, gathered in the midst of the
nations, offers a very particular kind of salvation for those enslaved to the powers of
the world. Lohfink points out that the salvation offered by God to the gathered
"means not only eternal life but also primarily the rescue, the salvation, the peace
they already receive. They live, indeed in a new bond of togetherness in which each
562has everything he or she needs because all give everything they have." Lohfink
points our attention to the "the already" character of salvation embodied in the life of
the ekklesia as described in Luke:
Awe came upon everyone, because many wonders and signs were being done
by the apostles. All who believed were together and had all things in
common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the
proceeds to all, as any had need. Day by day, as they spent much time
together in the temple, they broke bread at home and ate their food with glad
and generous hearts, praising God and having the goodwill of all the people.
And day by day the Lord added to their number those who were being saved
(Acts 2:43-47).
The awe of "everyone" was not the awe of miraculous "wonders and signs," rather it
was, in Coles' terms, an ateleological surprise—the possibility that a community
could exist in which wealth was shared, all were fed, and perhaps most importantly,
unity was not due to coercion or necessity, but joy. Joy, generosity and care for the
"least" were possible because the basileia was becoming; indeed, the God-who-is-
love was gathering to Himself a people capable of living in freedom from the
powers. These people were saved not in some distant mystical sense, but in their life
together—within a concrete people and a concrete history.
The description of exodus and gathering as found in Lohfink extends the description
of the caelestis civitas begun in Wannenwetsch. Wannenwetsch emphasized
(negatively) the double eschatological character of the church's invitation as
judgment (de-citifying) and the promise of hope, while Lohfink exhorts (positively)
562 Ibid. p. 223
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the church to begin thinking of itself and its invitation: the call to exodus, and the
subsequent gathering of exiles into a community of people capable of living between
the "already" and the "not yet."
In the Meantime
Despite the polarized descriptions of ecclesiology offered by Hauerwas and
O'Donovan in chapter 2, there is much to be said for avoiding the implicit
exclusivity in the dichotomy between all "already" or all "not yet" theologies; for if
anything betrays the "already" character of the church it is that the gathered body is
fractured, and if anything subverts the "not yet" it is that the fractured body (or at
least its parts) still performs the eucharist. Thus in order to better understand the
church's embodiment of the double designation, both "already" and "not yet," in the
next section I will look at the way in which the church performs the eucharist whilst
divided in the midst of the powers. In short, if the church were fully "already" then
there would be no division in the body of Christ, and if the church were completely
"not yet" then the gift of the eucharist would be premature.
In the next section I will address Cavanaugh's description of globalization as a
violent organizing logic, a power. The powers discussed up until now have been:
secularization (as the de-Christologizing of discipleship and the translation of its
language into that of radical democracy), and the liberal nation-state. The danger of
globalization however, is that rather than gather people into a false community (the
state), or translate Christian practices into non-confessional language, it scatters all
people, calling them out of their communities and gathering them nowhere—all the
while calling it's activity unification. The simulacrum of catholicity engendered by
globalization is the promise that if everyone is exiled everywhere then there is no
need to gather anywhere, rather, the whole world is home. In the following section I
will provide an account of eucharistic performance as the sacrament by which God
continually gathers his people, in direct opposition to the power of globalization, by
making present the "already" in the midst of the "not yet"—that is to say, as,
ontologically, both local and catholic. Next, I will look at a concrete example of
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church division where it seems the most irreconcilable, in the eucharistic theology of
Mennonites and Catholics. The church cannot but help be deemed fragmented (as
opposed to gathered), a broken body, when practices central to the life of that
community, i.e., table fellowship, become impossible due to internal divisions. Yet
that dialogue exists (relationship and love persist), painful though it may be, bearing
a promise that reconciliation is possible through the grace of the God-whose-being-
is-communion. The Bridgefolk then, bear witness to the generous receptivity that is a
necessary characteristic of dialogical engagement, even for those within the same
teleological tradition. To put it another way, because the conversation has started, no
longer can Bridgefolk Mennonites look at Catholics as if they were ateleological
aliens and vice versa. This will all prove helpful in my attempt to suggest to
Hauerwas a means of repairing inconsistencies in his theological politics, primarily
through an account of gathering as ontological activity, not just in terms of what one
gathers against, i.e., the powers, but also the eucharistic grace that God bestows on
His church so that the church might live beyond the purview of the powers.
Globalization as the Power that Scatters
According to Cavanaugh (one of Hauerwas' most prominent students), the ability of
the church to see itself as a people on pilgrimage is failing. He gives three reasons as
to why this is the case: (1) the modern state's program of subsuming the universal
into the local has been extended by globalization; (2) globalization disallows the
possibility of pilgrimage and flight through the rationalization of space; and (3) the
false catholicity celebrated by globalization distracts the church from the
reorganization of space and time, both local and catholic, occurring in the eucharist.
For Cavanaugh, truthful Catholicism is not equivalent to universalism, but requires,
as we will see, the universal redemption of local places in which the eucharist
celebration concentrates full catholicity in each local gathering.
The church's inability to understand its call to be gathered is due in part to the
demonization of "locality." Cavanaugh notes:
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Just as the nation-state freed the market from the 'interventions' of local
custom, and freed the individual to relate to other individuals on the basis of
standardized legal and monetary systems, so globalization frees commerce
from the nation state, which, as it turns out, is now seen as more localization
impeding the universal flow of capital.563
Thus, Robert Nisbet is correct in his identification of the rise of the modern state
with the triumph of universality over locality.564 This, as Cavanaugh notes, is
synonymous with the "sovereign state's usurpation of power from the Church, the
nobility, guilds, clans, and towns" during the middle ages.565 As a result, a direct
relationship was established between the sovereign and the individual, which John
Milbank dubs "simple space;" this is to be contrasted with "complex space," the
intermingling and overlapping of loyalty, responsibility, and authority in medieval
society.566 According to Cavanaugh, globalization is the hyperextension of the nation
state's program of the subsumption of the universal into the local. That is to say,
globalization is not merely the fragmentation of complex space, as is the modern
state, but is also an enactment, "a universal mapping of space typified" by an
extended "detachment.. .from particular localities."567
Cavanaugh explains this new configuration of space arising within modernity by
looking at Michel de Certeau's distinction between "itineraries" and "maps."
According to Certeau, itineraries did not survey "spatial stories" as a whole, but
traced narrative movement through space and time by giving a log of the most
important events that happened on a journey. He contrasts this to the mapping of
space on a grid, the "formal ensemble of abstract places." For Certeau, maps are the
"totalizing stage on which elements of diverse origin are brought together to form the
tableau of a 'state' of geographical knowledge." Cavanaugh notes that
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Space itself is rationalized as homogenous and divided into identical units.
Each item on the map occupies its proper place, such that things are set
beside one another, and no two things occupy the same space. The point of
view of the map user is detached and universal allowing the entire space to be
seen simultaneously. The type of mapping that Certeau describes is a
corollary of the rise of the modern state, which depends on the ability to
survey a bounded territory from a sovereign centre and make uniform the
relations of each particular unit of space to every other.569
This modem panopticonic mapping, in which space is rationally homogenized so that
it relates directly to the centre, requires the state and state institutions to ensure that
the coercive power relations such mapping requires are diffused throughout society
as a whole. Foucault's prisoners need to feel the all-penetrating Gaze, the threat of
coercion. (Interestingly enough, "insiders" must fear not only external threats but that
of their own state as well). Yet, globalization undermines even the locality of the
state.
The new order eschews loyalty to workers, products, corporate structures,
businesses, factories, communities, even the nation," the New York Times
announces. Martin S. Davis, chair of Gulf and Western, declares, "All such
allegiances are viewed as expendable under the new rules. You cannot be
emotionally bound to any particular asset.570"
By breaking down the barriers between nation states, the disciplining of space into
rational units is preserved through dispersion. Rather than having many geographies,
states, or prisons that the centre must watch over, globalization ensures that
discipline is "ever more tightly organized through dispersal"571 turning multiple
subjects into one unified object for observation.
The demonization of locality and the rationalization of all space via the Gaze of
globalization, leads Cavanaugh to describe common metaphors, such as pilgrimage
and flight, as unable to resist globally segmented space. He cites Gilles Deleuze's
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concept of the "line of flight" as an oft-invoked postmodern solution to a modern
572dilemma. For Deleuze, one can create "nomad spaces" of flight from the totalizing
surveillance and territorialization of controlled space.573 While "flight" (or exodus) is
a perfectly good form of resistance if one is seeking escape from the segmentation of
space created by a state or state institution, it becomes less so when there is no space
in which to escape—when the whole world has Fallen under the all-encompassing
Gaze. As Cavanaugh notes, "The irony here is that in the globalized economy direct
discipline over a particular locality has given way to the discipline of sheer mobility,
the ability to flee."574 Indeed, it is the "sheer mobility" of globalization that
continually oppresses workers. The flight of corporations from one location to
another removes all protections offered by locality.575 Thus, flight continually
reproduces the segmentation of space, "complicating" all forms of nomadic
resistance. Cavanaugh continues,
Far from yielding peaceful flight, the compression of space in the "global
village" has not only exacerbated but produced insecurity and conflict in the
late twentieth century, since global mapping brings diverse localities into
competition with one another.. .Through transcending spatial barriers, capital
is able to map and exploit even minute spatial differentiations, unleashing an
economic war of all against all.576
Rather than simply subsuming the local into the universal, globalization puts the
local at odds with itself. While global competition forces each locality to sell its
unique advantages in order to "lure capital," at the same time it paradoxically forces
each locality to tailor itself, to be "modeled on those localities that have been
previously successful."577
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The result of local competition is the construction of a "global village," which is both
maintained and constituted by a false sense of catholicity. As noted by Cavanaugh,
New Yorkers and Africans commune on the internet and Mexican food is
popularized in Minnesota; of course the use of the internet in both New York and
Africa is reserved for the rich (or at least those able to pay), and the dominant form
of Mexican in Minnesota is the fast-food chain Taco Bell ("which serves up a hot
sauce that a native Minnesotan could mistake for ketchup"578). If the proponents of
globalization are to be believed, peace and equality are almost within our grasp. All
one must do is submit, or enslave, oneself to the metropolitan free-market which
promises to shrink the globe. Cavanaugh quotes the president of the Nabisco
Corporation who describes this Utopia as:
One world of homogenous consumption...[I am] looking forward to the day
when Arabs and Americans, Latins and Scandinavians will be munching Ritz
crackers as enthusiastically as they already drink Coke or brush their teeth
with Colgate.579
Thus, the catholicity of globalization makes it possible for those with money to see
all the peoples of the world as sharing one space-time.580 As Ken Surin says, while it
is important for the other to be "different" it is just as important that it remain
S8 1
"merely different." The commodification of the other produces a simulacrum; i.e.,
a copy in which difference exists on the surface only precluding any "engagement
with the genuinely other."582 This consumption of particularity both exacerbates and
produces false catholicity. Moreover, without real other, there is no conflict and no
ateleological surprise. While the world waits for the full consummation of
globalization, conflict is likely to arise, but when it does one need only to pack one's
bags and go somewhere else.
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Eucharistic Performance and Vulnerable Catholicity
For Cavanaugh, the only hope that the church has is in retaining (or perhaps
reestablishing) its pilgrim status; such a move requires firstly the recognition and
rejection of the simulacrum of catholicity offered by globalism, and secondly the
COT
acceptance of the eucharist as a "counter-narrative of global proportions."
Cavanaugh describes the gift of the eucharist as that of true catholicity, precisely
because the eucharist
does not depend on the mapping of global space. The Church gathered in the
catacombs, after all, was as catholic as the Church that would ride
Constantine's chariots to the ends of the known world...The action of the
Eucharist collapses spatial divisions not by sheer mobility but by the
gathering of the local assembly. The Catholica is not a place, however, but a
"spatial story" about the origin and destiny of the whole world, a story
enacted by the Eucharist.584
Tracing the etymology of the word "catholic" from the Greek adjective katholikos to
its modern usage, Cavanaugh cites the distinction, made by Henri de Lubac, between
"universal" and "catholic" in the English language: while "universal" suggests
spreading out, "catholic" suggest gathering together; while "universal" indicates a
585
"reality prevalent everywhere," "catholic," according to de Lubac,
says something more and different: it suggests the idea of an organic whole,
of a cohesion, of a firm synthesis, of a reality which is not scattered but, on
the contrary, turned toward a center which assumes its unity, whatever the
expanse in area or the internal differentiation might be.586
According to Cavanaugh, it is important to note, however, that the catholicity of the
church made present through the eucharist is a "decentred centre." The eucharist rite
is celebrated in local churches around the world, and as such, its middle-point is
everywhere. It is for this reason that Hans Urs von Balthasar suggests that
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Christendom is not the normal state of the church (because the church's catholicity is
not dependent upon extension through space).
While for Cavanaugh the celebration of the eucharist occurs in a diaspora of local
communities, these are all ultimately gathered into one. He notes that it is not part,
but the whole of the body of Christ which is present, gathered together at each Mass,
for the whole body is accounted for in each fraction of the elements. Similarly, it is
not part, but the whole body of Christ present in each eucharistic community.
Cavanaugh cites this as the reason Paul refers to the local community in Romans
16:23 as hole he ekklesia. If each local community is as Paul says, "the whole
church," then it must be the case, argues Cavanaugh, that "Each particular church is
not an administrative division of a larger whole, but is in itself a 'concentration' of
the whole."587 Wherever the whole body of Christ is present, there also is the whole
catholic church. Unlike the modern state or globalization, the church is not catholic
in the sense that all the parts relate to a center, but that all the parts relate to centers
present locally—in which each locality is a manifestation of the whole catholic body.
As stated by Cavanaugh, the eucharist
Refracts space in such a way that one becomes more united to the whole the
more tied one becomes to the local. The true global village is not simply a
village writ large, but rather "where two or three are gathered in my name"
(Matt. 18:20).
In short, catholicity does not depend upon global mapping, but on the collapse of the
entire world into each local assembly gathered around the eucharist—what
Cavanaugh so eloquently describes as "the world in a wafer."
While the eucharistic dismantling of the dichotomy between the universal and the
local might be seen by some as a fascist sectarianism, which, by allotting any
privilege to local gatherings attempts to exclude others, this ignores the fact that the
catholicity given by the eucharist results from a story not a place. Drawing on
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Certeau's earlier mentioned distinction between maps and itineraries Cavanaugh
points out that
Stories organize and link spaces in a narrative sequence. They not only move
from one space to another, but more accurately construct spaces through the
practice of characters who trace an itinerary through the story...The itinerary
implies not seeing but going; the subject does not survey the space detached
as from above but is immersed in the movements indicated by the story.589
For Cavanaugh, the story of the eucharist is not told, but performed. It is an itinerary
describing the practices and gestures of the body on its way, making the pilgrim's
path as or before the "feet perform it."590 Thus, the itinerary of the eucharist is a
spatial story that deconstructs the "overcoding of the map," and the church performs
the eucharist as a way of going forward, transforming local places into storied
spaces.591 Yet, the journey of the eucharist, when performed in an economy of "sheer
mobility," means that resistance occurs "not by fleeing, but by abiding."592
Therefore, the pilgrimage of the local church does not necessarily occur as mobility,
for the "entire world and more comes to it in the Eucharist."593 Rather, the eucharist
is the ultimate cure to loneliness. As noted by the Hebrews writer, we have company
when we approach the altar:
You have come to Mount Zion and to the city of the living God, the heavenly
Jerusalem, and to innumerable angels in festal gathering, and to the assembly
of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven, and to God the judge of all, and
to the spirits of the righteous made perfect, and to Jesus, the mediator of a
new covenant, and to the sprinkled blood that speaks a better word than the
blood of Abel (Hebrews 12:22-24).
Thus, it is because the eucharist concentrates the entire catholic church in each local
gathering, in such a way that localities are not forced to compete with one another,
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for localities "are not juxtaposed but identified."594 Moreover, when a locality does
not have to compete it can take the time to be truly vulnerable. According to Paul, in
the catholic body of Christ, "If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one
member is honored, all rejoice together with it" (1 Cor. 12:26). This honor and care,
Cavanaugh continues, ensure the care of the weakest members of the body because
that member is identified with oneself. Yet, "At the same time the other is not merely
different but wholly other, for the suffering are identified with Christ himself (Col.
1:24), who nevertheless remains other to the Church."595
If Cavanaugh is right, globalization tells both the world and the church a story of
false unity (God-less love). In the world, the powers, and particularly globalization,
force localities into competition with one another in the name of universal prosperity;
in the church, globalization encourages blindness to the divisions that really exist in
her midst. Cavanaugh therefore admonishes the church to be mindful that the
eucharist should not be falsely told as that which unites the church while "some live
off the hunger of others." The divisions that Paul saw within the eucharistic assembly
of the Corinthians are still with us today. It is Cavanaugh's encouragement therefore,
to remember that although the "already" is fully manifested in the Catholica of each
local church around her altar, the church still lives "between the times" for surely the
"not yet" is still fully evident in the divisions among us. If the church is to be
paradoxically a people on pilgrimage and a people who abide, it must come to terms
not only with its own failures to love, but also with the false-love of globalization
that attempts to obscure those divisions both locally and catholically.
To summarize, the church needs to see itself as simultaneously "already" and "not
yet." There is no meeting in the middle between triumph and reticence, but only
patience between the ascension and the Eschaton. While it is dangerous for the
church to see itself as a castle in a warring world, it is equally dangerous for the
church to see itself as merely a colony trying to make its way in a world of war. The
church has received a gift in Christ, and continues to receive that gift in the
594 Ibid. p. 120
595 Ibid. p. 121
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performance of the Mass at every gathering of the community. It is the eucharist
which makes the church triumphantly "already," while at the same time giving it the
skills to recognize, and remain vulnerable in its "not yet-ness." This received gift of
the "already" in the midst of the "not yet," constitutes both the hope of the church
and its fulfillment. As such, unity is not something that the church works for, but
something that is given to it—it is not a product of her agency, but a glimpse of
God's creativity. This is not to say that the church can sit back and be content with
its divisions, but that it must discern those divisions as flaws on the canvas that God
has provided—not the Master's flaws, but those which have been inflicted by human
agency (our refusal to love). It is the human brush that mars the work of the Master, a
result of failed attempts to accept what has already been given and which will be
given again.
When The Gathered Scatter: The Bridgefolk
In March and April of 2001, a mixed group of Catholics and Mennonites met with
Abbot John Klassen, OSB, and Kilian McDonnell, OSB, of St. John's Abbey in
Collegeville, Minnesota, to "explore the possibility of initiating an on-going dialogue
that would make the Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition of discipleship, peaceableness,
and lay intentionality more accessible to Roman Catholics, while sustaining those
practices by reconnecting them to their spiritual, liturgical, and sacramental roots in
the Catholic Tradition."596 These early meetings were very positive, and as a result,
the first official Bridgefolk gathering took place in July of 2002. As noted in their
mission statement, Bridgefolk
is a movement of sacramentally-minded Mennonites and peace-minded
Roman Catholics who come together to celebrate each other's traditions,
596 In the Introduction to "Creating Peacemaking Communities for the New Millennium Catholics and
Mennonites Bridging the Divide" Conference at St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minnesota. July 12-
14, 2002. Text retrieved from http://www.bridgfolk.net; Conferences, 2002. It should be noted here
that the Bridgefolk talk about themselves as being from two different traditions, when in reality they
are both called to be gathered around the person of Christ. The differences between them might not
seem as great if they adopted Yoder's idea of tradition as a vine (Chapter 3), rather than a tree. On
their current view, it is as if they all started off in similar places but branched off along the way. On
Yoder's view, they must continually loop back to examine their roots in light of their divergence, the
possibilities for newness on his model are very real. They are not bound to continue along different
paths.
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explore each other's practices, and honor each other's contribution to the
mission ofChrist's Church.597
Together the men and women of Bridgefolk seek better ways to embody the
commitments of both traditions. While the ecumenical prospects of such a
conversation are exciting, the words do not come easily.
During the gathering in July of 2003, Gerald Schlabach offered a reflection paper
entitled "Between the Times, Between the Communities: Eucharistic Theology for
the Bridge." He begins by telling the story of a wedding between two Christians, a
Mennonite and a Catholic. According to Schlabach,
Since the wedding was to be a Catholic ceremony, Mennonite family
members were uncertain whether they should take communion. At the
rehearsal, one of them pulled the priest aside and asked what they should do.
"There are two rules I must observe as a Catholic priest," he told them. "The
first is that I cannot invite non-Catholics to receive communion. And the
second is that I cannot refuse communion to anyone who comes forward in
the communion line." With that he gestured to indicate that the conversation
598
was over.
Thus, it is with the words, "Welcome to Catholic culture — welcomed to the table? or
not?" that Schlabach describes the mixed messages that such paradoxical theology
sends to both Mennonites and Catholics. He begins by noting that when one of the
Benedictine hosts attempted to convey a similar message at the 2002 gathering, the
message was neither easy nor clear. According to Schlabach, while some of the
Bridgefolk heard hard words, others saw generous pastoral gestures, and all felt the
deep pain of their mutual disunity. Thus, the Bridgefolk pray for the day that they
will "partake together at the table of the Lord without any reservations whatsoever,"
397
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a day when they will shall embrace the "living unity" which they see "God's Spirit
[as] already making present among" them.599 Yet, Schlabach continues,
In the meantime, we gather together in Bridgefolk precisely because we have
discovered a unity worth celebrating and exploring even though we still are in
a "meantime," living between the times, living between the "already" and the
"not yet" of that Christian unity which is both a gift and a calling.600
It is in the hope of finding out how to embody a unity that is "on the way," that
Schlabach describes the intertwining of two of the church's most constitutive tactics:
rule and flexibility. He begins by recounting the tale told by Gregory the Great in his
Dialogues about the last visit St. Benedict received from Sister St. Scholastica.
Having "spent the whole day [together] in the praise of God and in holy
conversation" at some distance outside the gate of the monastery, Scholastica
wished to continue discussing "the joys of heaven" on into the night. Faithful
to the Rule for his community that St. Benedict himself had penned, Benedict
was determined to return to his cell before nightfall. But while he acted
strictly according to the rule, she acted on love and prayed to God with so
many tears that the heavens themselves—calm until now—burst out in their
own downpour of rain and thunder. Benedict could not leave.601
Gregory comments that because Scholastica's love proved stronger that Benedict's
resolve, the lesson to be learned is that the durability of Benedictine tradition is
constituted by the cohabitation of structure and flexibility (looping back amidst
radical vulnerability and generous receptivity). According to Schlabach, both are
needed for the fullness of Christ's church. Without the integration of structure and
flexibility, he argues, Bridgefolk would not be possible; that is, without the
structured Rule, the story of Benedict and Scholastica would have been lost, and
without the flexibility of the Rule, the durability of it would be severely
compromised.602
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Schlabach uses the story of Benedict and Scholastica, and the virtues embodied
therein, as the lens through which he reads Pope John Paul II's encyclical, Ecclesia
de eucharistia. According to Schlabach, the relationship between structure and
flexibility in the Rule is reflected in the encyclical as the relationship between the
objective and the subjective. However, because the objective has primacy over the
subjective in the encyclical, the relationship reinforced is one between norms and
exceptions; that is to say, objectivity is the norm but normativity becomes stagnant if
there is no flexibility through which exceptions are made intelligible. The most
obvious example of this primacy, says Schlabach, is "that the 'objective reality' of
transubstantiation, by which the bread and wine become the very body and blood of
Christ, is guaranteed 'independently of our mind' by 'the objective truth' of Christ's
words in John 6"603:
"Truly, truly, I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and
drink his blood, you have no life within you"... "My flesh is food indeed, and
my blood is drink indeed."604
When the question is asked: "who may participate in communion?" the Pope makes
it clear that subjective "invisible communion" is insufficient without objective
"visible communion."605 While "invisible communion" is integral to the unity of
Christ, i.e., a necessary condition of its existence, "objective communion" must be
present in the "visible framework" of the church's hierarchy, which is to say that
"invisible communion" alone can never be a sufficient condition for the unity of
Christ. For, according to John Paul II, "Eucharist as the supreme sacramental
manifestation of communion in the Church, demands to be celebrated in a context
where the outward bonds of communion are also intact,"606 While the church
constitutes the eucharist and the eucharist constitutes the church, it is the case, notes
Schlabach, which Catholic sacramental theology cannot turn to a pastoral and
subjective account of the eucharist until the objective account has first been satisfied.
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In Catholicism therefore, the sacrament of Eucharist thus requires the
apostolic succession, and so on. In turn the ritual must be performed
according to canonical guidelines. The personal holiness of the priest is not
the criterion of eucharistic validity. The quality ofmusic, the eloquence of the
homily, the aesthetics of worship, and the intensity of experience are not the
final test of sacramentality.607
For John Paul II, there are two major problems with allowing non-Catholics to
receive eucharist: first, it sends the world a duplicitous message,608 and second, it
opens the unifying and unified gift of the eucharist up to a divided catholic church. In
the first case, lifting the prohibition would be premature, communicating to the world
that the divided church bodies had reconciled all their differences. As noted by John
Paul II, this
might well prove instead to be an obstacle, to the attainment of full
communion, by weakening the sense of how far we remain from this goal and
by introducing or exacerbating ambiguities with regard to one or another truth
of the faith. The path towards full unity can only be undertaken in truth.609
In the case of the latter, it is as Paul says to the Corinthians: eating and drinking
eucharist in the midst of division is equivalent to eating and drinking damnation upon
itself (1 Cor. 11:17-34). While the Holy Father recognizes that divided brothers
hunger to share the Divine Meal together, it is the case, according to Schlabach, that
we must first acutely feel the pain of our separation and learn to view it realistically
before unity can go forward. With the rule in place, Schlabach moves on to attend the
pastoral flexibility within the pope's encyclical.
In the face of the normative prohibition of open eucharist in the Catholic Church,
John Paul II offers the exception:
While it is never legitimate to concelebrate in the absence of full communion,
the same is not true with respect to the administration of the Eucharist under
special circumstances, to individual persons belonging to Churches or
607
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Ecclesial Communities not in full communion with the Catholic Church. In
this case, in fact, the intention is to meet a grave spiritual need for the
salvation of an individual believer, not to bring about an intercommunion
which remains impossible until the visible bonds of ecclesial communion are
fully re-established.610
While the "special circumstances" are often deemed to be for those Christian from
high-church traditions, with a substantial doctrine of the real presence, for whom it is
temporarily impossible to receive in their own tradition (due to emergencies such as
displacement, travel, and illness, and nearness to death), Schlabach is not convinced
that this is all the Holy Father has in mind. He notes that if all "special
circumstances" could be anticipated, then it would be pointless for the pope to speak
of discernment as he does whilst saying that it is "possible to provide for the
salvation of souls with proper discernment." Schlabach continues,
So what of a Christian whose personal vocation is so intimately wrapped up
in working for Christian unity, promoting mutual understanding, and
reconciling differences in their very person that to falter or turn away from
their calling would in fact pose a certain kind of risk to their salvation? What
of a group of such Christians who banded together to support one another in
their callings and on this journey—not claiming to constitute one more
church, yet faithful to a communitarian understanding of Christianity that
requires us to embody the changes God is working through us, by joining
together into durable bonds of society, friendship and accountability? 611
In addition, what will a community such as this need? According to Schlabach, such
a community requires "sustenance" for the long and arduous pilgrimage that
stretches out before them. John Paul II's affirmation of the journey, and admonition
that the church not squander or cheapen the "treasure" of the eucharist, are words of
comfort to the Bridgefolk.
The path itself is long and strewn with obstacles greater than our human
resources alone can overcome, yet we have the Eucharist, and in its presence
we can hear in the depths of our hearts, as if they were addressed to us, the
same words heard by the Prophet Elijah: "Arise and eat, else the journey will
be too great for you." (1 Kg 19:7).612
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Though the "special circumstances" imagined by Schlabach are not spelled-out, they
are perhaps implied, namely, that "some may find the ecumenical quest itself
unsustainable without the nourishment of the sacrament."613 Citing the preacher to
the papal household, Fr. Raniero Cantalamessa, Schlabach argues that a traveler can
only move forward for so long on hunger pangs alone, and for those on pilgrimage,
even when received, the eucharist increases hunger for the fullness of God's
Kingdom even as it satisfies. Indeed, hunger is proper to the pilgrimage.
Schlabach describes this hunger as the "'eschatologicaf reality of the eucharist."
According to Schlabach,
In the Eucharist, what Christ has "already" accomplished in the world
through the Church brings near and makes present those realities that are "not
yet" altogether tangible except by faith....In elaborating on the bedrock
Catholic conviction that "The Church draws its life from the Eucharist," the
pope has underscored the "already" of "the Eucharist [that] makes the
Church" - in other words, the norms and conditions that define an authentic
Eucharist. But according to the eschatological tension that the Eucharist holds
together, accent can also be placed on the "not yet" of the Eucharist in this
way: "The Eucharist makes the Church."614
For Schlabach the process of making is "ongoing and unfinished;" the church must
always draw strength from the eucharist because the church, and in particular the
unity of the church, is still being completed. Thus, "Unity is required for eucharist,
but the eucharist makes unity possible."615 This is not circular theology, but rather a
reflection on the way in which a fractured church can still receive eucharist. For the
Bridgefolk there is no question as to whether a theology of exceptions is biblical.
But some of the Pharisees said, "Why are you doing what is not lawful on the
Sabbath?" Jesus answered, "Have you not read what David did when he and
his companions were hungry? He entered the house of God and took and ate
the bread of the Presence, which it is not lawful for any but the priests to eat,
and gave some to his companions." (Luke 6:2-4).
613




As noted by Schlabach, there would be no story to share if David and Jesus had not
assumed the validity of the Hebrew priesthood and the Law of Moses. David and
Jesus did not challenge the authority of their tradition even when they justified
exceptions to it. Thus, it is with great respect that the Bridgefolk approach the
structures and rules of the Christian tradition, while at the same time singing praises
for the flexibility "buried deeply but integrally within the tradition itself."616
In short, even at the bridge between Catholic and Anabaptist there is hope for unity.
The eucharist is the manifestation of the "already," making Christ really present to
the church during each performance of the Mass. Presently, however, the church is
divided, and the pain caused by that disunity brings the excruciating agony of the
"not yet" back into focus. While, because of division, concelebration of the eucharist
is impossible between un-unified communities, a unified and unifying celebration of
the eucharist among starving pilgrims is not. Most importantly, it is essential to
remember that "living between the times" can only be a matter of theology when it is
a reflection upon the embodied discipleship of pilgrims becoming princes.
Conclusion: Re-gathering Hauerwas
Finally, it should be noted that the concept of gathering has recently made a vital
appearance in the work of Hauerwas. Hauerwas traditionally has made the same
mistake as Yoder in that his absolute refusal to systematize his work, or to write a
"big" book, leaves him with the inability to see much of what he has written. Thus, it
is no surprise that one of the first occasions upon which we see Hauerwas say much
about gathering is in Matthew, his commentary on the gospel of the same name.
In his chapter on Matthew 5, Hauerwas writes that, "The difference between those
who admire Jesus and those who would be his disciples is indicated by His disciples'
willingness to 'come to him' on the mountain."617 There is a parallel, Hauerwas
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notes, between the Sermon on the Mount and "the day of assembly" at Sinai—Jesus
becomes "the new Moses" teaching a new Israel how "to be holy." The teaching
transmitted by Jesus, in particular the beatitudes, are not says Hauerwas, to be
identified as law, a list of requirements, or a codex. Rather, they are a "description of
the life of a people gathered around Jesus."618 To put it another way, the beatitudes
are not recommendations, rather "Jesus is indicating that given the reality of the
kingdom we should not be surprised to find among those who follow him those who
are poor in spirit, those who mourn, those who are meek."619 This is what happens
when you have a community that is generously receptive to the "weakest of these."
Moreover, to talk about the church as salt and light is to talk about its visibility. That
visibility is its witness. The church witnesses, by the kind of members that constitute
it, that something about the cosmos has changed. No longer are the rich, the fat and
the strong blessed. The whole universe has been turned upside down in just such a
way, that, for those with eyes to see, the poor are not a disease but a gift. The
apocalyptic reordering of the universe by the Christ-act is heralded: "The kingdom
has come near." The in-breaking of that basi/eia occurred in the incarnation of Jesus.
Furthermore, Hauerwas tells us, "The Sermon on the Mount cannot help but become
a law, an ethic, if what is taught is abstracted from the teacher."620 That is to say,
with Bonhoeffer, that "Action in accord with Christ does not originate in some
ft") 1
ethical principle." The actions of the ekklesia—like receiving in its midst the dregs
of society, or the selling of landed property in order to support unemployed
pilgrims—can make no sense unless they are grounded in an understanding of reality
transformed by Christ. Yet, Hauerwas' understanding of gathering as described here
is pragmatic. It is always in terms of gathering around Jesus in order to understand,
i.e., make intelligible, the practices of the church. Indeed, the eschatological




620 Ibid. p. 59
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Bonhoeffer, D. 2004. Ethics. Green, C. J. (ed.). Krauss, R., West, C. C., and W. D. Stott (trans.).
Minneapolis, MN: Ausburg Fortress, p. 231
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necessary for being able to de-citify the city. Thus, Hauerwas is able to make a very
good case for truth-shouting. Hauerwas writes:
Too often we want to use the gift of speech as a weapon, often a very subtle
weapon, to establish our superiority. To learn to speak truthfully to one
another requires that we learn to speak truthfully to God, that is, we must
leam how to pray.
Yet, his use of the concept of gathering seems to apply predominately to the "we" of
the church. It would be extremely useful to Hauerwas to expand this to take into
account not God's word to "us," but "us" as God's word to the world. While he is
interested in the shape of the gathered, or a description of what the gathering looks
like, gathering as God's activity of drawing the world to Himself is never made
explicit. To put it another way, while intelligibility is certainly an aspect, or at least a
benefit—explanation as to why some are poor and others are not, why some suffer
and others do not—there is something missing. That is to say, what Hauerwas'
account of the gathered church needs is a description of gathering, not only as a
description of formative practice but also as ontological evangelism.
If Hauerwas would explicitly adopt an ontology of both the powers and the eucharist,
he would be in a much better position to resist the attractions of radical democracy,
by offering not just a postliberal critique of liberal political arrangements, but also a
robust postliberal alternative - a God and a politics constituted in and by peaceable
gathering. For Hauerwas, God has acted on behalf of the world and history has come
out right in Christ. The danger lies in positing the difference between the world and
the church as a difference between agents. If "agent" is a value-neutral term
signifying any of many possible actors, then a separation exists between act and
actor. Moral goodness on this model is constituted exactly where Hauerwas has
historically not wanted it to be, on choices made as opposed to the character of the
individual or social group. What is required then is a description of agency which
takes into account the ontological status of every agent in question: God, powers,
church, and world. There are on the one hand, the powers of sin and death that work
622
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to enslave the world, while on the other is the God who is simultaneously being-in-
communion and being-as-radical-freedom and those gathered to Him. This is the
point made by Lohfink when he writes: "The Church could not be the space for
redemption and liberation opened by Christ if it were...simply...an agency for
conveying truth."623 The church is God's act in and for the world. An ontological
distinction between agents must be preserved. The political arrangements of the
world operate on behalf (and as) the powers, the politics called church operates on
behalf (and as) Christ's continuing work in the world. If Hauerwas were to identify
postliberal theological politics as an ecclesiology of gathering in opposition to the
powers of sin and death, it would make visible the actions coterminous with each
actor. On this model, feeding a beggar is not the same act for a Christian as it is for a
radical democrat, precisely because the act is inseparable from the actor. The
ontological distinction is not between powers and church, but between powers and
Christ. The moral agency of the church is determined by Christ acting in, under and
with the body that He constitutes. Those gathered around Christ must discern the
powers and their agency (and agents) as sin, whilst inviting those enslaved peoples
under their dominium to come in to the assembled. Lohfink writes:
Christ is already set above all the powers and dominions (Eph 1:20-22), but
they still rule the world and society. Therefore, through the Church the
exalted Lord draws the world under his rule. The necessary consequence is
that the Church itself is worldly. It is not above the world or beyond the
world. We cannot even say that it is in the world. No the Church itself is
world and nothing else. But it is a world under the rule of Christ. It is a world
in which the fullness is already present. In this sense and only in this sense
can we say that through it the whole world and the whole of society are to be
drawn into the space of reconciliation that the Risen One creates in the world.
...Thus the principle of "wholeness" involves...the incorporation of
everything that constitutes a world: emotion, reason, education, wisdom,
religion, art, play—but equally the world of science, business, the
professions, word, leisure. Faith...brings home everything in the world...into
the redeeming and liberating rule of God.
Obviously that cannot be done without discernment, critical testing
possibly also distancing and rejection. But if the redemption of the world
presupposes its transformation the thing to be transformed must first be
grasped and accepted. The old principle of Christology that nothing can be
redeemed unless the divine Logos assumed it into his human nature is
623
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analogously true of the Church: Quod non est assumption, non est sanatum.
What is not assumed is not redeemed (and cannot be redeemed).624
Ultimately gathering the nations to Christ is a gathering that occurs through the
baptism of the nations into the church, not as Constantinian syncretism but as
discipleship. What Hauerwas needs to remember is that the church is not against the
nations, nor for the nations, nor the desire of the nations; rather, the church invites
the gathering of the nations into itself, a gathering into the real world—a gathering
that is disciplmg.
In the final portion of this thesis, I begin the task of moving the concept of ecclesial
gathering from an account of the church's self-understanding, to a description of the
church's activity in and with the world. What follows is not a theory about how to
think the practices of the gathered, or how to begin the activity of theological
discernment, but a description of the church whose love for neighbors and enemies is
a love that exceeds the church's ability to reason. The last chapter of this thesis is not
an attempt to explain or critique Hauerwas' love of the world as a thing-itself, but to
revel in it. The problem I have explored in this thesis has not been Hauerwas' love of
the world, but his attempt to explain that love reasonably through the language of
radical democracy. In short, Chapter 6 attempts to provide an account of the God-
who-is-love and whose love is ineffable, and who dwells (remains) in the gathering.
It is a snapshot into an ecclesiology for which gathering is not only a way of
thinking, but also a way of being that is, paradoxically, able to love the world
alongside its disciplining of it.
624 Ibid. p. 288-90
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Chapter 6
Gathering Beyond a Concept
The (radical) Politics of Love
While the first four chapters worked toward the critical and deconstructive portion of
this title, the final two chapters have worked, and continue to work, toward the
second half: the proposing of an ecclesial politics of gathering. Central to this
constructive and creative task is finding a balance - a location, a time - between
church and world. So far, in this thesis I have argued alongside Hauerwas that the
church does not have a politics but is politics and I have extended his position to say
that the shape of that politics is gathered. In the last chapter I mapped the positive
spatial and temporal geography of the gathered politics called church, exploring
God's liberation of the world from the multitude of Fallen powers: legion. My
account of the gathering, and those gathered, rejected fideism and withdrawal. It
rejected descriptions of the church as an alternative political arrangement with high
walls and closed gates - a ghetto or sect removed from the world. It defined the
antithesis of gathering as dispersal, positing an ecclesiology of gathering that was
fundamentally evangelical and singular (gathering as an inclusive and incorporating
politics). As such, the charitable work of teaching the barbarians to sing was
described as primarily the invitation to stop being barbarians. Yet teaching implies
education, training, and the sharing of knowledge - catechism. If teaching is
accounted as charity, such gifts cannot but seem imperial to those who have rejected
God's emancipation from legion. In the last chapter little time was given to those
who remain reticent and doubt; to those who see incorporation as colonialism; or to
the development of an account of the church's relation to the world as a thing-in-
itself (to avoiding the blinding of ateleological openness by eschatological hope). Is
the church-world relationship doomed then to the violence of Hegelian master-slave
dialectics? Can a necessarily evangelical politics love the world as the world? Is
there a potential for singing with the barbarians without civilizing them? Might
harmonies or rhythms be shared even if the lyrical logic is different? The question on
which I focus this chapter is whether collaboration between the church and the world
is possible.
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The duration of this thesis will work then toward parsing the "already" but "not yet"
distinction of a gathered politics that is on the one hand actively participating in (the
tentative futurity of) the redeeming work of Christ (gathering and being gathered),
and yet is simultaneously capable of actively loving the world as a thing-in-itself (in
the present). This move is one that will be reminiscent of John Paul II's identification
of the broken and divided church as presently living in the liturgical space between
eucharistic rule and exception. In that case, the church was able to navigate the
tension (albeit imperfectly) due to the eschatological promise of healing. As the
world does not share the apocalyptic vision, it may seem as if the eschatological
patience is condescension at best and violence at worst. Yet, I reject the nihilism
implicit in such a reading of the relationship between the singular and multiple. It is
my contention in this chapter that the paradox of a God whose existence is both three
and one sets the stage for an ontology in which difference is peaceably reconciled.
Shared acts of love, i.e., charitable collaborations, between the church and the world
participate in a similar paradox: on the one hand such collaborations (co-labor)
require a continuous and careful process of premeditative discernment by the
gathered polis; on the other such collaborations must acknowledge love as having
ontological priority over knowledge, which is to say that the act of self-giving is
never limited by the bounds of human reason. The double-nature of gathered
ecclesiology identifies the former with theology (God-reasoning) and the latter with
theurgy (God-bringing). In the theological aspect, the possibility of collaboration
must be prefaced by critique and judgment, and will sometimes result in refusal.625 In
the theurgic case, the collaborative act is ad hoc, it is not a means of doing but a
reflection on what has been done (the act that brought God to earth).626 As this
625 To put this in context of preceding chapters: Hauerwas' concession to radical democracy, can be
identified as accommodation rather than collaboration because it involves the premeditated
legitimating of a politics not founded on the confession of Christ; while Yoder's move toward a
Christian witness to the state, founded on middle axioms (the development of a pigeon between the
language of confessional Christian morality and secular linguistic arrangements), is premeditated
utilitarianism. Yoder legitimates the construction of a language for the purpose of evangelism and
discussion precisely because it is reasonable to do so. The failure in this case then is a rejection of the
second aspect of collaboration: the notion that love occurs in the face of reason and we ought not
construct relationships (even linguistic ones) for reasons of utility.
626
1 am using "paradox" in the broadest possible sense. On the one hand, I am talking about the
juxtaposition of two seemingly contradictory sets of belief, on the other I am gesturing toward the fact
that the simultaneous holding of both beliefs is the mystery of faith: the para doxa - an overwhelming
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chapter will argue, what makes either act possible (the doing of the theology, or the
theurgic bringing-forth of God) is the sacramental promise of John 6:57: "Whoever
eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me and I in him" (NIV, emphasis
mine). This remainder is the excess, the saturation of God in, with, and under the
sacrament. It is the eating of Jesus, and the full constituting of the body of Christ, by
the Holy Spirit. And so the activity of the gathering is not simply analogous to
God's activity, i.e., Christ-like, but is in some way a co-operation with (and as the
body of) Christ - a shared agency made possible by God's remaining with us. The
remainder is the promise of a transformation of ordinary time and ordinary activity in
the messianic event — parousia qua para-ousia. It is the presence of transcendent
being alongside material being. It is the ecclesial participation in God's loving of the
world, and the saturation of the gathering by the presence of God, which makes the
gathering God's sacrament to the world - that through which God works in, under
and with. Therefore, in this chapter I argue that the church loving the world despite
itself evidences God's grace to the church, that is to say God's remainder/abiding in
her.
Finally, this chapter continues the task of the last, by attempting to open up new
resources by which Hauerwas might begin to think about the church/world
relationship. The style of what follows is very different from that employed by
Hauerwas. It is systematic and concerned with ontology where he is hesitant and
pragmatic. Yet, this final chapter attempts to capture and continue Hauerwas'
unconditional love of friends, strangers, and enemies, whilst doing so in a way which
names the unintelligibility of that love outside the redeeming work of Jesus Christ.
The goal of this chapter is not to explain the ways in which the church's love for the
world should be thought, or to name which of the practices of the gathering toward
the world are acceptable and which are impermissible. Instead, this chapter works to
describe the mysterious God who-A-love, and who remains in the gathered so that
the gathered can remain in the world.
and transcendent glory; and "a mystery," as John McFayden and David McCarthy put it, "[is] not an
unsolved puzzle, but a reality with inexhaustible depth." (McFayden, J., and D. McCarthy. 2002.
Preparingfor Christian Marriage. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, p. 9).
225
Milbank on Pleonasm and Analogy
At first glance it may seem odd to return to the writings of John Milbank here in the
last chapter, particularly after his work was criticized in chapters 1 and 2 both for its
triumphalism, as well as its accommodations to liberalism and modernity (in the
form of his continued recommendation of state-based socialism). Just as chapter 3
asked Hauerwas why the church needed the new language of radical democracy to
explain care for "the weakest of these" to the world, the same question can be posed
of Milbank's socialism. Why talk of socialism when Christ already charged his
followers to care for orphans, widows, prisoners and the dispossessed (a practice that
he called discipleship)? Milbank's response is that the operation of the church is
distinct from any peculiar community. Moreover, the operation of the church should
not be limited to any specific group of people (because doing so would limit God).
Thus, socialism belongs no more to the state than to the church.627 While Milbank's
position is more nuanced than that of Hauerwas, the failure of his thought involves a
refusal to reject the pragmatic imaginary. The complaint here is not that he should
describe charity as an act belonging only to the church, but that he claims the
possibility of charity exists as an activity of the state, making Christ-likeness the
acceptable product of legal and violent coercion. This point has been made
particularly in regards to Milbank's Kantian conception of law by Leora
ZTO V A9Q
Batnitzky, and more generally by Slavoj Zizek in his description of the
relationship between subjective (eruptive violence) and objective (systematic, status
quo) violence. Regardless, Milbank's ontology, particularly his description of
paradox and reconciliation, is able to avoid the pitfalls of the modem attempt to
encyclopedically shoehorn the transcendent into the boundaries of human reason, as
well as the postmodern attempt to nihilistically dissolve the transcendent in order to
627 See Milbank, J. "Enclaves, or Where Is the Church?" in Milbank, J. 2009. The Future of Love:
Essays in Political Theology, pp. 131-144. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.
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secular society" in Clayton Crocket (ed.). 2001. Secular Theology: American Radical Theological
Thought, pp. 73-91. London: Routledge.
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bypass the modern dilemma. Milbank's ontology is neither violent and coercive, nor
arbitrarily nihilistic; rather, it is peaceable. This is not the place to fully explore the
disconnection between Milbank's ontology and ethics, yet it is the hope of this
chapter that the reading of Milbank developed here, regarding the ontology of
analogy and the practice of peaceable repetition (which preserve genuine difference),
might provide Milbank with the tools to repair his own system. It will be useful to
start with an overview ofMilbank's project.
It is in the final chapter of Theology and Social Theory, after eleven chapters spent
criticizing secular sociologies, their practices, and ontological frameworks, that
Milbank begins his assertion that theology must itself be taken as a social science,
and as in fact "the queen of the sciences for the inhabitants of the altera civitas"
which is "on pilgrimage through the temporal world."630 Similarities with the Yale
project quickly become apparent. According to Milbank, in the recent past (since the
Enlightenment) theology has suffered from a false humility, and looked elsewhere
for accounts of history or society (Frei's "foundational hermeneutics") which could
be made theologically relevant, ad hoc. Yet for Milbank, and also for Barth, Yale
and Maclntyre, there is no universal, rational, or neutral account of history that can
be declared already primitive to theology, rather theology must provide its own
account of "the final causes at work in human history."631 The nature of this
Christian account, says Milbank, is most clearly an ecclesiology, and all other
societies and communities can be defined by their continuity or discontinuity with
Christian historical practice: "As the Church is already, necessarily, by virtue of its
institution, a 'reading' of other human societies, it becomes possible to consider
ecclesiology as also a 'sociology.'"632 This position recapitulates Yale and the early
Hauerwas' turn to sociology, but with a difference. For Milbank, Christian theology
is not distinctive because it merely explicates and adopts the vantage point of the
church, rather all theology has to re-conceive itself as "the constant re-narration of
630




this practice as it has historically developed."633 For as Milbank writes, "[the] task of
such a theology is...to tell again the Christian mythos, pronounce again the Christian
logos, and call again the Christian praxis in manner that restores freshness and
originality."634 The difference, as will be argued in what follows, is that Milbank
avoids sociological realism by redefining (in a very Barthian way) story, politics and
reason through the facticity of the Incarnation. Thus for Milbank, Christian theology
must boldly assert itself as the paradigm for all social analysis, and it must do so by
continually re-narrating the social-sciences through the Gospel. Rather than
employing, with Lindbeck, Wittgensteinian language games, Milbank navigates
internal inconsistencies by noting that the Gospel itself is pleonastically re-narrated
635
by those who hear it. Non-identical repetition, recapitulation, and redefinition
633 Ibid. p. 381
634 Ibid.
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Milbank's critique of Lindbeck's sociological realism in Theology and Social Theory, is similar to
Yoder's (as discussed in Chapter 1), but Milbank's solution is a turn to ontology rather than to the
acting church. According to Milbank, there are two forms of "foundationalism" that must be rejected
in order for postliberal theology to take place. Firstly, postliberal theology must refuse the
Kantian/Cartesian affirmation of absolute (objective) truth. Faith is not grounded in a series of
propositions about objects which can be known. God is not an object which is visible to our rational
gaze. Secondly, Milbank argues that postliberal theology must reject the notion that Christian belief is
merely an "expression" of experiences which occurs prior to the holding of belief. That is to say,
Christian theology when done correctly must not recede into subjective Cartesian interiority but must
be a surface expression, on display for the world to see. Indeed, postmodern theology must understand
itself as being derived from a "particular cultural practice which projects objects and positions
subjects in a conjoint operation." (382) For Lindbeck, that which refers to reality is the entire practice
"with all its signs, images and actions, and not just a set of propositions taken in isolation." (Ibid.)
While Milbank believes Lindbeck to be correct in rejecting both forms of "foundationalism," he goes
on to argue that a rigorous acceptance of Lindbeck's thesis forces one to appreciate that a greater
place must be given to "propositions" that Lindbeck allows.
Milbank begins his extension and critique of Lindbeck by following D. Z. Phillips in pointing
out that Lindbeck's post-liberal theology must be set within a mythical and historical framework in
order for a performative reference to "the absolute" to make sense. According to Milbank, when
Lindbeck writes the sentence - "the whole of Christian practice refers to the absolute" — it is not
immediately clear what kind of "absolute" it is that the whole of Christian practice refers to.
Moreover, Lindbeck begs the question precisely because his notion of Christian practice internally
defines itself as "response to the absolute," "and indeed only constitutes itself as a practice insofar as
it imagines, in a hesitating and provisional fashion, the shape of the 'absolute' to which its own
practice is a response." (383). In short, Lindbeck has always already presupposed a relationship
between Christian practice and "the absolute," and this relationship is the stage upon which all
Christian performativity occurs. This mythic and historical stage sustains the entire Christian
performance—and is, at its very core, propositional. Indeed according to Milbank: "A 'prepositional'
level, grounded not on intellectual 'vision', but in creative imagination, is therefore implicit even
within a religious practice confined to worship and the recitation of stories." (Ibid). The need for a
"propositional level," or indeed a particularly Christian ontology, occurs when a difference in the
interpretation or retelling of the stories occurs. Milbank describes the work of Christian ontology and
Christian propositions as "taking off from the level of narrative; in fact, doctrine is derived from the
228
narrative itself, yet also provides continuity and clarity in the face of interpretive ambiguity. Yet,
Milbank continues, it is precisely because doctrine itself arises from interpretive ambiguity that
doctrinal issues cannot be settled simply by recourse to a more exact reading of preceding practices
and narratives. Indeed, were this the case, then heresies could be put down by merely repeating the
narratives in a louder tone in the hope that via such a repetition the truth would be made transparent.
Rather (and this is crucial for the entirety of Milbank's project),
doctrine represents a kind of 'speculative moment' that cannot be reduced to the heuristic
protection of narrative (in the sense of merely safeguarding what is properly implicit in the
narrative) because it relates to the synchronic, paradigmatic instance of ultimate 'setting'
which every syntagmatic sequence has to assume, and yet cannot adequately represent. (Ibid).
Milbank deepens his account of the "speculative moment" by appealing to the inventiveness
that is central to doctrine, and particularly the doctrine of the incarnation. According to Milbank,
Christians regard Christ as their standard, a judge by which to gauge every aspect of their lives. The
stories that Christians tell about Christ provide an account of the will and way of the judge. These
stories occur as a climax within the middle of history; all history before Christ points toward his
coming and all history since is situated within the Christ-has-come narrative. Christ is seen as the
"measure" of all reality in the same way as God's word, i.e., God's logos, is taken to do. Thus the
doctrine of the incarnation follows Christian practice in identifying Jesus with the logos. Yet
according to Milbank, there is a radically inventive moment at the center of such a doctrine:
Disconcerting as it may appear, one has to recognize in the doctrinal affirmation of the
incarnation a radically inventive moment, which asserts the 'finality' of God's appearance in
a life involving suffering and violent death, and claims also that in a certain sense God 'has
to' be like this, and has not just 'incidentally' chosen this path (384).
The justification for this inventive moment, i.e., speculative moment, is two-fold: (1) it provides
"redoubled force" to existing Christian practice that considers Christ to be the standard; and (2) it
provides a picture of God which is characterized by its "inherent attractiveness." While the first
justification when presented on its own terms seems to be a bit excessive, Milbank argues that the
second aesthetic justification, which paints a picture "of incarnation in a joyful and suffering life,"
provides a vision of "divine love" and God's involvement in human destiny that is otherwise
inaccessible. Indeed for Milbank, since the idea of a God-become-incarnate is excessive when
compared to the stories about Jesus, it is inevitable that at times these concrete stories will be deferred
to background. Moreover, the deferment of concrete stories about Jesus has clearly already begun in
the New Testament, and even in the Gospels themselves: "In fact, one should say that it has 'always
already' begun," notes Milbank, "because the dazzling effect of Jesus upon his followers caused them
to use divine metaphors with regard to him, which both 'reflected' Jesus (and in a real sense were the
presence of Jesus) and also, in a certain, not really-to-be-regretted fashion, obscured him in favour of
an idea." (Ibid). The "idea" of the doctrine of the incarnation then has worked itself back into the first
order level of mythical narrative and devotion. Indeed, according to Milbank, these "ideas" and
"speculations" are integral and unavoidable parts of historical Christianity both of which are
completely ungrounded accept for the "pleasing character of the conceits to which they give rise."
(Ibid). Yet there is a danger when confronted with the speculative moment that the "baroque scenery"
will "totally efface the syntagmatic, narrative dimension" of the original stories. Indeed, according to
Milbank:
Properly understood, the speculative idea does not encourage this, but rather...of its own
nature demands a return to the concrete, narrative level: if Jesus really is the word of God,
then it is not the mere 'extrinsic' knowledge of this which will save us, but rather a precise
attention to his many words and deeds and all their historical results. The idea helps to
confirm that God is love, the narrative alone instructs about what love is (385).
Thus, Lindbeck is right to argue that narrative alone can identify God for us, but the complexities of
that narrative require an attendance to the never fully represented "synchronic setting." There is an
implicit ontology always already "taking off' from the level of narrative which is not manifested as a
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(which always involves invention and creativity), are both the products and
production of faithful Christian practice. (The place where Milbank's project falls
apart is in his failure to limit pleonastic creativity in order to avoid violent
repetitions: he could appeal here to either Yoder's canon-within-the-canon or Coles'
description of "looping back" to an original framework).
Thus Milbank's Incarnational Realism leads him to describe theology as the
alternative to secular sociology and philosophy, requiring him to oppose the secular
philosophical claim that philosophy has both autonomy and independent content - its
own subject matter. Getting theology beyond philosophy for Milbank means
reinterpreting theology most primarily as beyond traditional metaphysics. Thus,
Milbank calls for an end to onto-theology, i.e., the attempt to understand God within
totalizing system, but rather requires "speculation" in the face of the hesitating, uncertain and
ambiguous connection between the identification of God and the ontological "idea" of God, within the
narrative. In short, narrative always already anticipates the inventive and speculative moment of
doctrine.
Furthermore, doctrines arise based upon "speculative interpretations of the implicit
assumptions of a narrative" whose articulation "will necessarily engage with the conceptual resources
available at a particular historical time, which then become an inescapable part of the Christian
inheritance, not a mere husk to be easily discarded." (386). That is to say, although doctrine is a
"second order" speculative moment which arises from the "first order" of narrative, such excess of the
invented affirmation constitutes a very real historical moment in which the artful performance of the
Christian narrative was supplemented and enriched by the doctrinal vision. Doctrine extends the
aesthetic imagination of the narrative providing a thicker and more beautiful description of the "first
order" of narrative stories.
According to Milbank, all of this bares crucially on Lindbeck's case for the formation of a
"metanarrative realism" precisely because Lindbeck fails to acknowledge the play between
paradigmatic and syntagmatic. For Lindbeck, correct performance of the Christian narrative is defined
in advance by the stories about Jesus. The Jesus stories situate the world within the exemplary
narrative of his life and so provide a "metanarrative." Yet Milbank argues that such an approach is
necessarily ahistorical and foundational: "Because...[Lindbeck] fails to see the tension in any
narrative between the assumption of a paradigmatic setting, and the unfolding of a syntagmatic
development, he proceeds to graft the paradigmatic function inappropriately onto the narrative
structures as such." (Ibid). Indeed, for Lindbeck the good (Christian) life is determined by "fixed" and
"hypostatized" narratives that stand as eternal truths outside the flow of time and history. The
narratives of Jesus are made foundational in such a way that the syntagmatic unfolding of history is
utterly arbitrary. The problem, according to Milbank, is that when these narratives are presented as a
paradigm, then they are seen as both over and done with and easy to interpret. Conversely, a truly
metanarrative realism would require a tension within the narrative itself as to whether the narrative
should stay in its historical place or alternatively, break out of its frame and into a new performance
through the course of temporal events. For Milbank, God continues to work within history and the
syntagmatic unfolding of events. As this is the case, the paradigmatic setting continues to be revealed
through the syntagmatic unfolding of history by the Spirit in the church. At any one distinct historical
moment the paradigmatic setting is vague and hesitating. Where Lindbeck offers a fixed and rigid
paradigm that can be "clearly read" off the first order level of narrative, Milbank suggests that
identifying doctrine as provider of the paradigmatic setting would offer a more mutable, cautious and
honest account of the syntagmatic nature of revelation.
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a framework of the philosophical notion of being.636 Onto-theology, according to
Milbank, is the attempt to make God comprehensible via a particular understanding
of the concept of being. In the onto-theological conception, God is one being among
many—a super-being. On this view, God, man, and vegetables all participate within
the same type: existence. God just participates in existence (being) infinitely more
than humans do. Thus, onto-theology allows humans to have epistemic access to
both God and the flow of history by transforming human perception into divine
vision; it allows humans to bypass knowledge of God on the way to understanding
the nature of existence: being in-itself.
Following the lead of Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar,637 Milbank argues
that the root of the modern secular deformity (which allows a place for both onto-
theology and secular sociology) lies in a fundamental theological shift during the
fourteenth century. This shift was principally a shift from the ontology of St. Thomas
Aquinas, and a notion of being founded in analogy, toward an ontology which
claimed all being as univocal. For Milbank this modern heresy can only be cured via
a non-identical (re)turn toward orthodoxy by and with theology. Thus Milbank sides
with Aquinas in describing being not as a form or concept which God (like man and
vegetables) participates in (i.e., univocity), but affirms rather being qua being as only
being insofar as it emerges from God. Indeed, following both Augustine and
Aquinas, Milbank interprets Exodus 3:14 to make Being the highest name of God: I
AM (or He Who Is). According to Balthasar, in Aquinas' ontology,
being (esse), with which he is concerned and to which he attributes the
modalities of the one, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, is the unlimited
abundance of reality which is beyond all comprehension, as it, in its
emergence from God, attains subsistence and self-possession within the finite
entities.638
636 There is an argument to be made here that Milbank is conflating onto-theology with univocity of
being. While onto-theology as Heidegger conceives the term is certainly a type of univocity, it is not
so clear that this is the case with all onto-theologians, of which Kant might be an example.
637
Balthasar, H. U. V. 1991. The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Volume 5 of The
Realm ofMetaphysics in the Modern Age. Trans. Oliver Davies. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
638 Ibid. p. 12. Note: the "abundance of reality which is beyond all comprehension" is the same thing I
am describing with the concept ofmystery.
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For Aquinas, there is no common genus or type that both God and God's creatures
share. This is precisely because, for Aquinas, "God is not a measure that is
proportionate to what is measured; so it does not follow that he and his creatures
belong to the same order."639 In short, Milbank, with Aquinas, wishes to preserve the
ontological transcendence of God. In Aquinas' ontology God is not knowable (Deus
absconditus) as such, but only by analogy; thus the language in which God is known
(Deus revelatus) is always analogical and never definitive of God's perfect mystery.
Aquinas explains analogy as the signification of different relations to one thing
(ideversas proportiones ad aliquid unum): 640
When we say he [God] is good or wise we do not simply mean that he causes
wisdom or goodness, but that he possesses these perfections transcendently,
We conclude, therefore that from the point of view of what the world means
it is used primarily of God and derivatively of creatures for what the word
means - the perfection it signifies - flows from God to creature.641
According to Milbank, the move from analogy toward univocity (the signification of
identical relations to one thing) begins in the theology of Duns Scotus,642 paving the
way for a "univocist drift" that continues through the work of Cardinal Cajetan,
Francis Suarez and culminates in the Cartesian revolution. In Descartes, rationality is
"not theologically assured by Christian Revelation, but metaphysically founded on
the humanity of 'men strictly men'" - the modem enclosure of the whole world
within the boundaries of human reason.644
639




642 Here Richard Cross has vigorously critiqued Milbank's reading of Scotus. See: Cross, R. 1999.
Duns Scotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and CROSS, R. 2002. The Metaphysics of the
Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
643
Marion, J-L. "The Essential Incoherence of Descartes' Definition ofDivinity." In Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty (ed.). 1986. Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Trans. Frederick Van de Pitte. pp.
297-306. Berkely, CA: University of California Press, p. 298
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Milbank's enterprise does not seek a return to Aquinas' notion of creaturely
participation in divine Being (a return to the pre-modern), but to re-form human
personhood, creativity, community and knowledge in the style of Thomist analogy.
Analogy, as the style of Thomism, begins with a genealogy of human participation in
divine being, but continues forward toward a neo-Thomist, neo-Platonic ontology
that re frames the Christian story in a peculiarly Christian way: by maintaining the
ontological transcendence of God without falling prey to subversion by modern (and
postmodern) methodologies, or naive nostalgia. This move from modern Averroism
to a Thomistic account of God-as-Being requires not only an ontological paradigm
shift from philosophy to theology but also a redefinition of the disciplines
themselves. This process has been well articulated by Wayne Hankey:
The problem, for Milbank, is not philosophy, metaphysics and ontology
absolutely, if their substantiality and autonomy could be eliminated. Ancient
philosophy sought objective substantiality and modern philosophy sought
subjective substantiality because they remained "inside the horizons projected
by the Greek mythos, within which the Greek logos had to remain confined".
Milbank envisages "another ontology" which is "'another philosophy'" and
"another metaphysics". This would be properly Christian, inscribed within
the Christian rather than within the Greek mythos.645
Milbank's turn from modern and Greek descriptions of philosophy and theology
cannot help but be a turn toward Neoplatonism, albeit a Neoplatonism filtered
through the lens of Aquinas, Augustine, and Dionysius the Areopagite. Thus,
Milbank's Neoplatonism is "no longer exactly Greek" as the notions of "presence,
substance, the idea, the subject, causality, through-before expression, and realist
representation" have been "radically" altered and reinterpreted by a God whose
644 A version of Cartesian univocity has been adopted as incorporative difference in Deleuze. For
Deleuze: "With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which
is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a
Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal
Being." Deleuze, G.1995. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia
University Press, p. 39
645
Hankey, W. J. "Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John
Milbank, John-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas." Modern Theology 15:4 (October 1999). p 387-415.
p. 390
233
highest name is Being.646 The Christian repetition of Greek forms is itself a
pleonasm, a creative (re)description. Similarly, the Thomistic repetition of analogy is
a repetition with difference. Milbank's repetition of the Thomist analogy can and
should be extended beyond a discussion of the univocalist vocabulary as commonly
conceived: being, goodness, justice, beauty. The analogy is not only broadly about
what creatures mean when they say that God exists, or that God is good, just,
beautiful. Rather the analogy can be inverted to describe creaturely knowledge of
other creatures. When asking, how ought persons relate to one another, the answer
can be founded in Jesus' new (kainos) command: "As [kathos] I have loved you, so
you must love one another." (John 13:34). The newness here does not speak to just
the love, but to its kind, degree, and observed proportion. The command is a
repetition of what has already come, albeit with newness; it is a call to a non-
identical repetition of the love that has been observed. In what follows, Milbank's
return to the Aquinas' doctrine of analogy will be inverted. No longer does the
analogy point epistemically from human knowledge of human love toward an
ineffable God-love, but from the Christian knowledge of God's love (in the ecclesial
gathering) to what is unknown: the shape of the church's love for the world.
Finally it should be noted that what I am arguing here is entirely different from
O'Donovan's claim in Chapter 2 that political theology requires an analogy between
God's rule and human rule. With Yoder, I am arguing that there is an ontological
difference between the power of the God-who-is-love and the powers of violence
that enslave the world. Power, for O'Donovan, is univocal; the difference between
God's power and human power is a difference of degree and right use (proper
authority). Yet I am arguing, with Hauerwas, that the God-whose-being-is-love is a
God who cannot help but seem weak and ineffectual to those who name exaltation as
strength, coercion and control. For O'Donovan, God's sovereignty is an omnipotence
deferred, for the pleonastically-minded reader of Hauerwas, God's sovereignty is the
triumph of love (communion, and the desire for communion) by the God-whose-
being-is-love. The discussion of the phenomenality of love that follows is the
646
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 295-296
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attempt to reorient the political analogy as the analogy between human communion
and the God-who-is-communion - the God-who-is-love.
The Analogy of Love beyond Nihilism and Univocity
Love as a philosophical category has enjoyed a recent resurgence in continental
circles thanks in large part to the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Yet most philosophers,
says Marion, "no longer have the words to speak of [love],. .nor the concepts to think
about it, nor the strength to celebrate it."647 Other more artistic endeavors remind
humanity of what has been lost ("the repressed, the unsaid, and the
unmentionable"648), yet love, without the conceptuality of the philosophers, remains
un-reasonable. For Marion, poetry has the potential to liberate humanity from its
"erotic aphasia" yet leaves us without a concept, while novels re-inscribe love within
a "social, plural, and public narrativity" but fail to identify the personality of the
phenomenon.649 Psychoanalysis identifies love by its absence; it is the suffering
caused by lack, the unnamable void that cannot be spoken or thought whole.
Conversely, for Marion, the problem with theology is not absence but presence.
Theology, fails, according to Marion, because it "knows [love]...too well."650
Theology "knows what loves is about" yet always interprets love through Passion,
annulling human passion by its failure to "give meaning" to the phenomenality ofmy
love.651
For Marion, theology fails for two reasons: first because it particularizes the
universal, and second because the self (whether human or divine) is always a self-
that-then-loves. The former concern has become the subject of the recent return to
647
Marion, J-L. 2007. The Erotic Phenomenon. Trans. Stephen E. Lewis. Chicago: The University of






Paul in continental political philosophy. For theorists like Slavoj Zizek652 and Alain
Badiou, 653 and to a lesser extent Terry Eagleton654 and Jean-Luc Nancy,655 the New
Testament is an untapped resource for overcoming postmodern nihilism. The
deconstruction of Christianity and the Christian canon ends in a non-peaceable
repetition, i.e., the excavation of a multitude of libratory concepts that can be used to
universally ground "life together" after the failure ofmodern reason. Marion grounds
the transcendent, that which saturates life in its excess and which overflows the
bounds of reason, in the concept of love. It is the universal, which cannot be
particularized (for instance by the Passion of Christ) without obscuring its
ontological priority. Marion's latter concern is that love is secondary to being: Being,
here, defined as that which is synonymous with the Cartesian ego - the thinking
thing. Thus the second aspect of the theological failure is because love is perceived
as the response of a subject that exists a priori - selfhood as self-knowledge precedes
love (given or received), rather than being constituted by it. Thus Marion says that
the Christian person is constituted by a knowing, and in particular a knowing of what
love is, that precedes their desire to know. This failure is, to use Milbank's language,
a pleonasm, a new recurrence of the contemporary philosophical aporia: the failure
of philosophy to remember its own erotic origins. The love of wisdom, what Marion
describes as the desire to know, means that "in order to attain the truth, it is
necessary in every case, first to desire it, and therefore to love it."656 For Marion, it is
love that is a priori: Amo ergo sum, or conversely, I am loved therefore I am.
652 Zizek has a number of texts that deal extensively with Paul, the most developed of which is a
recently published dialogue between he and Milbank: Zizek, S., and J. Milbank. 2009. The
Monstrosity ofChrist: Paradox or Dialectic. Creston Davis (ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
653 See Badiou, A. 2003. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Trans. Ray Brassier. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press. For Badiou, Paul overcomes the particularity of the Christ event,
making it the ground for human liberation qua radical freedom.
654 See Eagleton, T. 2007. Jesus Christ: The Gospels. New York: Verso, and also Eagleton, T. 2009.
Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Eagleton, while maintaining his Marxist atheism has much sympathy for the Christian imagination
and a Catholic reticence toward Paul particularly.
655 See Nancy, J-L. 2008. Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity. Smith, M., Malenfant,
G. and Bettina Bergo (trans.). New York: Fordham University Press. For Nancy, universalization
requires a turn to James rather than Paul, with an emphasis given to the concept of hope rather than
love.
656
Marion, Erotic Phenomenon, p. 2
236
In the final paragraphs of The Erotic Phenomenon, Marion turns from the task of
returning philosophy to the concept of love (not vice versa as love never left) by
asking whether the God "who names himself with the very name of love... loves like
we love, with the same love as us"?657 Marion's answer betrays everything that
comes before it, re-inscribing love as a Cartesian concept, defined and limited by the
boundaries of human reason and knowledge. Marion writes:
Clearly one may hesitate, but nevertheless we cannot avoid this conclusion.
For, in fact, God does not only reveal himself through love and as love; he
also reveals himself through the means, the figures, the moments, the acts,
and the stages of love, the one and only love, that which we also practice. He
plays the lover, like us.. .who ends up by identifying himself in the incarnated
Son, up to the unilateral promulgation by him to us of our faithfulness. God
practices the logic of the erotic reduction as we do, with us, according to the
same rite and following the same rhythm as us, to the point where we can
even ask ourselves if we do not learn it from him, and no one else. God loves
in the same way we do.658
Marion is unable to escape the grasp of onto-theology, and the definition of love as a
concept whose excess is always stifled by human reason precisely because of his re¬
formation of the concept of the univocity of being as the univocity of love. In the
same way that Milbank defined the God of onto-theology as a super-being, a being
who existence was of the same kind but who participated in that existence only to a
higher degree than that of humanity, so Marion claims of the Lover God: "When God
loves (and indeed he never ceases to love), he simply loves infinitely better than we
do."659 Love is given ontological priority to not only human selfhood but to God's as
well. The God of the philosophers can no longer be determined by his omniscience
and omnipotence but his desire. Marion writes: "God's highest transcendence, the
only one that does not dishonor him, belongs not to power, nor to wisdom, nor even
to infinity, but to love. For love alone is enough to put all infinity, all wisdom, and all
657 Ibid. p. 221
658 Ibid. p. 222
659 Ibid.
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power to work."660 God loves infinitely and first, yet even that love can always be
spoken, thought and appreciated. Its climax is material rather than ecstatic. The love
of God can never be indescribable or Marion's task has failed, and the
psychoanalysts will need to begin their task anew. The love that we are brought to is
a concept. It never occurs to Marion that the inability to speak or think love might
not be a function of its absence, but of its sheer presence.
So what does Marion's attempt (and failure) to bring us back to love have to do with
the stated goal of this chapter, i.e., the development of an account of a gathering (an
enclosure) that is paradoxically able to love the world as the world? Moreover, how
might Marion's work help redefine the political analogy, whilst avoiding the
univocity of love? The key is in Marion's failure, but this will become clearer after a
short aside on the nature of human making.
In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas famously makes the argument that human
making always falls short of genuine creation. Yet as Robert Miner argues, while it
may seem as if this means humans are trapped within the technical conception of
making (utilitarian and pragmatic), that is not exactly the case.661 According to
Miner, Aquinas makes true human creativity possible in his doctrine of analogy. As
stated earlier, Aquinas analogy argues that while God is the source of all being, there
is yet an ontological distinction to be made between Creator and created. God and the
world do not share a principle of existence, yet humanity can understand its existence
as analogous to God's. Drawing on Aquinas' metaphysical analogy and the writings
of Nicholas Cusanus, Miner is able to claim with Cusanus that "all human arts are
images, as it were of the infinite and divine art."662 For Miner, human making and
creativity is analogous to divine making; simultaneously human making actively
participates in the divine creation, while the understanding of that activity is defined
660 Ibid.
661 See Miner, R. 2004. Truth in the Making: Creative Knowledge in Theology and Philosophy.
London: Routledge
662
Cusanus, N. 1975. Idiota de Mente, Trans. Clyde Lee Miller. New York: Abaris Books, p. 45
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by its ontological separation from the divine. Indeed God's generative activity not
only anticipates and makes possible human creation, but celebrates and commands it:
be fruitful and multiply.
The possibilities for Marion's program should be clear. Marion's exhortation to
ground being in love - desire and relationship - need only adopt the Thomist
metaphysics of analogy to acknowledge love as more than a concept. On this model,
the love of God for the world is not infinite yet fathomable, it is the always ineffable
a priori; that which cannot be thought, only experienced. That is precisely the
revelation of Godself that becomes apparent in the creation of the world and the
subsequent Incarnation of Jesus: God's unreasonable kenosis, i.e., the gift of Godself
to the material that could not help but overflow the material - to saturate the world. It
is the knowledge about, and experience with, this love that is the basis for an account
of the gathering's love for the world as the world. The project cannot be to simply
reveal or recover a concept of love and gathering. With Aquinas we must
acknowledge that God and his activity transcend any conceptuality. We are creatures
who participate in the being of God and understand our own existence as analogous
but never identical to God's existence. Political concepts such as gathering and love
are crucial for self-understanding yet must always subject themselves to the analogy
between the God-whose-being-is-love-and-gathering and the political gathering
made possible by participation in that love. Participation in the being of God is a
participation in the being of the God-whose-being-is-love-and-gathering, and so
conceptualities are (rather than O'Donovan's mediators of reality) always only the
temporary tactics of finite human reason and are everywhere transcended by the
God-whose-being-is-love. The argument that follows is a stained proposal for a
description of an ecclesiology (of love and gathering), which rejects the univocal and
so is paradoxically possible precisely because its practices are both theological and
theurgic. The reconciliation of this disparity of practice is only possible because of
ecclesial participation in the being of God - a participation that is both constituted by
the sacraments that gather the church and in the constitution of the church as
sacrament, a reality made possible when the Spirit is counted as remainder.
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Between Theology and Theurgy
It is the contention of this chapter that the eschatological paradox of "already" but
"not yet" presumes, for the gathering, a paradox of ecclesial action: a call to
discipleship that includes both the practice of theology as well as theurgy. To
exemplify the double aspect of the gathering's relationship to the multitude we must
return to Milbank's account of the Christian difference, which rejects univocity in
favor of a more peaceable ontology.
Milbank identifies the Christian theological difference as a Trinitarian difference.
Thus in his own work, Milbank's (re)turn to Thomist analogy means that onto-theo-
logie, revelation imprisoned by the concept of being, must undergo a transformation
into theo-onto-logie, revelation as that which defines the concept of being.663
Incidentally, this is the same move that Hauerwas is making when he announces that
he does not have a political theology, but a theological politics. As we have seen,
Milbank claims that univocal departure from the Thomistic tradition centers upon
counting being, and not God, the subject of theology.
The solution (and this is where Milbank theological enterprise is more robust than
that of Hauerwas) is not simply a "looping back" to the person of Christ or a re-
narration of the ethical imaginary through the call to discipleship, rather for Milbank
the re-narration (or theologization) that occurs must be fully Trinitarian. This is the
point at which Milbank's task reflects that of St. Augustine:
According to Augustine, physics has for its object God as cause of being,
logic God as norm of thought, ethics God as rule of life. This Augustinian
order: physics, logic, ethics, corresponds to the order of the divine persons of
the Trinity: the Father is the principle of being, the Son of intelligence, the
Holy Spirit of Love. The systematic unity of the parts of philosophy reflects
here the reciprocal interiority of the divine persons.664
663 See Marion, J-L. "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-theo-logie." Le Statut Contemporain de la
Philsophiepremiere, Philsophie 17. (1996). pp. 29-50. p. 37
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Hadot, P. "Les divisions des parties de la philosohpie dans TAntiquite." Museum Helveticum, 36
(1979). Pp. 213-25. p. 212 quoted in HANKEY, W. J. 1987. God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of
God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 124
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The difference between Milbank's theo-onto-logie and Hauerwas' conception of
theological ethics however, is not just one of scale, i.e., an overemphasis in
Hauerwas on the person of Christ at the neglect of the rest of Trinity. Rather,
Milbank's theo-onto-logie identifies Christ as logos, the logic of reality, but also as
verbum, the very word that God has spoken to us. What this means is that for
Milbank reality is entirely linguistic. As Milbank makes clear in the "Logos" section
of The Word Made Strange, language (and the entire range of significant human
cultural productions) is not representative but constitutive (or at least analogous to
the language which is constitutive) of natural reality.665 Humans are able to make and
create, to do theology precisely because we participate analogously in the creation ex
nihilo, a creation by God's verbum. Frederick Bauerschmidt identifies the two most
important consequences ofMilbank's linguistic ontology, writing:
[f]irst, [human] creation is not a matter of the imposition of form upon a pre-
existent substance but is a generation of forms that are as much material as
they are intelligible. Second, if [human] language is primordial, then the
distinction between nature and culture is blurred, if not obliterated.. .Thus the
Christian metaphysics proposed by Milbank might be characterized as an
idealist materialism (or a materialist idealism?) in which the generation of
conceptual structures is a process that is coextensive with the generation of
material cultural forms.666
Indeed, for Milbank, humans produce their world so totally that "man as original
creator" participates "in some measure in creation ex nihilo."667 For Milbank, as for
Nicholas Cusanus and Robert Miner, every act of creativity, poesis, is an act of
theology: reasoning the divine. The task of the church is to make the world aware of
the fact, to help it identify creative acts as (re)narrating the word that God has
already spoken to the world.
665
Milbank, The Word Made Strange.
666 Bauerschmidt, F. C. " The Word Made Speculative: John Milbank's Christological Poetics."
Modern Theology. 15:4 (October 1999) pp. 417-432. p. 419
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Milbank's description of the Trinitarian theological difference has been developed
for the other two persons of the Trinity as well, although for now it is enough to note
that Milbank's move from onto-theo-logie to theo-onto-logie involves a restriction,
or perhaps more accurately, a loosening or freeing-up (from the limits of human
reason), of being-language—a transformation from transcendental categories to
Trinitarian categories. Milbank argues:
Factum...is Verbum in God, and so the made cultural object is promoted to
the status of a divine transcendental.. .and this is equivalent to saying that
God in his creation ad intra in the Logos "incorporates" within himself the
creation ad extra, including human history...Because Verbum marks a
primordial difference in the Godhead, it realizes a perfect tension between
Unity and Being...and allows no lapse into either a henological totality of
system or structure, nor an ontological totality of the isolated subject. When
Verbum is included as a transcendental, all the transcendentals are
transformed into personal intersubjective Trinitarian categories: but this
leaves us with more than a 'social God", it leaves us also with a cultural
God.668
And this is a God who does not exclude the multitude, even in the "not yet,"
precisely because the multitude participates and continues, albeit incompletely and
without understanding, in God's first generative act. Good theology, for Milbank's
project, can only be orthodox when it locates within its own activity the prior activity
of God (a sentiment that will be explored more fully in the next section).
The problem with Milbank's analysis is that while it is theologically more robust in
its argument, it fails to embrace the Hauerwasian style: the ineffable love of friends,
strangers and enemies. For Hauerwas the participation of the people of God in the
love of God is embodied inexplicably in the peaceable witness of the Dunkards. The
Hauerwasian style of the participation in, and continuation of, the ineffable love of
God requires the people ofGod to claim that love (of one's life, or of one's family) is
only love insofar as it non-identically repeats the weakness of the peaceable God.
The Hauerwasian question is: if every human creative act participates in the divine
act, how can one make a distinction between a creative/Godlike act and a
destructive/violent act? What happens if the human non-identical repetition of the
668 Ibid. 80
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divine act is coercive? What would help Milbank's project here is a reading of John
Howard Yoder's account of the powers and the didaskalos and the powers. With a
proper account of the powers, it would become clearer to Milbank that even
creativity can participate in a Fallen sovereignty: creating for its own sake -
progress. And while Milbank would most likely agree that progress as a thing-for-
itself is in some sense the enemy of God (i.e., it attempts to sublate rather than
participate), his ethical system does not have a method by which to distinguish right
kinds of cultural creativity. This is apparent in Milbank's often-repeated
recommendation of institutional state-based socialism (an
accommodation/legitimation rather than a collaboration/co-operation with the
world). The second thing that Milbank could adopt from Yoder in order to solve this
problem, is Yoder's account of a two-tiered theology; for the multitude generative
and creative, for the teacher/theologian corrective and disciplinary.669
The contention of this thesis is that theology is the task of reasoning about, and
creating with, the divine. Indeed, the entirety of this thesis (along with all Christian
theology) has been about how the church should understand herself after ascension
but before parousia. Part of that task has been correction and discipline, but in this
chapter as well as in chapter 5, this thesis has attempted to create - to do something
new. Chapter 5 was about the theology of the gathered, i.e., how the gathered should
know about itself. Yet as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, touting her
knowledge of the end of history is not the purpose of the gathering. With Hauerwas
we must repeat that the purpose of the church is to be the church, the act of the God-
who-is-love in and for the world. Just as God loves the world-as-itself, so too must
the church. This task is paradoxically different from that of theology. It requires
actions which make, which bring-forth, God in the world. If theology has been
deemed the careful task of reasoning the divine in history, theurgy is the confession
that human reason and the made products of that reason do not confine God. Theurgy
is, finally, the Hauerwasian style. The practice of theurgy pleonastically recapitulates
669 The difference between correction/discipline and Milbank's notion that "true political theology" is
always the "theological critique of society and politics" (Theology and Social Theory, p. 208) is that
the latter is the product of triumphalism while the former is the task which makes the community of
which we are already a part sustainable.
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the God who entered history in Jesus Christ - the perpetual mystery of incarnation.
As we saw in the writings of Cavanaugh, John Paul II, and Schlabach in the last
chapter, the incarnation continues in every Eucharist through the work of the Holy
Spirit. The church is, through the Eucharist, the living body of Christ in the world. If
the church is to continue the work of Christ, it must teach the ochloi
(crowd/multitude), and to authenticate that teaching it must work miracles and
wonders (semeion) in their midst (love and care for the weakest). Yet theurgy is not a
utilitarian means of conversion, but true compassion and love for the world. Jesus
mysteriously healed the sick, fed the hungry, and made wine for celebrations, not
merely as a means of legitimating his claim to divinity but because he loved them.
Those who experienced his miracles were friends, family, neighbors, strangers, and
enemies. The disciples of Jesus in the book of Acts pleonastically recapitulated the
miracles of Jesus in their wondrous gifts of love to the dispossessed. What follows
then is a description of theurgy as love: the act of the gathered that is not founded in
a reason or critique but in the spontaneous and ineffable loving as God loved; the act
that is not about God (theology) but which co-operates with God, bringing God to
earth. The question of how such a love (ontologically separate yet analogous to
God's love, as always already a co-operation with God's love) avoids O'Donovan
and Marion's univocity will be the subject of the next section.
Just as Milbank, following Augustine, deems theo-onto-logie as the task of getting
beyond ontologically prior (univocal conceptions) of being (via the theologization /
Trinitarianization of Greek metaphysical categories), so too must an account of
orthodox Christian theurgy involve a Trinitarian (re)conception of Platonism. The
kind of Platonism that opposes metaphysics, as noted by Gregory Shaw, is in fact
most closely related to that of "the god-inspired Syrian,"670 Iamblichus. After the
conversion of Constantine and the privileging of Christianity in the Roman Empire,
the leaders of the pagan world turned to Iamblichus (c. 240-c. 325 c. e.) for spiritual
and intellectual leadership. While much of late antiquity was concerned with the
conflict between paganism and Christianity (including Iamblichus' teacher
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Porphyry), Iamblichus concerned himself with preserving the old order of sacred
traditions rooted in the cosmic gods. The enemy was not Christianity in particular but
more generally the "new ways" which threatened to subvert the status of (and
eventually exile) the Hellenic gods. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of
Iamblichus' Platonism, and what we are most interested in, is his privileging of
theourgia (god-work) above theologia (god-talk). According to Iamblichus,
rationalism exalted the powers of the mind and diminished the cult of the gods.
Theology, like philosophy, concerned itself primarily with logos, a "discourse about
the gods," which was always ontologically separate from the gods themselves - a
human activity. Theurgy on the other hand, was for Iamblichus, a theion ergon (a
work of the gods). Shaw explains:
In theurgy...divine principles were embodied and enacted, not merely
contemplated, and in whatever context this occurred it was a "work of the
gods," a theourgia in which the human soul participated both as recipient and
beneficiary.671
Thus the Iamblichean theurgist attained Godlikeness (homoiosis theo) through the
cultic ritual, which invoked the presence of God, and through which "the Gods are
pleased."672 For Iamblichus, the goal of such rituals was self-perfection (as unity-
with-the-divine) rather than gnosis ("because it is self-contradictory to know one has
experienced an ineffable union").673 Similarly, for the ecclesial gathered, the
ineffable act is that which cannot be reasoned or theologically justified; it is
collaboration as co-operation, i.e., the joining of humanity to the God-whose-love-is-
mystery (a reality with inexhaustible depth).
The theurgic rituals of the church are her sacraments. Some, like baptism continue
God's work of gathering. Others, such as eucharistic, continually renew the union
between God and gathered. Indeed, as noted in chapter 5, the gathering itself is an act
671
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ofGod, made possible by theurgic sacrament (that in which God works in, under and
with). Yet the church not only receives the grace of unity-with-God in the sacraments
but also is itself a sacrament for the world. The call for the church to be the church is
the call to complete God's activity: to feed the hungry, to anoint the sick, to celebrate
marriages, vocations and the rejection of violence. The act of the church as
sacrament is not to demystify (share a knowledge of) God but to continue Christ's
wonders in the midst of the multitude; to participate in the mysterious love of a God
that is not a reason or a critique, but the scandalous Hauerwasian desire for
relationship.
Nevertheless, all of this gives rise to two questions: (1) why does a separation
between theurgy and theology, or an account of human love creatively analogical to
divine love require an ecclesial concept of gathering? and (2) if theurgy does require
an ecclesiology of gathering, how is the theurgic imaginary, as a syncretism between
mystery cult and Gnosticism, radically (rooted in) orthodox? To ask the second
question is not the attempt to reason the divine, but simply to question whether the
acceptance of theurgic practice is compatible with ecclesial discipleship. In order to
answer the first question, I will analyze a recent philosophical probe into the Pauline
messianic by Giorgio Agamben, and repair it through the application of Milbank's
pleonasm (as Pauline recapitulation). I will then ontologically extend the concept of
remainder in the final section to explain the co-activity of the gathering with God.
Sovereignty, Exception and the Messianic Remainder
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has inverted the postmodern return to
Paul. As mentioned above, there has recently been a trend in contemporary
continental philosophy to find, in the writings of St. Paul, leftist resources for
political resistance. Such political resistance becomes possible because, in the wake
of the deconstruction ofChristianity and the writings of Paul, there can be excavated
a universal (transcendent) ground for critique that continues the postmodern
deconstruction, yet simultaneously is able to find a universal generic ground for all
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the petit recits. For Agamben however, Paul does not identify a generic event, what
Badiou calls the "production of the same,"674 but its opposite: the messianic.
Agamben reads, in Paul's account of the messianic (Christos as mashiah), not a
search for the universal, i.e., a neat transcendental, but an isolation of the rest - the
remainder. The question is not: what does every event/story have in common? rather,
in what sense is every time located in and constituted in this time - the ho nyn kairos
(the time of the now)?675 Agamben identifies Christ-time, or messianic time, in Paul,
as the contraction of time itself. This contraction is summed-up in 1 Corinthians
7:28-30. Paul writes:
I mean, brothers and sisters, the appointed time has grown short: from now
on, let even those who have wives be as though they had none, and those who
mourn as though they were not mourning, and those who rejoice as though
they were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they had no
possessions, and those who deal with the world as though they had no
dealings with it. For the present form of this world is passing away (italics
mine, NRSV).
Therefore, Agamben, against Cullman, describes Paul's messianic time, not as the
midpoint between creation and parousia but as the present figure, and
recapitulation, ofboth. The time between "already" and "not yet," is not "a third eon
situated between two times; but rather...a caesura that divides the division between
times and introduces a remnant, a zone of undecidability, in which the past is
dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past."676 For Paul, the
ho nyn kairos is neither history (chronos) nor eternity, but the time (kairos)671 that
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that parousia is not reducible to Escahton. A properly messianic reading of Paul,
says Agamben, does not identify (with Cullman) parousia as "a second messianic
event that would follow and subsume the first."679 Rather, parousia simply refers to
presence: "par-ousia literally signifies to be next to; in this way, being is beside itself
ron
in the present." On Agamben's reading of Pauline messianic, parousia names the
presence in ordinary time (chronos) of another time (kairos). Indeed, the kairotic
moment occurs within the chronological but "it is that innermost disjointedness
within time through which one may—by a hairsbreadth—grasp time and accomplish
zro i
it." In short, the messianic event has occurred, and so time has begun to contract,
to end, the final product of which is the explosion into eternity. The shared temporal
location, for Paul and for us, is within that messianic contraction (kairos) of time
{chronos) in which all time is re-constituted, fulfilled, and ended-as-eternity. The
messianic ho nyn kairos as presence is a "pressing within chronological time" which
works and transforms it from within.682
For Agamben, the messianic caesura (hesitation) that divides the division between
times also divides the division between peoples. The "una separazione della stess
scparatczza" (separation of scparateness itself) arc those who arc identified by their
683lack of identity. When there is no longer a distinction between Jew and Gentile,
what is left is the messianic remainder: he or she, whose kairotic location in relation
to the messiah is that of between weeping and not weeping, married and not married,
Jew and not Jew. Paul makes, what Agamben describes as an Apelles cut, a division
between Jew and not Jew, between "every people and itself, between every identity
f.QA
and itself." It is not that Jews and not-Jews are now, after the messianic event, the
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same, rather it is that the very identity "Jew" must be divided against itself, as must
"not-Jew," ad infinitum. The life (zoe) that is left after the infinite Apelles cut is the
remainder. It is the end of being-in-common. Every life is equivocal and other. Thus
messianic remainder refers not only to the time of the now but also to the people of
the now. The people are not universally bound together by the phenomenality of
love, politics, or some other such transcendental, but are the remains of the messianic
event that constitutes time as it ends it. The problem with Agamben's project is
despite his divergence from the mode of the philosophical universalization of Paul,
his reading of Paul affects a (re)turn of the universal in the claim that all messianic
life is zoe - the remainder. This move allows Agamben to identify Israel as merely
the first people to acknowledge the Apelles cut, the first to divide their division and
so become in some sense the anticipation of messianic remainder. For Agamben, the
division/evacuation of all people from their context and subsequent relocation via the
messianic event is life-as-parousia. Agamben writes, "At a decisive moment, the
electedpeople, every people, will necessarily situate itselfas remnant, as not all." 685
Agamben's messianism is but a pleonastic universal, a deconstruction of persons-in-
time to a deconstructed remainder - to life as zoe. In order to understand the parts of
Agamben's analysis of Pauline's messianism that are worthwhile, and those which
need to be discarded, it is critical that para-ousia be defined not simply as "[all]
being beside itself' but being whose para-doxa of ousia describes an "overwhelming
glory" that exists beside. In short, para-ousia is always the transcendent {ousia)
beside the material {ousia), the relationship between which is Aquinas' analogy of
being. In order to understand the theological danger of accepting Agamben's account
of messianism and parousia as is, we must first understand how he accounts for the
difference between zoe and bios, and also the relationship between rule and
exception.
Agamben's book Homo Sacer elucidates the distinction between competing notions
of "life," zoe (bare life) and bios (qualified life, or the life together) by appealing to
an obscure figure in Roman law, the homo sacer (sacred man). Under Roman law,
the homo sacer was the person that the law defined as beyond the law. The homo
685 Ibid. p. 55. Italics in original.
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sacer could be killed by any person, yet could not be the subject of a sacrifice. The
homo sacer was the one included in the law, insofar as the law was required to
determine exclusion (the suspension of the prohibition to kill). Moreover, the homo
sacer existed, according to Agamben, in order to make a space (a remainder/an
exception) in which the law could suspend itself. Here Agamben is following Carl
Schmidt's account of the sovereign, the one who is simultaneously subject to the law
and the suspender of it. Schmidt explains,
The exception most clearly reveals the essence of the state's authority. The
decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically)
authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law...The
exception is more interesting than the normal case. The normal proves
nothing; the exception proves everything: the exception does not only
confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone.686
Two of the most recent examples of this sovereign/judicial suspension of itself, says
Agamben, are the prisoners at Guantanamo and the extermination of the Jews in Nazi
Germany. Both are reduced, b/opolitically, to bare life (zoe). That is to say, those
who live subject (qualified) to the law (which constitutes life as bios) are only biotic
subjects of law insofar as they are exceptions to it. The law is the mechanism that
makes them not subject to the law, which makes them part of the polls only insofar
as they are removed from it, which makes them homo sacer. Therefore, the
Holocaust is misnamed, says Agamben, because there is no burnt offering, no
sacrifice:.
The Jew living under Nazism is the privileged negative referent of the new
biopolitical sovereignty and is, as such, a flagrant case of homo sacer in the
sense of a life that may be killed but not sacrificed. His killing therefore
constitutes.. .neither capital punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the




Schmitt, C. 2006. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. G. Schwab
(ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 13,15.
687
Agamben, G. 1998. Flomo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. D. Heller-Roazen.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 114
250
The horror is not confined to the act of genocide, but to the capacity (the possibility
and imagination) of genocide - to the judicial announcement of a people external to
the judicial. For the homo sacer, any account of life together (of the political) is
stripped away, in the process of legitimating the political, (Apelles) cutting/dividing
life down to bare existence (zoe). Moreover, this is the very violence that is
ontologically prior, not just to the liberal state but to sovereignty qua power. A
violence that O'Donovan's political theology recapitulates qua God-as-sovereign.
The God-who-is-love can never be the God who delegates the suspension of love in
order to ensure it. While Agamben's critique of current political arrangements is
entirely correct, Agamben fails because he attempts to suspend the messianic itself.
For Agamben, the messianic hope is grounded on the legitimation of sheer
existence/survival - life-as-zoe. The overcoming of (to borrow from Zizek)
objective, subjective and symbolic violence becomes possible beyond the sovereign
in the glorification of every exception as remainder. The radicality of messianism
then is embodied in Jesus' rejection of the Caesar's sovereignty, in his announcement
of jubilee (the fulfillment of law, reason, and time [chronos]), and as Agamben sees
it, the whole world as remainder. Yet Agamben's position prematurely suspends the
messianic activity whose end is the (re)constitution - the (re)gathering - of biotic
life. The messianic does divide division against itself, but the Christ-event continues
from resurrection through the promise of a renewing Spirit at Pentecost. Life is
constituted politically (as bios) as a gathering, which is to say that God is doing
something new in the church.
If Agamben's work is going to be helpful to this project, the determination of where
and how Agamben's reading of the Pauline messianic fails and where it succeeds
must be determined. To begin with, it should be noted that Agamben's account of the
state of exception has direct implications for Marion's account of the phenomenality
of love. When reading Marion through the lens of Agamben's messianic, it is clear
that it is not the law (univocal/universal) of love that is interesting but the exception
to it; the exception indicates an inclusion that is only an inclusion as exclusion. That
is to say, the universality of the love phenomenon must also be conceived as
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constituted by a prior included exclusion: the love of God. When humans experience
love, that love is knowable as such because it is founded upon a suspension, a
hesitation, which makes it impossible to claim that the speech/love/representation of
love is unitary. To borrow Lacan's language, the symbolic order is also an order
based on exception; the ability to love, to order, to name, to create, are all founded on
the Trinitarian difference - the God who in every way is exceptional.
As mentioned above, the sense in which Agamben's fails in his exposition of Paul's
Christ-time is in his reduction of messianic life to zoe. Agamben's account of
sovereignty and exception is helpful insofar as it defines, in ways similar to Yoder,
the ontologically prior violence of the powers. In a sense, for Agamben as for Yoder,
the law/the powers are but a pale reflection of the messianic. The work of
philosophy/theology then becomes the naming of failed demonic flare-ups - the
places where time and personhood have been contracted by false messianisms
(literally anti-Christ's). The danger is in the politics that justifies itself by dividing
others whilst failing to acknowledge its own division, clear examples of which are
Nazi Germany and Guantanamo. Where Agamben fails is in his refusal to see that
the messianic contraction of kairotic time only makes sense for Paul because of the
particularity of the messianic event: the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ-
mashiah. While it may be possible, or even necessary, to think of messianic time and
persons as constituted in, and by, the contraction of all time into the ho nyn kairos, it
is essential that Agamben understands the full ontological implications of his own
statement: "the pleroma [fullness] of kaiori is understood as the relation of each
instant to the Messiah—each karios is unmittelbar zu Gott [immediate to God], and
is not just the final result of a process"688 It is the sheer fact of the apotheosis of
history in the person of Jesus of Nazareth which makes him mashiah-Christ. For
Agamben, the messianic claim is not "Jesus is Lord/God became man" but that "man
is destructible/all life is exception." In addition, this position leaves him with an
infinite prior violence and ultimately a Deleuzian univocity of difference. In order to
overcome this univocity of pleonasm, Agamben's account of para-ousia must be
688
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joined to the para-doxa of analogy; an analogy twixt the gathering as messianic
Christ-body and the Jesus who leaves the world whilst leaving himself with it.
While the messianic event begins with the deconstruction - the Apelles cut - of
political identity, the messianic event recapitulates (non-identically) the political in
the gathering around Jesus. What Agamben's account of Pauline messianity needs
then is not merely a Trinitarian account of the messianic, but also a Jewish account
of the messianic. Messianity for Paul only makes sense because of the messianic
community, the people of Israel gathered. It is indeed the case, as has been noted by
William Placher, that
one of the remarkable features of the narratives of his [Jesus'] last days is that
his increasing isolation makes it impossible to identify him with any one
"side" or cause. The Roman governor sentenced him as a Jewish rebel, but
the leaders of Judaism also turned against him. He attacked the powerful on
behalf of the poor, but in the end the mob too called for his blood. His own
disciples ran away; Peter denied him. He did not go to his death agony as a
representative of Jews, or of the poor, or of Christians, but alone, and thus,
according to Christian faith, as a representative of all.689
Jesus-mashiah did divide himself from division, and Paul's messianic does divide,
more generally, the self from the political, but this occurs only insofar as that
messianic re-identifies the political, and sovereignty itself, as beyond violent
exceptions. In Jesus Christ, God rejects a sovereignty of exception by subjecting
even Godself to the material. In so doing, God exposes, as Hauerwas, Yoder and
Milbank have all noted, the laws of the world (of Rome and the Temple) as founded
on violent exception (Jesus becomes homo sacer). God's sovereignty is peaceable -
the messiah and the messianic kingdom are peaceable - precisely because God
subjects Godself to the materiality of history. This kenosis is not the death of God (as
in Zizek's heterodoxy) or the death of politics, or sovereignty, but the transformation,
the pleonasm, the resurrection of each. In the words of Paul, "as for the economy of
the pleroma (fullness) of times, all things are anakephalaioomai (recapitulated) in
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him, things in heaven and things on earth (Ephesians 1:10).690 The Christ-event
makes biotic life, i.e., the political life, possible because it recapitulates the polls in
the ecclesial gathering. Agamben rightly notes that the concept of messianic
recapitulation in Ephesians is directly responsible for Origen and Leibniz's doctrine
of apocatastasis, repetition/retrieval in Kierkegaard, eternal return in Nietzsche, and
repetition in Heidegger. Yet if the incarnation and resurrection are included in the
Christ-event, as they surely were for Paul, then parousia ceases to be material being
beside material being and life as zoe. Rather, biotic life becomes possible because
recapitulation/pleonasm involves a re-gathering and re-identification rather than the
mere division of division and the death of sovereignty. On this reading of the
messianic, Thomas' doctrine of analogy, Nicholas's participatory creativity, and
Milbank's pleonasm become the Christological successors of Paul.
The Gathering as Sacrament
In Agamben's reading of the messianic remainder, parousia is the presence of the
material being beside itself, yet in the Gospel of John the messianic remainder is the
ontological reality ofpara-ousia, God's presence dwelling beside our own. The word
remainder {meno), occurs more than 40 times in the Gospel. The word is used
analogously to describe the ontological status of the relationship between Godself in
the persons of the Trinity, as well as to describe the relationship between God and
those he has gathered. To begin with Jesus describes his relationship to the Father:
Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words
that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who remains in me
{en moi menon) does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the
Father is in me; but if you do not, then believe me because of the works
themselves. Very truly, I tell you, the one who believes in me will also do the
works that I do and, in fact, will do greater works than these, because I am
going to the Father. (John 14:10-14 NRSV)
Note that the proof of the remainder of the Father in the Son and the Son in the
Father lies in works - the shared activity. It is the Father in the Son who acts, just as
John 1:1 begins with an account of the Son in the Father who creates {en arche en ho
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logos kai ho logos en pros ton theon kai theos en ho logos). That the divine
remainder is not binitarian but Trinitarian becomes clear in the testimony of John the
Baptist:
And John testified, 'I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and
it remained on him. I myself did not know him, but the one who sent me to
baptize with water said to me, 'He on whom you see the Spirit descend and
remain is the one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit.' (John 1: 32-3 NRSV).
The securing of a distinction between being (ousia) and person (hypostasis) by the
Cappadocian fathers was the ontological breakthrough that made this thinking in
terms of remainder not only possible but also orthodox. And so a reformed
systematic theologian like Colin Gunton can find himself in full agreement with an
Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan like John Zizioulas,691 that God is being-in-
communion. In the words of Gunton:
God is no more than what Father, Son, and Spirit give to, and receive
from each other, in the inseparable communion that is the outcome of
their love. Communion is the meaning of the word: there is no 'being' of
God other than this dynamic of persons in relation."692
God is love, and love is communion. The Father, the Son, and the Spirit remain in
one another because they give themselves each to the other; when one acts it is the
others acting in them. This is not the place to recite the genesis and evolution of
Trinitarian, thought (both Zizioulas and Gunton have done exhaustive studies on the
subject). What matters is that remainder, while being constitutive of God's
relationship to Godself, does not exhaust the Johannine use ofmeno.
The second usage of remainder in the Gospel of John extends the ontological
language about the God of love whose being-is-communion to the relationship
between God and humanity. In our earlier discussion of Yoder's practice/sacraments,
Yoder defined the sacrament of binding and loosing as an activity in which God
worked in, with, and under the activity of the disciples. This definition of the
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sacramental shared act was continued in the last chapter, specifically in regards to the
Eucharistic practice, which Cavanaugh described as a simultaneously gathering and a
being gathered. Both accounts tacitly assume divine remainder, the Johannine basis
of which begins in John 6:56-7, "Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood remain
in me, and I in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the
Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me." The-God-who-remains-in-us-
as-we-remain-in-him claims ontologically what Paul claims ecclesiologically in his
description of gathering as the body of Christ (messianic body) in the world:
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of
the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in one Spirit we
were all baptized into one body—whether Jews or Greeks, slaves or free-and
we were all made to drink of one Spirit...God has membered the body...so
that there should be no division in the body. (1 Corinthians 12:12-26).
Paul's claim that the gathering is the recapitulation of Christ's body in the world
makes clear that despite the bodily ascension, the body of Christ remains in the
world. Just as the Father, Son and Spirit remained in one another, so God continues
to remain among those gathered by the Spirit into the body of the Son. The complex
ontology of the Pauline remainder gets repeated in the Johannine Gospel, by Jesus,
not just as a comfort to the faithful, but as an exhortation to Christ-like activity:
Remain in me, and I in you. As the branch can't bear fruit by itself, unless it
remains in the vine, so neither can you, unless you remain in me. I am the
vine, you are the branches. Those who remain in me and I in them bear much
fruit because apart from me you can do nothing (John 15:4 NIV).
The body of Christ can only act insofar as the divine remainder acts, just as the Son
could act only act insofar as the Father acted. To be separated from the divine
remainder as located in the body of Christ makes participation in, under and with the
divine act impossible. Furthermore, the very possibility of remainder is based on the
peaceable sovereignty of Jesus. In John 15:14, Jesus notes that those who are
gathered in love under his sovereignty are the divine remainder, a remainder that
necessarily spreads the love (philos) of God as fruit (karpos) that then remains
(,meno), as food, for the world. Jesus finishes, announcing that "these commands
[are] so that you may love one another" (17); just "as the Father has loved me, so I
have loved you; remain in love." (10).
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Looping Back to Hauerwas
Having noted the plethora of Scriptural language surrounding remainder, it should be
no surprise that the theme of co-operation with God is also present in the writings of
Hauerwas. In an article that he wrote with Jim Fodor called "Performing the Faith,"
Hauerwas describes "Christian existence...[as] an activity—a performance," a
communal drama that is possible "only because Christians worship a God who is
pure act, an eternally performing God."693 Yet Hauerwas and Fodor go further,
noting that the "performing God...has invited us to join in the performance that is
God's life."694 The existence of God in which Christians are invited to participate is
not "some univocal Being but to Father, Son, and Spirit."695 Following Milbank,
Hauerwas and Fodor describe the being of Trinity as a "differential ontology
peaceably sustained" in the relationship between the divine persons.696 They are able
to agree with Milbank that
Christianity...recognizes no original violence. It construes the infinite not as
chaos, but as harmonic peace which is yet beyond the circumscribing power
of any totalizing reason. Peace no longer depends on the reduction to the self-
identical, but is the sociality of harmonious difference. Violence, by contrast,
is always a secondary willed intrusion upon this possible infinite order (which
is actual for God).697
Thus Hauerwas and Fodor write: "Trinity and creation are the language Christians
use to speak of this God."698 Human love and "openness to difference"699 participate
in the love of God, but are not identical to it, for "only God as Trinity can perform in
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such a way as not to be alienated from who God is."700 Hauerwas and Fodor end
where we have, by identifying creaturely participation in divine being as peaceable
co-operation:
Christians believe that no human action (or any other action for that matter)
can be described as autonomous activity, a self-generating movement. To act
is to share in the divine life, for human reality exists solely within God's
reality. Because the source or ground of human activity resides not in
ourselves but in God, any movement we make, any action we perform, entails
an actualization of the divine act in our own temporal and finite context. Far
from erasing the distinction between God's act and our actions, this claim
affirms that any human action truly and properly performed will be nothing
short of, and nothing other than, "a movement into our createdness."701
For Hauerwas and Fodor, the "best that secular peace can hope for" is just policing
and contractual peace - "a 'tolerable' regulation or management of conflict by one
coercive means or another."702 Hauerwas and Fodor also note their appreciation of
Milbank's description of the shape of the ecclesiology that participates in being-as-
communion. For Milbank, the church is the concentus musicus (harmonious music),
the beautiful and continuously differential process of alteration, revision, and
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interpretation. This process is necessarily nonviolent and open to ateleological
surprise. When violence arises in the series (in the form of jarring notes and
premature endings), consonance can still be preserved, for Milbank, because (in
God) nothing is excluded. Hauerwas and Fodor supplement Milbank's description of
the church as music with Wells' account of ecclesial performance and improvisation
(of which high and low status power plays are a part). Before continuing, a brief
aside is needed in order to expose the problem with these two ecclesial descriptions.
700 Ibid. p. 77
701 Ibid. pp. 85-6
702 Ibid. p. 88
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The danger for both Wells and Milbank, is that their ecclesiologies end-up, despite
their own best insights, (re)turning to a univocity of being. Wells' account of high
and low status games is utilitarian, and recapitulates (as discussed above) the
univocity of power. Milbank's ecclesiology has a similar yet unique problem. For
Milbank, the God-who-is-love is constituted as the infinite reconciliation of
difference, and the church, through her participation in that reconciliation, must
patiently allow for jarring notes in the knowledge that God will bring the series back
to harmony. Does the church's constitution as an eschatological community of
difference allow for participation in (or the incorporation of) differences that are
violent? An affirmative answer allows for: Milbank's "contractual peace" with
liberalism; Yoder's just policing; and O'Donovan' reauthorization of the Sword. This
is so because Milbank's account of the difference of God is identical to: Deleuze's
univocity of difference; Agamben's Apelles cut; Hegel's dialectic; and Badiou's
singular universal.704 Milbank's account of difference is univocal because his
rejection of Greek monistic being, in favor of Trinity, fails to sustain an ontological
distinction between "difference" - between the difference of the God-who-is-
difference-in-harmony and the difference of humanity. For Milbank, particular
violences are allowed because they can be made (ontologically) peaceable in God;
the peace of God becomes the harmony of infinite violence. The God of Milbank is
identical to the mashiah of Agamben - the division of division itself. Agamben's
account of the messianic ended prematurely (before resurrection, ascension, and
Pentecost) in a univocity of difference. Milbank's account of God-as-infinite-
difference ends in the same way because it forgets that God redeems and
recapitulates difference, in creation, as love - and in particular as a gathering that is a
politics-of-love. Difference qua difference is not good in the same way that peace
qua the extermination of one's enemies is not good. What Milbank needs is an
account of the powers; the powers are, to use Milbank's terminology, disordered
differences. God created difference and difference was good. Difference was God's
gift to his creation, the space for creation to be itself. It was the imago dei, which
allowed God's creation to be like Godself - to be in communion with other. Yet
704
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difference for creatures after the Fall is like love for creatures after the Fall: solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Without the redeeming work of Christ, the structures
of difference and love only know being-in-communion in terms of self-interest.
Flowever, the God-who-is-infmite-love-and-difference makes possible our
participation in His being - in His love and difference. Violence is not just another
difference that will be eschatologically assumed into the divine harmony. In the same
way that love is not love unless it participates in the God-who-is-love, difference is
not difference unless it participates in the God-who-is-difference. Violent difference
is the difference that eradicates and flattens the other in its search for uniformity.
Violent love is the relationship sustained by coercion and the suspension of itself.
Both fail to preserve the ontological distinction between Creator and creature. Both
fail to describe a genuine politics-of-love/politics-of-difference as participating
(albeit incompletely) in the God who, in his grace, brings relationship to the solitary.
To repair Milbank, one need only adopt an account of the powers and of God's
activity, which is constituted in (and as) a community that is simultaneously gathered
and gathering.
Despite the fact that "Performing Faith" appears in the same collection of essays in
which Hauerwas begins making concessions to Stout, Hauerwas and Fodor end this
essay with a brilliant description of ekstasis that mirrors the account of theurgy
developed above:
One of the traits of faithful performance is the way in which the performer is
drawn out of him- or herself and is "possessed" or "taken over" by the
work...these "ecstatic" moments are...features of self-absorbing play, where
the participant becomes so wrapped up in the activity that it may be more
correct to say that the game plays him than he plays the game, there is
something more involved in performing the faith than a temporary suspension
or loss of self-control.. .Self-divestment therefore invites a certain privation, a
peculiar giving up that is also a giving over—which means that, with regard
to Christian faith, the "loss" of self-control is not so much a forfeiture of
responsible agency as it is the cultivation of.. .contemplative receptivity.705
For Hauerwas and Fodor, ekstasis is discipleship recapitulated as the Pauline doulos
Christou (Christ-slave). While it is disappointing that the Hauerwas of "Performing
705
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Faith" was not able to stand his ground against the Hauerwas of "Democratic Time,"
it is impossible to deny that Hauerwas' arguments in each, are only made possible by
his love of God, and God's creation. While Hauerwas' struggles with univocity and
accommodation are due primarily to his refusal to systematically engage with his
sources (and his own body of writings), it is my hope that this thesis has begun the
work necessary to make possible (through the critique and repair of Hauerwas and
his sources) an account of gathering as God's (radical) politics of love.
In this chapter I have argued that theurgy names the co-operation of God and his
people - the activity of God in, under and with the gathered. It names a co-labor of
God and gathered (on behalf of the world) that is called love. Theurgy is the love of
the world, as the world. It rejects, with Marion, the priority of reason over
relationship. Theurgy is the act of the church becoming sacrament, God's conferral
of grace to the world. Grace not merely as the invitation to be gathered, despite the
fact that the church (in the ho nyn kairos) is an unfinished project, but the grace that
pleonastically enacts God: to heal the sick, feed the hungry, and comfort the
suffering. While theology names the process of attempting to discern through the
Spirit, by appealing to tradition, reason, and Scripture, the correct ways of thinking
about God and his activity, theurgy is the act which is God's creative and co¬
operative act in us.
The paradox of the gathered's love for the world is embodied most clearly in the
cultivating of friendships that don't make sense, whilst being tentative in the
acknowledgement of "secular co-workers: socialists communists and anarchists."706
The hesitation must remain because of the "already" but "not yet" character of
history. On the one hand, the gathering has the knowledge of love and so must share
that knowledge in all its offensiveness with the world, on the other hand the church
loves despite itself, precisely because God remains within her. When confronted with
Stout's question, "whether Christians, for their own theological reasons, may join
hands with others in the struggle for justice—and do so without holding their noses
706
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in the presence of their comrades?"707 the Hauerwasian answer is, "No." Yet
theology is not the sole activity of the gathering; the church, as God's sacrament to
the world, has no choice. It has been made to drink the Spirit and so become God's
body in the world. When the gathered think about "joining hands with others in the
struggle for justice," it will, if it is truly the body of Christ in the world, be surprised
by its own smell.
Conclusion
In this chapter I continued to outline the possibility of the concept of gathering for
the work of theological politics of Stanley Hauerwas, and did so by recommending
more faithful ways of thinking about how to love the world than those offered by
radical democracy, which as we have seen is ultimately an accommodation to the
powers. It would have been inappropriate, in this chapter, to have attempted to
develop a full-blooded account of the relationship between the gathering and the
multitude. It will be left for later scholarship to develop more fully, in a
Hauerwasian, and postliberal mode, the sources that are only hinted at here. There is
always a danger in trying to do too much, and so interesting discussions about
specific theological practices, such as how the church should reason about voting and
paying its taxes, have been put aside in favor of doing work which I deem to be more
consistent to the grain (if not the style) of Hauerwas' project. Hauerwas' work has
ever been about loving ones friends and enemies, and ultimately the rejection of the
qualification of that love is what has led him to embrace radical democracy. The
hope is that the account of the paradoxical nature of the ecclesia, as the doers of
theology and theurgy, and as the people in whom God remains (and whom God uses
to make that remainder available to the world), will provide Hauerwas, and readers
of Hauerwas, with the tools to love the world co-labor-atively and co-operative-ly
whilst rejecting the legitimizing of Fallen sovereignties. The hope is that this chapter
has refused, with Hauerwas, coercion, violence, and the hating of one's enemies, and
rejected the notion that one can choose one's friends and neighbors. Participating
analogously in the love of God means never entertaining the possibility of
707
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discrimination; because of the divine remainder it means embodying a love that
shines down on the evil and the good and sends rain to the just and the unjust
(Mathew 5:45). It means participating in a love that does not withdraw. As Costa,
Keller, and Mercedes have so wonderfully put it, the love of God is an
"[ejlementality, charged with the energies of nonhuman nature, [which] saves love
from sentimentality... In the connections of difference, it reaches toward always-
708
more-extensive relationship - more intensive reciprocity." What this requires is a
description of the activity of a politically messianic love that on the one hand does
not claim the univocity of love (that our love is the same as God's love) - a
difference preserved by describing God's loving act as analogous to human act - but
paradoxically claims human love as participating in, sustaining, and continuing the
divine act - a sacramental grace. Thus the gathering, through the possibility of divine
remainder, becomes, despite itself, a sacrament (a loving) for the world.
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Conclusion
The work of this thesis has been two-fold: to critique inconsistencies in Hauerwas'
postliberal theological politics, and to begin the work of repair necessary if Hauerwas
is to remain faithful to his own best insights.
The first chapter provides a genealogical reading of Hauerwas' primary influences
for the construction of his unique brand of postliberalism. While Frei, Lindbeck, and
the Yale school set the methodological stage for Hauerwas' writings, and in essence
provide him with an intellectual heritage (Barthian Christocentricity mixed with
postmodern critiques of the Enlightenment project), his particular contribution to the
postliberal school of thought is the result of a synthesis of Maclntyre and Yoder.
From Maclntyre, Hauerwas retrieves not only a critique ofmodernity and liberalism,
but also a partial solution—a return to a pre-modern, Aristotelian conceptuality, with
its emphasis on practical reason, dialectic, virtue, narrative, community, practices
and tradition. From Yoder, Hauerwas is able to clothe Maclntyre's call to story-
formed (dialectically traditioned) communities, with a particular story, a specific
community with peculiar practices, as well as a shared (teleological) account of the
good and the virtues necessary for achieving it: the messianic community called
"church." At the same time Yoder's description of Constantinianism, as the de-
particularization of the church due to a syncretization between the church and state
(Rome), reaffirms Hauerwas' distrust of liberalism as the neoConstantinianism—an
accommodation of the church to the nations such that Christian particularity is lost.
Chapter 2 explicates Hauerwas' methodological postliberalism (theory) as
theological politics (practice), arguing that the two are inseparable because of his
claim that the church does not have a politics but is politics. Yet Hauerwas' refusal to
systematize his writings, along with his preference for polemical dialectic, requires a
reading ofHauerwas' response to a political theology significantly different from his
own. Thus this chapter begins by examining the political theology of Oliver
O'Donovan in order to provide a framework from which Hauerwas scattered insights
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on postliberal Christian politics might be placed. This chapter argues that
O'Donovan's political theology comes much closer to a type 2 or 3 approach, on
Frei's theological typology (in Types of Christian Theology), because, for
O'Donovan, particular concepts are not applied to the reading of Scripture ad hoc,
but are primary, pre-existing the narrative itself. Such concepts include: politics,
kingship, sovereignty, rule, obligation, justice, etc. O'Donovan seeks to re-define the
possibilities of politics, rather than redefine politics itself. Alternatively, Hauerwas
argues that the political cannot precede the Christological, but can only be seen as the
faithful embodiment (discipleship) of the claim: Jesus is Lord. While politics is
central to the reading of Scripture, this is so only because the reading of Scripture
requires a response—an assembly that is not political qua current (worldly) political
arrangements, but is a politics proceeding from the activity of Christ (inscribed in a
particular historical community of care that is gathered around Him). Thus for
Hauerwas, what citizens of the civitas dei mean when they talk about politics, justice,
equality, liberty, etc., is very different than the definitions provided by citizens of the
civitas terenna. The church gathered in the midst of the nations cannot, according to
Hauerwas, see itself as anything other than a community of pilgrims and resident
aliens. The church cannot set up for itself walled cities, but must constantly be on the
move—celebrating its out-of-place-ness, vulnerability and weakness.
Chapter 3 examines a broad shift in Hauerwas' political thought in his most recent
writings, arguing that his sympathy for the radical democratic project undermines not
only his previous writings on the characteristics of postliberal theology, but his entire
political ecclesiology. This chapter argues that such a shift occurs partly due to
Jeffrey Stout's critique ofMaclntyre (in Democracy and Tradition), which identifies
American democracy as a tradition rather than a vehicle for the destruction
(fragmentation) of tradition, and partly due to Romand Coles' appropriation of
Yoder, which along with his deconstruction of Rawlsian liberalism is central to his
account of practical radical democracy. In short, both the anti-liberalism (Maclntyre)
and the Christian particularity (Yoder) of his synthesis are called into question.
Hauerwas' sympathies to radical democracy, as presented by Coles, lead him to
make theo-political concessions that include the possibility of: non-Christologically
founded political language; non-Christologically founded morality qua the "common
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morality" constructed within the tradition of American democracy; infusing lesser
truths into democratic societies in order to better them (i.e., the possibility of
progress); and remembering as a viable mode of politics (without reference to the
confession: Jesus is Lord)—all of which are antithetical to Hauerwas' postliberal
theological politics as demonstrated in chapters one and two. This chapter argues that
Hauerwas' support for radical democracy is due to radical democracy's ability to
provide an alternative to liberal political arrangements. Yet such a position cannot
but make the same mistake Hauerwas named in O'Donovan, namely the
identification of politics as a category external to the community gathered around
Christ. This chapter argues that there are lessons to be learned from outsiders, i.e.,
radical democrats like Romand Coles, but such lessons can be understood as good
only because they participate in the Good of God. This chapter ends with a reading
of the American civil war, as an example of the kind of problems possible when
Christians begin to identify political conceptualities as prior to the church's own
narratives, via Mark Noll's book The Civil War as Theological Crisis.
Chapter 4 is divided into two parts: the first of which attempts to supplement
Hauerwas' theological politics with Yoder's ontology of the powers, while the
second addresses inconsistencies in Yoder's own use of powers ontology that led
him to make concessions to liberalism; thus the task of this chapter is also to help
Hauerwas critically read Yoder in order to avoid: (1) Yoder's qualification of powers
ontology via a description of two kingdoms (two perfections), (2) Yoder's utilitarian
descriptions of violence and policing, and (3) Yoder's ecumenical (well intentioned)
pro-democratic sensibilities. This critical reading of Yoder is essential predominately
because an ontological account of the powers would replace Hauerwas' need to
adopt Maclntyre's meta-theoretical critique of liberalism with a re-description of
liberalism as Constantinianism (rather than vice versa), a re-description which is
founded on the activity of Christ.
Chapter 5 begins to positively plot a course past the problems in both Hauerwas and
Yoder by introducing the concept of gathering as central to any Christological
politics that takes seriously the call to discipleship, as well as the generous
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receptivity required of faithful evangelism and ecumenism. The chapter begins by
outlining a description of the community gathered around Christ from the writings of
Bernd Wannenwetsch and Gerhard Lohfink. Gathering becomes identifiable as a
metaphor that is simultaneously the call to exodus (and so openness to outsider,
exile, and stranger), and a critique (de-citification) of false gatherings (enslavement
to the powers). This chapter then draws on the work of William Cavanaugh to
examine globalization as a power that calls the citizens of the nations to exodus
without the possibility of gathering anywhere. Cavanaugh argues that the only
response to the sheer mobility of diaspora is the reclamation of particular locality—
the gathering of the church inaugurated and sustained in the gift of eucharist. This
chapter then responds to the brokenness of eucharistic communities as represented by
the Bridgefolk, an example that forces those gathered to remain humble. Finally, this
chapter ends with a brief exhortation to Hauerwas to temper his reading of the radical
democrats with insights on the importance of gathering that he makes in his
commentary on Matthew.
Chapter 6 moves beyond the question of the gathering's own constitution and self-
knowledge, by moving beyond the concept of gathering. Just as the concept of
ecclesial politics is redefined to mean gathering in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 explores
resources for redefining the love of the gathered as a participation in the activity of
God-whose-being-is-love. This is necessary in order to describe the church's love for
the world as a thing-itself, and to explain the temptation that Hauerwas' found in the
radical democracy of Stout, Wolin and Coles. The hope is to move Hauerwas and his
readers beyond a description of the gathered church as a politics of univocal love. In
order to do this the concept of pleonasm in Milbank and the doctrine of analogy in
Aquinas are applied to Marion's re-conceptualization of persons as constituted by
love, in order to describe God as more than the infinite lover whom we must imitate.
God is not an-infinite-self-which-loves, but is love itself. Moreover, human love is
only love in its God-likeness. Chapter 6 argues, with Giorgio Agamben, that the time
of the now is the time of the messianic. The parousia is now, but it is not, as for
Agamben, a dislocation, or an infinite division of person from primordially violent
politics, but a re-gathering of persons into a new politics-of-love. And that politics is
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only possible because the God who is love remains in us (the ecclesial polis), allows
for the loving of the world with, in and under His own activity. The Hauerwasian
ecclesiology then must be conceived of as not just theological, but also theurgic.
Gathering (and being gathered) is not just a way of reasoning about the politics of
love, but the active, pleonastic, creative, constitution of God in the world through
Spirit and sacrament. In short, the gathering is constituted by the sacraments, but also
constitutes a sacrament, despite itself, in and for the world.
Future scholarship will be required in order to explore a number of areas to which
this thesis only spoke briefly. The most necessary of which, in terms of Hauerwas'
scholarship, will be the critical evaluation of a recent joint venture between
Hauerwas and Coles (published after the initial submission of this thesis but the
arguments of which this thesis attempted to anticipate), titled: Christianity,
Democracy and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations Between a Radical Democrat
and a Christian. Whether or not Hauerwas is able to love Coles without giving in to
the temptation to reason that love, to do theology, will be essential for determining
the staying power of this thesis. Of secondary importance is the repair of the projects
of Milbank and O'Donovan that will involve encouraging each to secure for
ecclesiology, not just a theurgic account of divine remainder, but of the God-who-is-
love. If each were to adopt a definition of ecclesiology as gathering (whose existence
like that of its maker is constituted by being-in-communion), their writings would be
more likely to resist the temptations of efficacy embodied in the violent (God-less)
political arrangements of the world. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, further
time will need to be spent discussing, ad hoc, the practices of the church that have
historically, and pleonastically continue in the present, to mysteriously manifest the
ho nyn karios as para-ousia.
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